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# INTRODUCTION

*United Nations activity flourishes or declines in large part according to the political weather outside the Headquarters. During the period of this Review, the international climate was extremely variable. In early 1958 the world warmed with hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union might peacefully adjust their differences, in late 1958 and early 1959 it shivered beneath the icy winds of crisis blowing from Berlin, the Middle East, and the off-shore Chinese islands, and at the end of 1959 it experienced a new spring born in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland and christened the "spirit of Camp David."*

Both years were marked, moreover, not only by intense terrestrial competition between East and West, but also by new thrusts into outer space; and the hopes of the majority of the United Nations Members that states would use the heavens only for peaceful purposes flourished in the General Assembly hall even as the satellites themselves were rotating about the earth. The Soviet Union had actually opened the space age in the period just before this *Review* begins, for in October and November 1957, it had sent aloft the world's first artificial earth satellites, "Sputniks" I and II, and dramatized its feat even more by placing in the second one a canine passenger, a small Husky named Laika.

The United States was unable to launch a space vehicle until January 31, 1958, when Explorer I left its pad, to be followed in March and July by its orbital companions in the Explorer and Vanguard series. Meantime, in May the Russians sent off the 2900-pound Sputnik III. It was a giant compared to its forty-pound American cousins, although the American vehicles reportedly flew higher and carried more sophisticated instruments. In October 1958 a United States Pioneer rocket rose to a height of 71,300 miles, a record at the time, although short of the moon, which was its intended goal. And in December, the United States put into orbit a four-and-one-half-ton Atlas missile, its largest effort that year.

On the second day of 1959, the Soviet Union took the honor of first firing a rocket into a solar orbit (a feat which the United States duplicated in March); in September one Russian rocket actually hit the moon; and a month later another photographed the face of the moon not visible from the earth.

Trying to come to grips with practical and legal problems re-

lating to the peaceful uses of outer space, the United States and nineteen other delegations<sup>1</sup> proposed to the thirteenth Assembly in November 1958 that it create an *ad hoc* committee on the peaceful uses of outer space. The Assembly adopted the plan,<sup>2</sup> and the committee began work, but without the Soviet Union, which carried out its threat not to serve unless the Communist states had as many members as the non-Communist. Poland and Czechoslovakia, not surprisingly, also refused to serve and so did India and the United Arab Republic, whose delegates maintained that it was useless to discuss outer space unless the government with pre-eminence in the field attended. The remaining thirteen members<sup>3</sup> continued their work nonetheless, and in 1959 submitted the useful report discussed in this Review.<sup>4</sup>

In 1959 the Assembly, wishing to bring the Soviet Union into a new Permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, rejected a Western proposal to leave the Committee's membership unchanged, and instead elected to the enlarged body twelve Western-oriented states, seven Communist states (including Hungary), and five neutrals.<sup>5</sup> The Assembly asked its members who were so inclined to explore and use outer space only to better mankind, a principle to which both the U.S.S.R. and the United States gave their votes. The Assembly also asked the Committee to prepare for an international scientific meeting on outer space.

The Assembly had in mind a gathering similar to the second conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy convened in Geneva under United Nations auspices in September 1958 and attended by 4000 scientists from sixty-nine countries. The conferees unanimously agreed that their talks had been useful, and they also reported that before nuclear power becomes available for everyday use, they had a great deal more experimental work to do.<sup>6</sup>

Whatever the future may reveal about the atom, inter-governmental work went forward during this period under the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA has found itself having to com-

<sup>1</sup>Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>2</sup>Resolution 1338 (XIII), passed by a vote of 59-9-19.

<sup>3</sup>Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.

<sup>4</sup>See pages 54-57. The report is UN Doc. A/4141.

<sup>5</sup>The original Committee members were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R., U.A.R., U.K., and U.S.A. The six new members added in 1959 (Res. 1472 [XIV]) were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lebanon, and Romania.

<sup>6</sup>For the report of the Secretary-General on the Conference, see UN Doc. A/1949.

pete for resources and talent with the bilateral programs of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. But both the United States and the Soviet Union pledged during 1959 that they would exchange information with each other through the IAEA.<sup>7</sup> If the great powers had cooperated with IAEA more fully and sooner, it might have done far more useful practical work than it had by 1959. But even without this backing, IAEA was already an important source of published information on technical matters and frequently brought specialists together to exchange information. It sponsored one meeting in Warsaw in 1959 on industrial uses of radiation and another in Monaco on disposing of radioactive wastes. During the fiscal year 1959, moreover, the Agency convened eighteen meetings of experts in various specialties relating to atomic energy. It also moved to define and protect the legal rights of those injured while working with atomic materials, and was developing effective safeguards for handling fissionable materials and guarantees against nations' diverting nuclear materials to military use. Besides these important tasks, it was investigating radiation hazards.<sup>8</sup>

Other defenses against radiation were being constructed by the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. The General Assembly asked this group in 1959 to investigate the effects of ionizing radiation upon man and his environment.<sup>9</sup> The Committee had already presented the thirteenth Assembly with a comprehensive study of the effects of atomic radiation<sup>10</sup> and had proved its value in collecting and analyzing relevant data. It is a scientific body without operating or executive functions and besides reviewing radiation levels, it stimulates study and research. Thus, the group has suggested that the World Health Organization inquire more closely into radiation-induced diseases and human genetics, that the Food and Agriculture Organization look into the radioactive contamination of foods, and that the World Meteorological Organization investigate the effects of stratospheric fallout.<sup>11</sup> The Committee has also been keeping track of the increase in radioactive fallout from past nuclear tests.

World concern over these tests constituted one of the most important influences on the United Nations' work during 1958 and

<sup>7</sup>For the joint Eisenhower-Khrushchev communiqué, see *Department of State Bulletin* (DSB), XXXIX (October 12, 1959), 499-500.

<sup>8</sup>See pp. 52-54. For the IAEA Report, see IAEA Doc. GC (III) 74, 22 July 1959.

<sup>9</sup>Resolution 1376 (XIV). The committee members are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, U.S.S.R., U.A.R., U.K., U.S.A. See pp. 93 and 94 for discussion of the group's work.

<sup>10</sup>UN.GA. 13th OR., Suppl. No. 17.

<sup>11</sup>See UN Doc. A/4119.

1959. In March 1958 the Soviet Union took account of this concern and announced that it was suspending nuclear tests unilaterally and urged the West to follow suit. This momentous statement, the first by Mr. Khrushchev in his newly assumed role as Soviet Prime Minister, opened a new Communist campaign for "peace." The timing of the Russian gesture was particularly embarrassing to the West, for although the U.S.S.R. had just completed certain nuclear experiments in Siberia, the United States and Britain were just on the verge of conducting tests in the Pacific and in Australia.

The official American view was that to get other states to discontinue testing weapons, the U.S.S.R. would have to accept a disarmament "package" which would also stop nations from manufacturing nuclear weapons and start them reducing their nuclear stockpiles. The United States was not sure just how to respond to the Soviet initiative, however, because it lacked accurate scientific information on both the dangers of nuclear radiation released by atomic explosions and on the possibility of detecting the explosions themselves at a distance.

The General Assembly had in 1957 called for experts to investigate these technical matters,<sup>12</sup> as the Western powers had urged during disarmament discussions that year, and President Eisenhower revived the idea of a scientific appraisal in replying in April 1958 to Premier Khrushchev's proposed moratorium on tests. The President suggested that the atomic powers instruct their experts to explore the feasibility of detecting nuclear weapons tests and also to determine how best to guard against the danger of surprise attack. Much preliminary sparring took place as the two super-powers selected the states whose scientists should participate in the conference and argued over their terms of reference, for the Soviet Union again insisted on "parity." Ultimately, however, delegations from Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. met with American, British, Canadian, and French scientists at the European headquarters of the United Nations and worked there from July 1 to August 21, 1958.

To everyone's apparent surprise, the experts agreed that it was technically possible to establish workable and effective controls which would detect violators of a world-wide atomic test ban. States would, however, have to create about 165 control posts all over the world on land and sea and authorize air patrols and mobile inspection teams to range far and wide.<sup>13</sup> These conclusions acquired urgency later when the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation reported that nuclear weapons were a major source of harmful radiation.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Resolution 1148 (XII).

<sup>13</sup>See U.N. Doc. A/3897.

<sup>14</sup>UN.GA.131b. *ORs, Suppl. No. 17*



The experts' talks in Geneva having proved so fruitful, the United States then asked the Soviet Union and Great Britain to join it on October 31 in an effort to establish by treaty an international control system and an end to nuclear weapons tests. President Eisenhower said that the United States would moreover forego testing for a year after October 31 to allow the negotiators time to agree. Actually, the three atomic powers all conducted tests before the October 31 voluntary deadline and then settled down in Geneva to negotiate. The United Nations Members, as this *Review* shows (pages 68-111), all welcomed this seemingly hopeful development in the fall of 1958.

Another series of talks intended to dissipate the dangers of surprise attacks also began in Geneva on November 10. The delegates to these meetings were never even able to agree on an agenda and suspended work in December 1958 after thirty sessions held over a six-week period (see pages 95-104). Surprise attacks proved far more highly charged issues than nuclear tests, for in the background was a Soviet complaint to the Security Council that the United States was sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs towards the frontiers of other states and threatening their security.<sup>12</sup> (The U.S.S.R. referred to the flights by the American Strategic Air Command, designed by the United States to keep some planes in the air at all times and so forestall a modern Pearl Harbor type of attack.)

The United States countered this Soviet move by proposing that the Council establish an Arctic inspection zone, as the United States had already suggested in 1957 in the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee. The United States argued that if the U.S.S.R. had accepted this proposal earlier, it would have no reason now to fear American flights. The Soviet Union, however, chose to cast its eighty-third veto to defeat the American resolution, and then the Soviet Union's own resolution was defeated 9-1-1.

*It was not surprising therefore that the Soviet Union continued to insist that it was impossible to talk seriously about preventing surprise attacks until the United States discontinued its flights over Europe and the Arctic by planes carrying atomic devices. The West for its part, submitted technical papers on data useful in creating a control system which would protect states against long-range aircraft, ballistic missiles, and ground forces. Their plan envisaged elaborate checks on all military installations everywhere, while the Soviet plan for inspections placed more inspectors in the NATO countries than in the Warsaw Pact states and excluded from the plan crucial areas of interest to Western military strategists. The Soviet negotiators*

also coupled their scheme to a call for a one-third reduction of all armed forces in Europe and would have prohibited Germany to possess nuclear weapons or missiles.<sup>16</sup> With such diverse approaches, the prospects for the surprise attack talks were bleak from the outset.

But the discussions among British, American, and Soviet delegates on nuclear tests (see pages 104-11) continued into 1959.<sup>17</sup> The negotiators agreed in 1958 that it was desirable eventually to set up a seven-nation control commission headed by an administrator. The "Atomic Three" would be permanent members and would elect four others to serve in rotation. This hurdle past, the conferees had to face three issues in 1959: whether the control commission voting procedure would allow for a veto; whether the inspection teams would be permanent or created *ad hoc*; and what the nationality would be of the inspectors in the 180 control posts. The bargaining was detailed and further complicated by new scientific data indicating that it was more difficult than at first supposed to detect underground tests. By the end of 1959 the powers had nonetheless formulated seventeen treaty articles and a preamble. In the meantime, the self-imposed moratorium on atomic tests expired and was voluntarily extended by the United States at least until the end of 1959.

The talks on nuclear testing stand out as the principal steps taken in 1958 and 1959 towards disarmament. The Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, which had attempted to reach a "package" agreement on disarmament, last met in 1957. After that, the Soviet Union refused to participate in its work, arguing that it was not a sufficiently broad or representative organ.<sup>18</sup> Even after the Assembly enlarged the Commission to twenty-five members for 1958, the Soviet Union was not satisfied. And when the thirteenth Assembly further expanded the body to include the membership of the U.N. itself,<sup>19</sup> the hard negotiations were already going forward in the nuclear test talks. Then, on September 7, 1959, the Big Four Foreign Ministers agreed to set up a special ten-nation committee to explore in 1960 "avenues of possible progress" towards limiting and reducing armaments and armed forces under effective international control. This new committee was to consist of five NATO powers and five Warsaw

<sup>16</sup>See UN Doc. A/4078, Annexes 7, 8, 10, 11, and 15.

<sup>17</sup>January 5-March 19, April 13-May 13, June 2-August 25, and October 27-December 19.

<sup>18</sup>The Commission members through 1957 were the members of the Security Council (plus Canada when Canada was not a Council member). The Subcommittee consisted of Canada, France, the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. By Resolution 1150 (XII), the General Assembly expanded the Commission membership by adding fourteen other states: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>19</sup>Resolution 1252 (XIII).

Pact powers,<sup>20</sup> thus giving the Soviet Union the parity it had been seeking for two years.

The General Assembly continued in both 1958 and 1959 to examine the disarmament question on its own. The Soviet approach to the issue was to discontinue atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, to reduce the military budgets of the Big Four by ten to fifteen per cent, and to use the savings to assist the under-developed countries. But the Russians had no control system in their plan. The U.S.S.R. did not submit its proposal to a vote in the General Assembly, once the First Committee turned it down, 39-10-32. Then the Assembly turned down a fourteen-power African and Asian draft resolution urging an immediate end to testing.

The West, on the other hand, asked the Assembly to urge the Big Three to do all they could to agree on suspending nuclear tests with effective international control and urged also that they undertake no further tests while they were negotiating, two views which the Assembly accepted.<sup>21</sup> The Assembly also adopted a resolution expressing a hope that the Geneva conference would be successful.<sup>22</sup>

The fourteenth Assembly also considered two major proposals, one presented by the U.S.S.R. and the other by the United Kingdom. It will suffice here to indicate that the Western plan insisted on a control and inspection system from the outset in a world where there was little trust; while the Soviet Union insisted that trust had to arise from disarmament and only afterwards could states establish effective controls.<sup>23</sup> The Assembly did not attempt to choose between the two plans; it just passed the record of its deliberations on to the Disarmament Commission and the Ten Nation Committee.

As their comments in the *Review* show, the United Nations Members are very much disturbed by their inability to break into the perennial cycle of political tensions and armament. Most of them agree that some political *détente* must precede attempts to disarm, but all of them want the nuclear powers to continue conferring on the slim chance that they might trip upon some direct first step towards disarmament which itself could help reduce tensions. The technical complexities of the problems clearly puzzle some of the delegates as much as they do laymen, and many deplore the lack of progress in arms control since 1945. A few have gone as far as to remind their colleagues of the fate of the League of Nations once its disarma-

<sup>20</sup>Canada, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States; Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. See DSB, XXXIX (September 28, 1959), 438-39.

<sup>21</sup>Resolution 1252 A.

<sup>22</sup>Resolution 1252 V, proposed by Austria, Japan, and Sweden.

<sup>23</sup>For the Soviet plans see GA. ORG. 14th. Annexes, Agenda Item 70 and comments by Vasily Kuznetsov in Committee I. For the Western proposals, see UN Doc. A/C.1/820. See also Resolution 1373 (XIV).

ment efforts failed. As one delegate put it, the Members are in danger merely of "deserting the humanely barbarous for the ghastly barbarous."<sup>24</sup> Some delegates, moreover, were greatly distressed by the Big Three Foreign Ministers' desire to move outside the United Nations to talk about disarmament, although others have acquiesced willingly in this procedure, believing that the discussions themselves were too crucial to worry whether they occurred inside or outside the U.N.

When states move away from the United Nations to solve their problems, however, they inevitably cast some doubt on the value of the United Nations as a forum for reaching agreement, and both the Secretary-General and the delegates have pondered the problem. India<sup>25</sup> in particular pointed out that existing tendencies to push matters to a vote in United Nations meetings were no substitute for continuing talks and ultimate agreement. The Secretary-General and many delegates too, have also reminded the world that it would be dangerous to allow U.N. meetings to become merely propaganda forums where the contenders tried most of all to score points.<sup>26</sup>

Despite these appeals and warnings, however, both East and West showed no disposition in discussing the crucial questions that divided them to deny themselves propaganda advantages, and both sides seemed to press for votes on their own resolutions rather than for agreements.

Negotiations and propaganda were not, of course, confined in these two years exclusively to questions of arms and atoms. Political problems, especially in the border lands around the Mediterranean Sea and in the Far East, continued to occupy the attention of delegates at the United Nations.

On some questions, there was hardly any possibility of the United Nations' helping negotiations. Assembly debates on Hungary,<sup>27</sup> whose government had still not permitted U.N. Special Representative Sir Leslie Munro onto its territory, were necessarily circumscribed. Sir Leslie could only report at the end of 1959 that the United Nations' objectives had not been realized: foreign armed forces remained in Hungary; repression continued, as did unjustified trials and executions (the most noteworthy having been the execution, contrary to pledges given by the Hungarian Government, of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter). In both years under review, the Assembly deplored the failure of Hungary and the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United Nations or to cease the practices which had so offended the

<sup>24</sup>See p. 81.

<sup>25</sup>See p. 76.

<sup>26</sup>See pp. 33-50 and 113-23.

<sup>27</sup>See pp. 123-24.

majority of Members. The Assembly urged Sir Leslie to continue his efforts, the Special Committee on Hungary having been discharged in 1958.

Regarding Korea, too, the United Nations could only reaffirm in both 1958 and 1959 its hope that the Communists would help it establish a united, independent, and democratic state under a representative form of government and restore international peace and security there. In Korea itself the U.N. Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea continued its work, the U.N. Command accused the Communists of having violated the armistice no fewer than 218 times in the year beginning September 1958, and 2147 U.N. prisoners of war still remained unaccounted for.

The Assembly condemned the Communists again in 1959 when it called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and their distinctive cultural and religious life in accordance with the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>22</sup> Both Ireland and the Federation of Malaya had brought the matter to the Assembly because they were convinced that the People's Government of [Communist] China was destroying the Tibetan heritage. They recalled that in March the Dalai Lama fled to India to escape Chinese troops sent to his country to put down tribal revolts against Communist reforms there. The Assembly vote (49-9-26) showed many abstentions, largely reflecting support for India's position that the United Nations could not usefully pass a resolution affecting an area which since 1950 had been under the suzerainty of a power not even a Member.

The United Nations passed no resolutions on Algeria in either 1958 or 1959 because the Assembly seemed disposed to wait to see what French President DeGaulle, who had come to power in 1958 and who in September 1959 had pledged self-determination to Algerians, might do on his own. Nor did it act on the threat to Germany posed by Khrushchev's announced intention in November 1958 to end the Four-Power occupation of Berlin within six months. The Berlin and German peace treaties do not fall within the United Nations' jurisdiction, under Article 107 of the Charter, although a threat to the peace in that area would ultimately come before the U.N., and Mr. Hammarskjöld showed himself ready to have the U.N. contend with the issue if states believed U.N. action could at any point be helpful.<sup>23</sup>

The U.N. had nothing to say, either, about Kashmir. Pakistan's complaints (pages 124-25) stand therefore as something of an indictment of the organization. But here, as elsewhere, Dr. Frank P.

<sup>22</sup>Resolution 1353 (XIV).

<sup>23</sup>See p. 118.

Graham, U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan, was still standing by to abet a settlement when one was desired, and though the situation remained stagnant, the calm was preferable to the storm which was its alternative.<sup>30</sup>

For different reasons, the Cyprus question disappeared from the United Nations' purview in 1959. The Assembly had encouraged Britain, Greece, and Turkey to settle their differences peacefully under the principles of the Charter,<sup>31</sup> and such a settlement was reached in February 1959. The treaty owed much to the diligent efforts of an international civil servant who had done a great deal to bring the parties together, the Secretary-General of NATO, M. Paul-Henri Spaak.

Mr. Hammarskjöld, playing a similar role in the United Nations, emerged in 1958 and 1959 as a major conciliator. The Assembly relied upon him in 1958 to arrange first to get observers into Lebanon, and next to get foreign forces out of both Lebanon and Jordan after the United States and the United Kingdom had moved their troops in.<sup>32</sup> Disorders had broken out inside Lebanon in May, and in June, Lebanon and Iraq charged in the Security Council that President Nasser of the United Arab Republic was trying to subvert the Lebanese Government and bring the country under his influence. The Council decided to dispatch an observation group to Lebanon, but, unable to cope with the practical details, it left the Secretary-General to improvise the machinery. He decided upon the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), drew the nucleus for it from the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, and went himself to Lebanon to inaugurate it.

UNOGIL was unable to gain access to the rebel-controlled areas, and Lebanon thought that it was as a consequence failing to see the infiltration of troops allegedly coming from Syria. Suddenly, Iraq on July 14 found itself in the throes of a military coup favoring Nasser's supporters. The revolution had hardly taken place, when President Chamoun of Lebanon requested President Eisenhower to send troops to Lebanon, which he did. Britain then moved forces into Jordan. Both western governments, acting under Article 51 of the Charter, reported their willingness to withdraw as soon as the United Nations could establish order. Soviet vetoes, however, prevented the Security Council from deciding in eleven meetings between July 15 and 22 either to send a U.N. force to Lebanon or to ask the Secretary-General to take such steps as might be necessary in the

<sup>30</sup>Dr. Graham submitted a report (S/3984) in March 1958 setting out five recommendations aimed at getting India and Pakistan to resume direct negotiations. India, however, found the report unacceptable.

<sup>31</sup>Resolution 1287 (XIII).

<sup>32</sup>See pp. 130-59.

crisis. And resolutions asking Britain and the United States to withdraw "immediately" and also suspending UNOGIL did not receive sufficient votes to pass. Mr. Hammarskjöld announced that he would nonetheless do what he could to keep the situation from deteriorating further (see page 33).

The Soviet Government called for a summit meeting to discuss the Middle East crisis, but just as Prime Minister Macmillan's suggestion, that the heads of Government meet as delegates to a special session of the Security Council (under Article 28/2) gained favor, the U.S.S.R. abandoned the idea — possibly under pressure from Mao Tse-Tung. Mr. Khrushchev now revived an earlier American suggestion for a third emergency session of the Assembly, which duly convened on August 7. Largely because the Arab states themselves preferred unity to living under the threat of more outside intervention, they joined in sponsoring a resolution, which the Assembly adopted unanimously. It asked the Secretary-General to make "practical arrangements" under the Charter in regard to Lebanon and Jordan and also to make it possible for Britain and the United States to withdraw their troops from the two countries.<sup>33</sup>

Armed only with this vague proviso, the Secretary-General then visited the Middle East to establish a United Nations "presence" there as a substitute for the western troops. And, ultimately, he recommended that UNOGIL continue to facilitate the withdrawal of American troops and that a special United Nations agent (Pier P. Spinelli, Under-Secretary in charge of the European Headquarters of the U.N.), should represent the Secretary-General in Jordan. He also reported that the U.A.R. and Iraq would end their oil embargo against Jordan when the British troops left in October. These plans proved quite acceptable to the General Assembly, and with the withdrawal of western troops, the United Nations representative remained to keep a wary eye on the ever-explosive region.

Elsewhere in the Middle East the United Nations continued many useful services. The principal U.N. presence continued to be the United Nations Emergency Force, which since 1956 has helped maintain order in Palestine. From August 1958 to September 1959, 137 incidents occurred along the lines the Force was holding, but none was permitted to get out of hand. During this period, the Force numbered over 5000, which proved adequate for its tasks. A new commander, Major General P.S. Gyani of India, succeeded General E.L.M. Burns of Canada in December 1959. Finding the funds to pay UNEF posed problems, however, for the Secretary-General (see pages 61 and 64).

<sup>33</sup>Resolution 1237 (ES-III).

Despite the United Nations' interest in the area,<sup>34</sup> complaints of border violations by either Israel or one of the neighboring Arab states came before the Security Council in January, February, and December 1958, and in January 1959. The Council urged Israel and the Arabs from time to time to use the facilities available to them in the Mixed Armistice Commissions and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and adjudicated, circumscribed, or settled several specific issues.

The Suez problem, though out of the headlines during 1958 and 1959, still occupied the attention of the United Nations system. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1958 helped arrange compensation for the former owners of the Canal, and in 1959 advanced funds to widen and improve it. But the U.N. was still unable to guarantee to Israel free passage through the Canal, which the Egyptian operators interrupted from time to time. U.N. forces at Sharm el-Sheikh did help, however, to give Israel an alternative trade route through the Gulf of Aqaba to the port of Elath.

If United Nations' problems in the Middle East were complex and varied, so were those of the Far East. There the tension in 1958 arose from the renewed Communist Chinese offensive against Quemoy and Matsu in August, which led the United States to help the Nationalists run an artillery blockade against Quemoy in September. The matter did not come before the United Nations, except in so far as it may have influenced Members to continue to exclude from the agenda of the United Nations a debate on Chinese Communist membership in the organization.<sup>35</sup>

A more satisfactory development was the success of the Secretary-General in 1959 in settling a dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, whose relations had deteriorated steadily since 1953 after a dispute over border territory accommodating a temple. The Secretary-General, practicing what he later termed "active preventive diplomacy,"<sup>36</sup> notified the Security Council in December 1958 that the two governments had invited him to send a representative to help them solve their difficulties. Without waiting for Council approval (but having provided the Council with a chance to object), Mr. Hammarskjöld, in an unprecedented move, designated Ambassador John Beck-Friis (Sweden) to carry out a conciliation mission in January and February 1959. Beck-Friis helped arrange for the two sides to release each other's nationals and to cooperate in restoring calm in the area, and the two states renewed normal relations.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup>See pp. 159-62.

<sup>35</sup>See pp. 161-75, 119.

<sup>36</sup>See p. 122.

<sup>37</sup>See pp. 122, 196, 201.



Another crisis for the U.N. was posed in the summer of 1959 in Laos where revolt was supported and possibly instigated from North Vietnam.<sup>38</sup> The rebels supported the Communist-led Pathet Lao party, which had been excluded from the Laotian Government. On September 4, 1959, the Government charged by telegram that North Vietnam had committed "flagrant aggression" against it and asked the United Nations for an "emergency force" to stop the aggression and to keep it from spreading. Instead, the Security Council dispatched a subcommittee<sup>39</sup> to investigate the matter. The U.S.S.R. had cast what it intended as a veto of this decision, but the Council ignored this negative vote when Council President Egidio Ortona (Italy) ruled (and the Council did not overrule him) that setting up the subcommittee was a "procedural" matter under Article 29 rather than a "substantive" one under Chapter VI of the Charter.<sup>40</sup> The U.S.S.R. insisted (pages 127-28) that this decision was quite contrary to usual practice in the Council and contrary to the Charter itself.

Despite these doubts cast upon its origins, the subcommittee visited Laos in September and October, and indicated in its report<sup>41</sup> that military action against Lao army posts and units had taken place, that the actions seemed to have been coordinated centrally, and that witnesses almost unanimously held that outside support must have come from North Vietnam; but that none of these charges could be proved. The Secretary-General himself visited Laos by invitation in November 1959 and on his own initiative requested the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe (Mr. Sakari Tuomioja) to review the country's economic situation with an eye particularly on how U.N. economic and technical assistance might further the nation's growth and stability. In this way Mr. Hammarskjöld kept the matter before the U.N., helped ameliorate the situation, and made the U.N. presence felt in the Southeast Asian area.

In addition to these political problems, readers will find reflected in this *Review* delegates' opinions about many organizational questions. The pressure of the rising membership in 1958 and 1959 manifested itself in repeated comments on the inadequacy of United Nations' organs at present properly to include the increasing numbers of Asians and Africans who are now Members. Moreover, many dele-

<sup>38</sup>See pages 125-30.

<sup>39</sup>Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Tunisia.

<sup>40</sup>See *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946-1951* (New York: United Nations, 1954), pp. 154-65, for a discussion of this highly technical issue. See also Alexander W. Rudzinski, "The So-Called Double Veto," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXV (July 1951), 443-61.

<sup>41</sup>S/4236.

gates were concerned lest the growing attachment to blocs obliterate concern among the nations for a global point of view.<sup>42</sup> Bloc warfare was visible in the competition for places on the Security Council,<sup>43</sup> in the perennial discussion of the People's Republic of China,<sup>44</sup> and in the debate on the role Non-Governmental Organizations should have in the deliberations of the Economic and Social Council.<sup>45</sup>

Quite clearly, the small states, whatever their political proclivities, appreciated the opening general debate in the General Assembly for the opportunity it provided them to express their opinions and concern about international problems other states normally do not ask them about,<sup>46</sup> but there were continuing misgivings about the inactivity of the Security Council. Mr. Hammarskjöld, by urging the Council members to meet and discuss general as well as specific problems, had suggested ways in which the Security Council could contribute more to world peace (page 203), but there was no rush to adopt his suggestion. On the voting procedures in the Council, the United States continued to press to remove the veto from procedural questions, but it stood firm with the U.S.S.R. about the veto's importance in matters involving force.<sup>47</sup>

In administrative and financial affairs, the United Nations has found ways at last of fitting into the calendar in some rational fashion the proliferating meetings of international agencies, although shortage of space and funds still loom as major difficulties.<sup>48</sup> The old problem remains of getting the delegates to scale down the demands they make on the United Nations to the level of the activities they wish to pay for.<sup>49</sup> The Secretary-General has found himself short of cash on several occasions, as he indicates (page 218), not only because some states have refused to meet certain commitments, but because others are slow in making funds available. As noted above, this problem has arisen particularly in connection with the UNEF because the Soviet Union and the Arab states have consistently refused to help finance it. They argue that Britain, France, and Israel, whose invasion of Egypt created the need for the Force, were wholly responsible for the expense and should bear the annual cost of \$20

<sup>42</sup>See pp. 166-68.

<sup>43</sup>See p. 166 for references to the battle between Turkey and Poland which ran through 52 General Assembly ballots and was settled only by permitting the two countries at long last to split the term.

<sup>44</sup>P. 168-75.

<sup>45</sup>Pp. 190-92.

<sup>46</sup>See, for instance, the comments by Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, and India, pp. 180-82.

<sup>47</sup>See pp. 213-14.

<sup>48</sup>See pp. 217-23.

<sup>49</sup>See, for instance, the comments by Pakistan and the Sudan, p. 221.

million themselves. The Latin American states have argued for placing the principal financial burden on the permanent members of the Security Council to whom the Charter gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. For these and other reasons, 1957 and 1958 assessments had been paid by fewer than half of the states by the time the fourteenth Assembly met in 1959.<sup>50</sup> Many of these attitudes are set forth in considerable detail in the *Review*.<sup>51</sup>

States in general still seem to find financing the United Nations onerous, even though the comparisons between their contributions and other items in their national budgets is ludicrous.<sup>52</sup> But niggardly though the states are, the attention their delegates give, for instance, to such matters as information centers in the trust territories, the geographical distribution of personnel, and documentation, all of which are mentioned in Chapter V, is impressive.

Reviewing 1958 and 1959 as a whole, one cannot but marvel at the variety of services the United Nations, with all its imperfections, has rendered in the international political life of the world. Economic, trusteeship, and legal developments, which do not form part of this *Review*,<sup>53</sup> should not, of course, be lost sight of. But surely the most significant development of these two years was the emergence of the Secretary-General, who began his second five-year term in 1958, as an independent force in international politics. No one was more aware than he of the delicacy of his position, as his comments in this *Review* clearly indicate,<sup>54</sup> but to his initiative and creative diplomacy in the Middle and Far East, the world in this period owed much. In Lebanon, and in Cambodia and Thailand, directly, and to Kashmir, Jordan, and Hungary, through his representatives, he has extended the influence of the United Nations wherever states might wish to settle their differences within the framework of the Charter. And where they were not prepared to use the facilities he had to offer (as in the Berlin issue), he made it clear that theirs was the choice to make.

Critical decisions affecting all our futures were still largely in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, but even these super powers agreed with the Secretary-General that they were not immune to the influence of the majority of the Members.<sup>55</sup> The

<sup>50</sup>UN.GA. 14th. *ORs. Suppl.* No. 1, p. 10.

<sup>51</sup>See pp. 61, 64.

<sup>52</sup>See, for instance, the remarks of Cuba (pp. 219-20) on the difficulties of paying the rising costs of international organization and the comments by the United States about reducing its proportion of costs (pp. 222-23).

<sup>53</sup>The 1957 *Review* dealt primarily with economic and social matters.

<sup>54</sup>See, for instance, 192-203.

<sup>55</sup>See pp. 119-20, 158, 163, 233-34.

United Nations was certainly not the decisive factor in world politics that many of the founders had hoped for in 1945 (and many delegates expressed their regrets at the gap between expectation and reality<sup>46</sup>), but wherever states were in fact moved to act in terms of the United Nations Charter, the organization was proving adequate to their desires.

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<sup>46</sup>See pp. 22-30.

## NOTE

In compiling the material for this *Review*, we have sometimes had to work from preliminary documents, which in large part accounts for the diverse form of citations used in the preceding pages. We have used the following symbols and abbreviations frequently:

A/	{General} Assembly
Doc.	Document
DSB	<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>
E/	Economic and Social Council document
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
mtg.	meeting
ORt.	<i>Official Records</i>
p., pp.	page, pages
PV	verbatim record ( <i>procès verbaux</i> )
Res.	Resolution
S/	Security Council document
SC	Security Council
Suppl.	Supplement
TC	Trusteeship Council
UN	United Nations

We should also like to acknowledge here the assistance of Miss Brenda Brimmer and Mr. Linwood Wall, custodians of the United Nations Documents Collection at New York University, who have graciously given us much of their expert help.

W.C.  
T.H., Jr.  
R.N.S.

## Chapter 1. UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

### *Introduction*

In evaluating the United Nations' work during 1958 and 1959, all the Members agreed that its performance still fell short of its high ideals; they disagreed on how close it was to its goals and where the responsibility lay for its shortcomings. The faults which the Members decried varied according to national interests. Some, like Australia, took a very conservative view not only of the United Nations' successes but also of its prospects, and they stressed the value of regional organizations. Other states, like Iran, pressed either by East or West, or both, and fearing outside intervention, complained particularly about these same regional substitutes for the international collective security arrangements contemplated in Article 51. And Communist states, like Romania, iterated the familiar Soviet complaint that the United Nations was in danger of becoming a "tool" of the West.

At the same time that the states expressed their diverse misgivings, they all pledged their devotion to the United Nations and its purposes, and asserted a common determination to make the U.N. succeed.

Even the United States and the Soviet Union, while blaming each other for creating tensions, agreed during these years that the United Nations was useful in or out of a cold war. Clearly, both super-states took unremitting advantage of the propaganda opportunities that the United Nations' "parliamentary diplomacy" affords. But both Russian and American diplomats also indicated that they, like their colleagues, still valued the unique opportunities in the United Nations not just for public, but for private, diplomacy, even between near-belligerents. All the states demonstrated, moreover, that no matter how many times they might meet outside the organization, they still appreciated the value of having the United Nations always available.

The Secretary-General's perceptive speeches on the United Nations as an instrument of diplomacy show that he assesses the Secretariat's usefulness quite realistically. His remarks also testify eloquently that the Organization has shown itself extremely adaptable to the wide-ranging purposes of the Members.

## General Evaluation

UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958

I think that it may be true to say that the United Nations is so far our best experiment in the direction of applied democracy in international life. It is an experiment because we are just trying out how best to work for the purposes. It is an experiment because the forms are still not quite settled, and we may hesitate concerning rather fundamental facts which in other Constitutions are regarded as settled. We are venturing into a new field, and in a new field new solutions must as a matter of course be found.

—Speech to U.N. Association, London. Notes for Correspondents, No. 1773, pp. 8-9.

UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958

. . . We should recognize the United Nations for what it is—an admittedly imperfect but indispensable instrument of nations in working for a peaceful evolution toward a more just and secure world order. At this stage of human history, world organization has become necessary. The forces at work have also set the limits within which the power of world organization can develop at each step and beyond which progress, when the balance of forces so permits, will be possible only by processes of organic growth in the system of custom and law prevailing in the society of nations.

. . . the United Nations is not a new idea. It is here because of centuries of past struggle. It is the logical and natural development from lines of thought and aspiration going far back into all corners of the earth since a few men first began to think about the decency and dignity of other men.

Now the lines between national and international policy have begun to blur. What is in the national interest, when truly seen, merges naturally into the international interest.

—Speech to Parliament, London. *Today's World and the U.N. Four Addresses . . .*, U.N. Office of Public Information, pp. 3, 9.

ARGENTINA (Florit) September 19, 1958

3. The United Nations genuinely represents one of the most far-reaching ventures ever undertaken by man. It is a noble attempt to unite the international community through the rule of law and to give practical effect to that universal morality which we all desire, as being the only means whereby peaceful relationships can be established between all the peoples of the earth. But the high hopes which we place in the United Nations do not, of course, allow us to forget the extreme gravity of the problems which today darken the world scene and jeopardize the destiny of the civilization shared by all peoples here represented.

4. The existence of two powerful blocs around which vast numbers of the population of the world are grouped is an undeniable fact. And it is also a fact that the ceaseless interplay of power and national interests gives rise, within the restricted areas which it affects, to constant and ever-recurring disputes which bring mankind to the brink of chaotic and unpredictable situations. By a curious paradox of history, that very progress which, with unparalleled and ever-increasing speed, has opened up new horizons of spiritual wealth and material to mankind can destroy all its work in a single instant. Thus the full realization of the freedom which this progress has created can easily annihilate the rich universe which has been won.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 751 mtg.)

**AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 25, 1958**

2. . . . People everywhere are oppressed by the danger of world war. This situation is a tragic commentary on the efforts of the United Nations over the past thirteen years. (Same, 759 mtg.)

**BURMA (Tun Aung) September 29, 1959**

143. The United Nations has its shortcomings and its limitations, but it must be admitted that it has successfully steered the world through one crisis after another and prevented a major clash between the two camps armed with frightful weapons of destruction which can be brought into action at a moment's notice. If the United Nations cannot give us genuine peace, it has succeeded in saving us from the scourge of war. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 248)

**CAMBODIA (Son Sann) September 17, 1959**

112. The United Nations now exercises a sure influence on the international scene, and it is in our Organization that men of goodwill place all their hopes for the building of a better future. There has been some progress in this direction, and it can be said that in spite of some unavoidable fumbling and occasional set-backs, the United Nations has done valuable work. (Same, pp. 28-29)

**CHILE (Gutierrez) October 1, 1959**

. . . The Organization set up in San Francisco, when war was still a fact, has not fully realized the hopes placed in it, but gradually we have been able to include in its composition many countries which, while their behaviour at times is not palatable, nevertheless strengthens the present and will further strengthen the future.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, pp. 78-80)

**CHINA (Tsiang) August 18, 1958**

15. In an ideal world with an ideal United Nations Lebanon and Jordan might have found their appeals to the Security Council sufficient without exercising their right of collective self-defence under Article 51

of the Charter. Likewise, under ideal conditions, the United States of America and the United Kingdom might have contented themselves with action in the Security Council, without sending military assistance to Lebanon and Jordan. Unfortunately, we must face the world as it is, and we must evaluate the United Nations as it actually is today. No nation at the present moment can rely solely and entirely on the United Nations for self-preservation, and no nation under present-day conditions can forget the right of collective self-defence.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORr. 738 mtg.)

#### ETHIOPIA (Deressa) September 24, 1958

81. Through its courageous actions in the special sessions of 1956 and 1958 the United Nations has grown in stature and in ability to cope with crises. This, of course, is due not only to the resolute attitudes adopted by various delegations but also to the equally courageous spirit and intelligence which have guided and inspired our distinguished Secretary-General.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORr. 756 mtg.)

#### GHANA (Ako-Adjei) September 24, 1959

8. The United Nations is an effective and useful instrument for promoting peace and mutual understanding between nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORr., p. 161)

#### HUNGARY (Sik) October 5, 1959

We can say without exaggeration that the United Nations is at the crossroads. The international situation and the disarmament proposal on our agenda give the General Assembly a chance to steer the ship of mankind towards peace and security and thus to fulfill the great hopes pinned to it. At the same time, any possible attempts to receive the cold war and the policy of strength will reopen the previous manoeuvres and may turn the United Nations into a new source of the cold war. In the full sense of the words, it is in the common interest of both socialist and capitalist countries, of both small and big Powers, that the present session of the General Assembly strengthen, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the spirit of peaceful coexistence.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 820, p. 77)

#### INDONESIA (Sastroamidjojo) September 30, 1959

5. In contrast to the giant strides made in the scientific and technological fields, we continue to move with pygmy steps in the field of international relations. For the past decade and a half, our dreams of a better, more peaceful and secure world have remained mired in the frozen wastes of the "cold war." Though we reach for the stars, we remain the victims of our own fears and suspicions. Even the acclaim for man's ingenuity in mastering the elements is sheathed in an atmosphere of alarm and apprehension.



7. The creation of the United Nations was an act of faith. It was the solemn affirmation that from the rubble of war would arise a new social order based on justice and equality. From bitter experience was born the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. In the Charter of the United Nations are enshrined the aspirations and ideals of mankind.

8. Yet, as has so often been said, this international Organization can be no more than the sum of the individual Member States. Inevitably it is cast in the image of world conditions. It is the centre for harmonizing the actions of nations, but reflects at the same time the existing disharmony.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 273)

IRAN (Hekmat) September 19, 1958

118. . . . We appreciate the great achievements already made by the United Nations in limiting armed conflict. However, we cannot but recognize inadequacies in its machinery for achieving some of its main purposes as set forth in the Charter. The establishment of an international force to meet the threat of armed aggression, as prescribed by the Charter, has not so far been possible due to the lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council. In consequence, the provision of the Charter calling for collective security has not been actuated. We retain the hope that, with the relaxation of tensions resulting from the sincere efforts made to restore confidence, difficulties in the way of the creation of such an international force will be overcome.

119. In the meantime, however, certain Member nations have tried to supplement this unfortunate gap by setting up defence alliances in line with Article 51 of the Charter. The ideal, of course, would have been the establishment of a United Nations collective security system to enforce peace whenever and wherever the need arose.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 751 mtg.)

IRELAND (Aiken) September 19, 1958

97. It would be quite wrong to assign all the blame for the troubles of the world to governments of the present day. These governments, particularly the Governments of the major Powers, were bequeathed grave difficulties, frightening responsibilities and dangerous antagonisms; the heritage of the chaos and terror of two world wars. It is not surprising that the aftermath of the Second World War has been a period marked by fear, resentment and suspicion. In such a climate it is not easy to bring about even limited agreements between contesting groups. Yet a number of such agreements have been achieved, and offer the best hope of future advance in international understanding. I need only mention among the more recent of such achievements the agreement

which led to the evacuation and neutrality of Austria; those which made possible the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon; the cultural and technical exchanges between the major Powers; and the scientific co-operation between different groups of Powers during the International Geophysical Year, 1957-1958. Each agreement, each act of international co-operation, does something to clear from the atmosphere the poisonous accumulations of earlier conflicts and thereby to render a new conflict less likely.

98. It should be noted too that, despite so much publicized contention on the highest levels, the many organs of these United Nations are working quietly on the acute problems that confront humanity in these days of revolutionary technological and political change. The great Powers are in closer diplomatic contact here in this building and elsewhere than they have been for years. (Same)

#### ISRAEL (Meir) September 24, 1959

91. . . . The attempt to thrash out problems in discussion and not by force, the interchange on every level of views and opinions, the opening of the doors to normal intercourse between peoples—all these are a welcome advance towards mutual understanding, giving renewed cause for hope. This is a field in which the United Nations has a major role to play. With all its imperfections, our Organization seeks to give expression to humanity's longing for a world at peace.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 153)

#### ITALY (Piccioni) September 25, 1958

9. Fortunately, a widespread reluctance openly and formally to violate the principles of the Charter is becoming more and more evident.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 758 mtg.)

#### JAPAN (Fujiyama) September 17, 1959

138. While noting the accomplishments of the United Nations, we must also recognize the fact that the Organization has been prevented from fully exercising the functions originally intended for it because of the limitations imposed upon it by the international situation—the East-West conflict. We must admit also that on occasion there has been a tendency for the United Nations to be utilized as a forum for selfish propaganda and fruitless academic discussion.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 18)

#### JORDAN (Rifa'i) September 23, 1959

83. The fourteen years following the establishment of this great Organization have provided the family of nations with the most effective forum for their meetings, consultations and discussions.

(Same, p. 133)

**NEW ZEALAND (Nash) October 3, 1958**

46. The variety of activities encompassed within the United Nations is without parallel in the modern world. The Organization alone provides a forum for the discussion and resolution of political problems. It assists the study of economic and social difficulties affecting particular areas of the world. It provides aid in almost every field of human endeavour. It offers the means of realizing the ideals proclaimed by Abraham Lincoln of the equality, the worth and the essential dignity of all men. Through the United Nations, we can best achieve the hope enshrined in the words of the Atlantic Charter that "all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 770 mtg.)

**NORWAY (Lange) September 30, 1958**

70. To sum up, in three of the most important fields of United Nations activity—namely, mediation and conciliation, disarmament, and economic development—the last year has seen encouraging progress, which gives grounds to hope for further constructive results in the years to come.

(Same, 765 mtg.)

**PAKISTAN (Prince Aly Khan) October 3, 1958**

72. As the great "centre for harmonizing the actions of nations", this Organization is also the focal point for the achievement of world unity. The importance of this objective in terms of peace, security and the welfare of the human race cannot possibly be exaggerated, particularly now that we are opening new horizons of outer space.

. . . . .

102. Turning now to the problem of tensions among the great Powers, it must be admitted that the United Nations has thus far failed to alleviate these tensions to any very substantial degree. It would certainly be a gross exaggeration to claim that in this respect our Organization has been "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations".

(Same, 769 mtg.)

**PERU (Belaunde) August 19, 1958**

61. . . . The United Nations was founded on the assumption that complete harmony and co-operation would prevail among the great Powers. Unfortunately, the signatures on the Charter were not yet dry when this assumption was gravely undermined. And yet, in spite of that, a true miracle has occurred. The United Nations has performed its function. In the atmosphere of faith in justice and peace which it created, war ravaged Europe has, with the generous help of the United States and through its own efforts, achieved a remarkable recovery. Greece and Turkey have revived, and in this same atmosphere of hope we have witnessed the splendid recovery of Germany, Italy and Japan.

62. In spite of the disagreement among the great Powers, the United

Nations—and this is a truly extraordinary fact in the history of mankind—has surmounted such grave crises as the Berlin blockade, Korea and Suez. Before that, it solved the seemingly insoluble problem which attended its creation: that of achieving universality, which was absolutely necessary if we were to speak with complete authority and in the name of all mankind.

78. Spheres of influence or dependence are a thing of the past. The United Nations is simply a juridical institution based on complete equality. It has, as its history and actions reveal, treated large and small countries as equal. . . . In the missions so successfully undertaken by the Secretary-General, the United Nations has carefully respected that principle. For each action, the full consent of the countries concerned was sought. (UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs. 741 mtg.)

PERU (Belaunde) September 15, 1959

28. The United Nations has dealt with the gravest problems and day by day has been asserting its moral authority and prestige throughout the world. No one can deny that today the fundamental provisions of the Charter are being complied with. We have proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; we have established peace in Korea; sound solutions have been found for problems that seemed insoluble; an effective international emergency force has been brought into being which is respected, not for its material power, but because it embodies the authority of the United Nations. After many years of effort, thanks to a display of mutual understanding that does credit to all, we are achieving, in the spirit of the Charter, the universality which is essential if the Charter's purposes are to be fulfilled.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 3)

PORTUGAL (Garin) October 5, 1959

As the years go by, and in spite of the trying tests of international disharmony, the United Nations has played a most influential part in the life of mankind. Even though it often is misused as a propaganda stage for the selfish interests of some Governments, its stature as a world forum, as a kind of rallying point of the community of nations, has grown steadily, and its accomplishments in helping to safeguard world peace in more than one instance are the more praiseworthy and gratifying because the United Nations has had to overcome many difficulties placed in its path.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 821, pp. 38-40)

ROMANIA (Brucan) September 24, 1959

37. . . . One cannot fail to observe that the Western Powers have endeavoured and are endeavouring even now to use the United Nations

as an instrument of their policies, to subordinate this wide international organization to their own narrow interests, to create within it a feeling of hostility which makes co-operation among Member States almost impossible.

38. The facts show that this wilful effort is exerted along the following lines: First, the endeavour to have the principles of the Charter identified with the so-called Western outlook; in other words, to force a unilateral interpretation of those principles upon the Organization as a whole. Secondly, discrimination against a number of States either because of their belonging to the Socialist system, or because of their refusal to participate in Western military alliances. Thirdly, the forcing through of resolutions which reflect exclusively the interests of the Western Powers. Lastly, the confusing of the sphere of internal affairs of States with that of international relations, with a view to using the United Nations as a machinery for furthering the political, economic or military aims of the Western Powers throughout the world, as a machinery directed against the anti-colonial movement of nations, against the drive of peoples for progress and social justice, as well as against the regimes chosen by the peoples of Member States.

39. In practice, those activities are carried on either by unilateral interpretations of the Charter or by violation of the rules of procedure, and, within the Security Council, by trampling underfoot the principle of unanimity of the permanent members. In short, all those principles, all those rules of procedure, which were worked out at San Francisco precisely with a view to maintaining the character of international organization in a world of divers social and economic systems, are being distorted and broken to serve the narrow and exclusive interests of a group of Member States.

40. True, in a number of instances, the Western Powers have had the support of the majority to this end, and for one reason or another a number of States have deemed it fit to cast their vote in support of such actions. This fact, however, does not alter the data of the problem, and that problem is one all Member States interested in strengthening the United Nations ought to ponder: Is it really wise to undermining continually the very foundation of the United Nations, its very reason of existence, only to further the narrow and short-term interests of a group of Member States? The Romanian delegation believes this to be both unwise and shortsighted. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 149)

SAUDI ARABIA (Shukairy) October 1, 1958

85. . . . It seems as though a wild race has been set in motion between the United Nations on the one hand and international outbreaks on the other. To follow this race, you have to follow the tracks of Mr. Hammarskjöld, who is not only our distinguished Secretary-General but the master of our missions and the servant of our Charter.

No sooner had he embarked on his assignment in the Middle East than the situation flared up in the Far East. It is a wild race of events, which we must face squarely. It is a race that must be ruled out at any cost—any cost except the dictates of peace and justice. For such a race brings victory to none and defeat to all—not to speak of the untold misery, the indescribable destruction and the unthinkable annihilation.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 766 mtg.)

#### SPAIN (de Lequerica) October 6, 1959

Let us recall the great shock of Suez; let us recall the emotion at the violent danger of Lebanon, the question of Cyprus, and then we will realize the capacity of the United Nations; then we will see the hopes that we can still place in this Organization. Its prestige, its spiritual authority, the security of being able to count on an enormous army of good will, the support of powerful countries when the moment for action arrived, make of the United Nations a fearful organism to those who threaten public order. The Secretary-General very acutely pointed out the utility and usefulness of this Organization, devoted to public diplomacy, and that it was extremely useful to work in it on the normal levels of diplomacy, if at least not secret diplomacy, at least, shall we say, reserved diplomacy. This is true and there is no essential contradiction in such a gauging of it.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 822, pp. 18-20)

#### THAILAND (Khoman) September 24, 1959

147. . . . Although this Organization may not succeed in every task facing it, nevertheless in the short period of some fourteen years it has done more than any other international organization has ever done in the whole history of mankind.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 159)

#### TUNISIA (Mokkadem) October 2, 1959

The fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly is opening under favorable auspices which enables us to hope that there will be a diminution of international tension which will enable us to look towards a strengthening of international peace and security alike. . . .

These hopes are confirmed and strengthened by exchanges of visits between heads of States and Chiefs of Governments, especially the ones carried out and forthcoming between the Heads of two of the world's greatest States, President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev. The warmth of direct human contact, the direct appraisal of the conditions of life of the peoples concerned will again bring out constructive elements and approaches for the unfreezing of the cold war and relaxation of international tension.

If our Organization has not served as the forum for these conferences, meetings and visits, it nevertheless has the merit of having created the

psychological and political conditions for having them carried out, and it has to a considerable extent contributed to their having been successful. In so doing, our Organization is implementing the Charter in the way it should, and it is acting for the triumph of its principles and for the fulfilment of the objectives which it has set for itself.

(UN, GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 818, pp. 43-45)

**TURKEY (Zorlu) September 24, 1958**

45. The state of affairs in the present-day world situation naturally has a direct bearing on our work in the United Nations. It limits the scope of our activities. It hampers the solution of vital problems like disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful instead of warlike purpose. It renders many questions of more or less local and particular interest insoluble by injecting partisan propaganda and polemics in their discussion. (UN, GA. 13th. OR., 756 mtg.)

**UKRANIAN S.S.R. (Palamarchuk) October 3, 1958**

63. The experience of the United Nations shows that the key to its success lies in strict and unfailing observance of the Charter. The attempt of some Powers to turn it into an instrument for achieving their own ends renders the United Nations powerless. It is constantly taking decisions which do not reflect the real situation in the world. . . . (Same, 769 mtg.)

**U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) September 18, 1959**

4. More than fourteen years have elapsed since the establishment of this international forum, yet the purpose for which it was created has not so far been fully achieved. The people still live in a constant state of anxiety about peace and about their future. How can they fail to feel that anxiety when military conflicts flare up and human blood is shed first in one part of the world and then in another?

. . . . .

7. The United Nations is itself the very embodiment of the idea of peaceful co-operation among States with different social and political systems. We need only look around at the many States in this hall with their different social systems; what a multitude of races and nationalities they represent and what varying outlooks and cultures!

8. In view of the different approaches of States to controversial questions and their different conceptions as to the causes of the present international tension, we must face the fact that persistent efforts, restraint and wise statesmanship on the part of Governments will be required in order to remove these differences.

. . . . .

96. The United Nations . . . importance is determined by the fact that all the countries of the world are represented in it. They have

united in order to consider together the urgent problems of international relations. If two or more States are unable to reach agreement among themselves, the United Nations must help them. Its function in such a case is to plane down the sharp edges in relations between States which can produce conflict, strain and even war. If it performs its primary task of strengthening universal peace and the security of peoples, the United Nations will receive the respect due to it, and its authority will increase.

97. I must say in all candour, however, that today the United Nations is unfortunately, in a number of cases, not carrying out its functions along those lines. Sometimes, indeed, a faulty posing of problems in the United Nations results in unnecessary strains in relations between Governments.

98. Why is this happening? For the reason that not all the States Members of the United Nations have the necessary respect for that body, in which mankind places so many hopes. Instead of consistently supporting the authority of the United Nations, so that it will really be the most authoritative international organ and the Governments of all countries will always come to it when they have to solve vitally important problems, some States try to exploit it in their own narrow interests. An international organization cannot, of course, act effectively on behalf of peace if within it there is a group of countries whose policy is to impose the will of certain States upon others.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, pp. 31-38)

**UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (Fawzi) October 7, 1958**

61. It did not suffice, before, to have the Covenant of the League of Nations; and it does not suffice now to have the Charter of the United Nations. These are all empty things unless and until they are matched with palpable realities and sober deeds, deeds and realities which are consonant with our days, their impact, their concepts, their relationships and the vigour of their dynamisms. Dominating the present scene is science, with its giant stature, its accomplishments, its dangers, and its promise.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.*, 773 mtg.)

**UNITED STATES (Sisco) April 21, 1958**

. . . the United Nations is an organization intimately concerned with the considerations of power as a factor in world politics. . . . In the United Nations power is linked in many respects with responsibility. The United Nations is a mirror of the world as it is, and, if it sometimes reflects an ugly image, it is not because of the mirror but because of the world itself. . . . The United Nations reflects in large measure the political, economic, and social conditions of the world as they confront us today. This attests to its viability as an international organization.



It is a mistake to consider the U.N. as an organization which prevents states from pursuing *their own national interests through peaceful means*. . . . The existence of the United Nations does not in any sense dispense with the need for skilled and imaginative statesmanship and diplomacy. In fact there is a surprising amount of realistic, quiet diplomacy which goes on day in and day out under the aegis of the United Nations before issues actually burst forth in the public forum of the Security Council or the General Assembly. No one at all familiar with the actualities of the United Nations would take at face value the appearances of openness and spontaneity in its deliberations. Quiet diplomacy is an essential part of its workings.

A fourth factor which has had a marked influence on the United Nations relates to the kinds of international problems it is asked to consider. The United Nations has become in many instances an avenue of last resort. Issues have normally reached a critical stage between parties before they become a subject of United Nations consideration. This organization has played an important role in putting out fires that arise in the form of international disputes.

We should avoid underestimating the value of the United Nations even if it has not measured up fully on occasion. For the plain fact is that many of our international problems today are susceptible of only modest solution—rarely complete or ideal solutions. In these days of frequently occurring crises the United Nations cannot be a cure-all. The existence of an international organization does not mean that we have a made-to-order, all-purpose formula for solving the innumerable issues of international relations. The search for an all-purpose formula is illusory. —Address before the McBride Lecture Foundation, Western Reserve University, *DSB*, XXXVIII (June 9, 1958), 972-73.

UNITED STATES (Dulles) May 11, 1958

The United Nations . . . exerts a great influence throughout the world. Nevertheless it fails to satisfy all of the needs of the nations. Its Security Council can be rendered impotent by the veto of any one of the five permanent members. Nine days ago the Soviet Union cast its 83d veto and thereby struck a grave blow to the good neighborliness and harmony which the charter prescribes.

The General Assembly makes recommendations, but it cannot act. Its influence is great with those countries which have what our Declaration of Independence calls a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind". But it is otherwise with nations which lack such respect. For example, the General Assembly resolutions with regard to Korea have been ignored to this day by the Soviet Union and by Communist China, and its resolutions with respect to Hungary have been defied by the Soviet Union. —Address at the Minnesota Statehood Centennial Ceremonies, *DSB*, XXXVIII (May 26, 1958), 848.

**UNITED STATES (Dulles) September 18, 1958**

18. The United Nations, now in its thirteenth year, continues to work constructively for peace and order. It has promoted the peaceful adjustment of sharp political differences. It has advanced the independence or self-government of peoples ready for such responsibilities. It has stimulated economic development and human betterment.

19. But much remains to be done to reinforce peace and to hasten the progress that can then be achieved.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., 749 mtg.)

**UNITED STATES (Cargoe) October 24, 1958**

We must realistically recognize the basic differences of view which exist between the Soviet Union and the United States sharply limit the ability of the U.N. to carry out the collective-security role envisaged in the U.N. Charter. . . .

. . . The United Nations has the necessary flexibility to facilitate the establishment of a broader collective-security system whenever the fundamental attitudes and policies of governments will make this possible of achievement.

The United Nations has in fact developed as the greatest single center the world has known for harmonizing the actions of nations. Quite apart from the formal agenda of United Nations meetings, we can never know the scope of the informal conversations which take place in the corridors and lounges of the United Nations. I have never walked through the Delegates Lounge of the United Nations when the General Assembly is in session without being sharply aware of this great gathering of leaders from all over the world and the many opportunities this affords for useful discussions of mutual problems. At the current session of the General Assembly, for example, some 65 foreign ministers and prime ministers have been in attendance.

—Address before the Rochester Citizens Committee for United Nations Day, DSB, XXXIX (November 10, 1958), 229, 731.

**UNITED STATES (Wilcox) November 28, 1958**

Despite the fact that the world has been in turmoil and crisis since World War II, the United Nations has compiled an impressive record. What are some of its accomplishments?

*First.* It has nipped incipient wars in the bud and, on several occasions, has taken action that may have prevented the outbreak of a nuclear war.

*Second.* It has served as an indispensable bridge between East and West at a time when the chasm of suspicion and distrust between the two worlds has been getting wider and deeper.

*Third.* It has furnished a great forum where much has been done to

reveal to people everywhere the evil nature of Communist imperialism and to frustrate Communist designs to mislead the world.

*Fourth.* It has cushioned the shock of conflicting national interests in the world and has often averted open conflict by encouraging its members to talk out their problems rather than shoot them out.

*Fifth.* It has fought poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance in order to help improve the well-being of mankind and remove some of the basic causes of war.

It is true that the United Nations has not always responded to man's high aspirations. There have been failures to reach solutions to international difficulties in accordance with the charter. Obviously an organization so young in years is bound to have its limitations. We must recognize these limitations and increase our efforts to make the United Nations an even more effective organization than it is today. There is one great lesson which experience has taught us. It is absolutely essential that we and the other members of the United Nations never relax in our efforts to achieve a durable peace. We must never permit ourselves to become fatalistic about the prospects of war.

Peace with justice is the most important goal to which we can aspire. On that all of us can agree. But peace must have adequate foundations. One of these foundations is that nations must live by the principles of law and order. Another is that they must settle their disputes by peaceful means. A third is the awareness that human beings are entitled to more than mere subsistence.

The United Nations provides the main instrument available to the world for the attainment of these essentials of peace. It may not be perfect, but it is the best the wit of man has been able to devise. But the task ahead of us is a long and difficult one. It will require many years of determined effort and sacrifice on our part.

—Address before the National Council for the Social Studies and the World Affairs Council of Northern California, *DSB*, XXXIX (December 22, 1958), 1002-1003.

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 12, 1959

We believed in 1945 that great-power cooperation within the framework of the United Nations would constitute the best possible guarantee for world peace. We still think so.

. . . . .

During the past 14 years the members of the U.N. have laboriously and painfully built a truly remarkable machinery for peace. This mechanism is designed not only to help maintain peace but to help promote the well-being of mankind everywhere.

—Address before the American Association for the U.N. New York, *DSB*, XLI (September 28, 1959), 441-47.

## UNITED STATES (Herter) September 17, 1959

75. Most Members of the United Nations look upon our Organization sincerely and genuinely as a means to promote world order, and they are willing to adapt their national policies to this great goal. But there are a potent few who seem to participate in the United Nations only as it gives them opportunities for manoeuvres that will advance their own narrow nationalistic purposes, even at the expense of world order. Otherwise, they flout the United Nations.

76. In the Security Council eighty-five vetoes have been cast by one of the permanent members. In most of these cases, the veto vote was the only negative vote and the vetoed proposal was objected to only because it would have interfered with some ambitious objective of the State in question. It is difficult to reconcile that conduct with the spirit of our Charter.

77. In the General Assembly there is a similar pattern. Most of the Governments here give great weight to the recommendations of this Assembly. But there are others which defy those recommendations when they interfere with national policies. Hungary is an example.

78. In consequence, there is no uniformity in the acceptance and application of our Charter and our processes. There are two different standards of conduct.

79. . . . this double standard is incompatible with the basic purposes of our Organization and that it poses a challenge which we shall have to meet.  
(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 749 mtg.)

## UNITED STATES (Herter) September 17, 1959

27. . . . we must deal with a major problem that the League of Nations did not master and that the United Nations has not yet been able fully to resolve; that of preventing change through the use of aggressive force, while devising processes to accomplish needed and constructive change through peaceful means.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 9)

## UNITED STATES (Herter) September 20, 1959

. . . [The United Nations] is a cornerstone of United States foreign policy.

Peace with justice is the paramount goal of peoples everywhere. However, if nations are to achieve this goal they must work together to build its foundations. This effort, to succeed requires nations to live by a code of international law and order. They must be willing to resolve their differences through peaceful methods, not through force. Finally, they must assist all peoples to enjoy a decent standard of living.

The United Nations, together with its various organs and councils, serves as the most effective mechanism for mobilizing this cooperative effort. It is by no means perfect. However, during its 14-year history

it has built up a record of solid progress. Its very existence has encouraged its members to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations.

It is a prime support of peace because it furnishes processes to achieve needed and constructive change through peaceful means rather than aggressive force. Although the chasm of suspicion between the free world and the Communist world remains deep, the United Nations has served as a bridge to greater understanding. It has helped to harmonize relations between nations by providing means by which member states can talk out their problems rather than fight them out. The United Nations has fought hunger, poverty, disease, and ignorance in order to promote better living standards and remove some of the basic causes of war.

One of the principal weaknesses of the United Nations, of course, is that it does not have available a permanent force to assist it in preserving the peace. Despite this limitation, the United Nations has faced up to a series of crises.

—Statement to television audience, *DSB*, XLI (October 12, 1959), 507-508.

UNITED STATES (Herter) September 22, 1959

28. The United Nations itself is one of the major instruments both for deterring force and for accomplishing peaceful change. The United Nations helped to resist force when aggression threatened the Republic of Korea.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 10)

UNITED STATES (Herter) September 22, 1959

. . . procedures at the United Nations. . . strike me as quite complicated, but complicated procedures are always an essential part of a deliberative body such as the United Nations is.

—Remarks to the U.N. Correspondents' Association, New York, *DSB* XLI (October 12, 1959), 504.

URUGUAY (Montero) September 23, 1959

127. . . . The United Nations has gradually been winning the confidence of the peoples of the world. It has been successful in restoring peace, in putting an end to localized conflicts which could have spread dangerously; it has important accomplishments to its credit in the field of technical and economic assistance—a less spectacular aspect of its constructive work but of no less importance than the political aspect.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 137)

VENEZUELA (De Sola) September 29, 1958

29. Despite some criticism of its ineffectiveness, the United Nations continues to be the channel through which mankind must direct its efforts in order ultimately to achieve the lasting peace which it desires.

(UN. GA. 13th *ORs.*, 762 mtg.)

## *Instrument of Diplomacy*

UN (Secretary-General) February 5, 1958

The task of peace-making in our times differs in important respects from the task of past centuries.

There is, first the greater urgency of the need for peace-making and the fact that this urgency makes itself felt on a universal basis. This results from the rapidly increasing destructiveness of modern weapons and the growing interdependence of all parts of the world, an interdependence which makes every "local" war a potential world war.

Nations have responded to this need by supplementing the instruments and procedures of classical diplomacy with the permanent machinery of international organization, established by treaty. The League of Nations was the first expression of this response and the United Nations is a second. The purpose of the United Nations, like the purpose of the League of Nations before it, is to add strength to the force of the common interest, as expressed in the Charter and the consensus of member nations, in the tasks of peace-making and peace-building.

Yet another difference between the task of peace-making in our times and the task of past centuries arises from the form given to world organization and the simultaneous development of the modern media of communications, which, taken together, have made it possible for public opinion to become a major factor in international life. The form of international organization, beginning with the League and continuing in the United Nations, has been aptly described by Professor Philip Jessup as parliamentary diplomacy. This parliamentary diplomacy, with its public debates, is in part the reflection of a desire to introduce democratic procedures in the field of international politics. Back of the introduction of parliamentary diplomacy is also the belief prevalent at the end of the first World War that the catastrophe might have been avoided had the peoples been fully informed by the governments about their international agreements and policies. The reaction was summed up in Woodrow Wilson's famous call for "open covenants openly arrived at."

War as an instrument of national policy, except in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack, is outlawed by the United Nations Charter. However, the arms race continues unabated. This is so because there is not yet sufficient trust among the nations to reach a disarmament agreement with adequate safeguards against attack. But each new advance in the continuing development of weapons of mass destruction is making more evident that the risks of war to any nation which might be tempted to break the law of the Charter by embarking upon it are too great.

In these circumstances it has become more essential than ever to seek

and apply on a world scale other techniques for settling disputes—to seek agreements which are fair and just and to shape national policies to circumstances in such a way as to make war both redundant and obsolete. We cannot afford to reckon peace as merely the absence of war. We have to make of it a positive and over-riding discipline of international life.

The new institutional forms for this discipline, which are to be found in the United Nations, have, as I have just indicated, given emphasis to public procedures recalling those followed under the constitutions of democratic states. The resemblance is real, but it is also misleading. There is an essential difference between the nation and the society of nations, each of which remains individually sovereign. The United Nations General Assembly is patterned on a parliament but with power only to recommend, not to legislate. Its Councils and Secretariat resemble in some respects the executive branch, but with strict limitations on their powers. Its judicial branch, the International Court of Justice, is again much more severely circumscribed.

This resemblance in form, but not in the substance of power, between the institutions of parliamentary diplomacy and the institutions of a democratic national state has both its positive and negative aspects. On the positive side the public discussion of world issues, even in a forum without legislative power, may contribute—and in fact often has contributed—to an easing of tensions and to progress toward accommodation or agreement. There are usually more than two sides to any dispute, and debate in the United Nations provides an opportunity for the representatives of nations not directly involved in a conflict to bring their influence to bear in the direction of arriving at a reasonable consensus of views as to the common interest. Furthermore, insofar as United Nations debates are fully and fairly reported, the possibilities are increased for giving to the public an opportunity to appraise national policies as expressed in these debates and to arrive at an objective opinion concerning them.

On the negative side, it must be said that public debates in the United Nations can just as readily be used to make a propaganda case for home consumption or for use in other countries as it can be used as a genuine step toward peaceful accommodation. The public conception of the peace-making role of the United Nations also tends to be distorted, because it is so largely based on reports of these debates which emphasize the conflicts that make news.

Finally, the public processes of parliamentary diplomacy tend to create a dangerous optical illusion in another respect. This arises from a confusion between the form and the substance of the legislative process in parliamentary diplomacy as practiced in the United Nations. A voting victory in a national legislature leads to decisions which have

the force of law. The legislative process in the United Nations, on the other hand, leads only to the passage of recommendations which do not have the force of law. The force of public opinion behind such a recommendation may influence the decisions of the governments toward whom the recommendation is directed, but the power of decision remains with the individual national governments.

The legislative process in the United Nations is not a substitute for diplomacy. It serves its purpose only when it helps diplomacy to arrive at agreements between the national states concerned.

It is diplomacy, not speeches and votes, that continues to have the last word in the process of peace-making.

I think the experiences of the past 12 years have demonstrated that there is need to redress the balance between the public and private procedures of the United Nations if we are to make better progress in peace-making. When I speak of private procedures I mean here the methods of classical diplomacy as applied within the new framework provided by the Charter and the institutions of the world Organization. There always been this practice of private—or quiet—diplomacy in the United Nations, and there has been a marked increase in its use within the past year or two. But the need for it is not sufficiently understood. The best results of negotiation between two parties cannot be achieved in international life, any more than in our private worlds, in the full glare of publicity with current public debate of all moves, unavoidable misunderstandings, inescapable freezing of position due to considerations of prestige, and the temptation to utilize public opinion as an element integrated in the negotiation itself.

"Open agreements" represent the response to a sound demand. How, and to what extent they should be "openly arrived at," on the other hand, is a principle which requires serious consideration in the light of the very aims which the public procedures are intended to serve.

Considered simply as the only meeting place on the common ground of the Charter of the ambassadors of 82 member countries, the United Nations provides a unique opportunity for the continuous exercise of classical diplomacy for peace-making without any formal procedures. We can register efforts to give such diplomacy the support of firmer procedures. Such procedures may help and they represent a further elaboration of classical diplomacy as exercised within the United Nations. They are, however, to be regarded as particular cases, the bulk of the private diplomacy at the United Nations being wholly informal.

Let me give you three examples of such procedures. Two constructive and highly useful committees established by the General Assembly in the past three years are very small committees which meet entirely in private. Both of them happen to be advisory committees to the Secretary-



General, but a similar pattern could be usefully followed even if this were not the case. It is quite likely that most of you in this room have never heard of either of them, because they meet with little publicity. I do not suggest that the Assembly and Councils of the United Nations should replace public by private diplomacy. Far from it. Public debates must continue to be a primary function of these organs. I wish only to stress two points.

First, since the "legislative" processes of the United Nations do not lead to legislation, and the power of decision remains in the hands of the national governments, the value of public debate in the United Nations can be measured only by the degree to which it contributes to the winning of agreement by the processes of diplomacy. If public debate contributes to winning consent either immediately or in the long run, it serves the purpose of peace-making. If it does not so contribute, then it may be a useless, or even harmful exercise.

Second, I believe that more attention and effort need to be given to using the unique opportunities for private diplomacy that exist in the United Nations. Private diplomacy is just as necessary as ever in arriving at agreements between sovereign nations. Sometimes its primary role is before a public debate, sometimes in the intermissions of debate, sometime afterward, and often at all of these times. Classical diplomacy continues to be usefully practiced in the old tradition on a bilateral basis. But more of it is needed now in the practices of the United Nations if we are to develop to the full the capacity of the Organization as an instrument of peace-making.

Unlike the Assembly and the Councils, the Office of the Secretary-General, by its very nature under the Charter, must practice private diplomacy on almost all occasions until results are reached. In recent years the Secretary-General has increasingly been used for operations of a purely diplomatic type, either on behalf of the United Nations as such, or for one government in relation to another on a good offices basis. He is in a position of trust vis-à-vis all the member governments. He speaks for no government. It should go without saying that in the course of negotiation, or a mission of good offices, he must respect fully the laws of diplomatic discretion. He can never give away what must be considered the property of the government with whom he is working. Nor could he pass public judgment upon their policies without wrecking the use of his office for the diplomatic purposes for which experience shows that it is much needed. Of course, when a mission has resulted in a formal agreement between the parties, the agreement is made public, but it is, of course, not for him to evaluate it in public.

—"The Elements of Privacy in Peace-Making." Speech in Athens, Ohio. Press Release SG/656.

## UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958

The United Nations, despite some formal resemblances, has none of the powers of a world government or parliament. It is a framework for diplomatic operations. The power of decision remains, in almost all cases, with the Member governments. Beset as we are with what often seem to us to be the truly desperate anxieties of our age, it is easy to be impatient with both the evident weaknesses of world organization as thus constituted and the new complexities of international relations which it reflects.

. . . . .

Criticism has been directed against the great emphasis which I have in recent years put upon the adaptation of private diplomacy to the multilateral framework of the world organization in pursuit of the goals of the Charter. But whether you call it private diplomacy, or quiet diplomacy or something else, I believe it is in the interest of the Member States that we move in this direction.

I would not for a moment suggest that the functions of debate and vote do not have their essential place in world affairs today. Nor would I suggest that any step be taken that would retard the development of an increasingly influential role for a well-informed public opinion in the making of foreign policy. But the United Nations is subject to the same principles that apply to diplomacy in all its forms. Long experience has shown that negotiation in public alone does not produce results. If the United Nations is to serve as an increasingly effective instrument of negotiation, the principles and methods of traditional diplomacy need to be applied more fully alongside its public procedures. There are many opportunities for the greater use of private diplomacy in the United Nations in conjunction with its parliamentary procedures. Let me give you a few examples drawn from the experience of recent years. Some of them have a direct relevance to the relationship of the West with the communist countries, some with the relationship of the West with the Middle East. All of them have served the aims of the United Nations and have been used to reduce the tensions and dangers of conflict. [See pp. 57 and 94.]

. . . . .

There are many opportunities open to the Member governments and to their representative organs in the United Nations which do not involve my office for the greater use of private diplomacy of a traditional kind side by side with the public procedures of parliamentary diplomacy, either through the use of additional formal procedures or on a purely informal basis.

—Speech to Parliament, London. *Today's World and the U.N., Four Addresses . . .*, U.N. Office of Public Information, pp. 2, 5-6, 9.

UN (Secretary-General) June 3, 1958

The United Nations is necessary because the classical forms of bilateral diplomacy are no longer sufficient in the world that has become ours. The Organization is necessary, moreover, because regional organizations alone cannot satisfactorily make up for these shortcomings of bilateral diplomacy. The Organization is necessary, finally, as a phase in the evolution toward those more definitive forms of international cooperation of universal scope which I, for one, am convinced must come, but which cannot be brought into being without many experiments and long preliminaries.

. . . when the United Nations is said to have scored a success, this obviously means only that intended results have been reached in making use of the forms of negotiation the Organization offers. And when it is said that the United Nations has failed, this means, conversely, that it turned out that what was desired could not be reached through these forms of negotiation. A success, by the way, would then probably have been equally impossible in the classical forms, or on a regional basis. In other words, the technique of negotiation characteristic of the United Nations, even though it may have advanced further than other, older forms, has turned out not sufficiently advanced to make it possible for us to cope with these cases.

The technique which has primarily attracted attention is, of course, the public debate in the Assembly or the various Councils. It represents a public diplomacy added to the private diplomacy that used to be the rule. The transition to public diplomacy allows public opinion to follow the unfolding of diplomatic operations and, conversely, it offers an opportunity for public opinion to influence the position taken in the course of the negotiations.

. . . all Member States maintain permanent representation in New York and accredit ambassadors to the Organization. This has created what actually amounts to a standing diplomatic conference at United Nations Headquarters. The new and broader opportunities of negotiation which have thus been opened are being used increasingly. Aside from those debates and votes which figure in the press, there is thus a continuous, intense and fruitful diplomatic activity of the multilateral type, which has led to a coordination of positions, to reconciliations and to planning which would have been far more time-consuming and complicated if conducted in traditional forms—if they had then been possible at all. It is dangerous to overestimate the importance of personal contacts, but on the other hand it is unrealistic to underestimate the

importance of the fact that qualified representatives of opposing camps live together, sharing their problems, and at the same time are in continuous touch with representatives of "uncommitted" governments. In these respects, as far as I am able to judge, things have developed further in New York than in any international centre in the past. —Speech in Oslo. Same, pp. 22, 23, 24-25.

UN (Secretary-General) May 19, 1958

Although the conflict between the Western world and the Soviet world has fundamentally changed the conditions in which the United Nations must now work, it has not rendered the United Nations efforts less essential. On the contrary, the deeper the cleavages, the greater the need to maintain, by such means as we have, contacts across the frontiers, a forum for discussion and, above all, the possibilities for reconciliation. The United Nations is not an instrument for so-called appeasement from the point of view of either side, but it is a platform where a business-like mutual exploration can go beyond what is possible in regular diplomatic forms. The public diplomacy of United Nations meetings, and the private diplomacy for which the United Nations also provides a framework, have served and will continue to serve to limit and reduce the impact of the basic conflicts. Even one who looks over the history of the past years in the most sceptical and critical spirit would have to admit that without the possibilities offered by the United Nations, the world would be bogged down much deeper in the difficulties caused by the "cold war" than it finds itself today.

... the Organization has corresponded to basic needs of our time. In order to do so it has had to develop along lines somewhat different from those anticipated. It has shown the flexibility of a sound institution. The Organization has not been able, always and fully, to master the great difficulties it has had to face. But it should in justice be said that it has lessened the tensions or paved the way for peaceful solutions of most of the conflicts on which it has been called upon to try its strength. Although it is a new venture, with possibilities only partly explored, it has justified the hopes of those who have served it and supported it as a pioneer undertaking. ...

It has been criticized as a place where we lose our time in pursuing a debate sterilized by the weaknesses so often flowing from a narrowly tactical approach to the problems of the community of nations. But the United Nations may, for better reasons, be hailed as a forum where delegates, inspired by their responsibility and guided by the spirit of the Charter, can find means to further, in international political life, the kind of human communication with other nations which is the

basis of fruitful debate and, alone, can lead to the solution of conflicts. . . .

It is one of the surprising experiences of one in the position of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to find in talks with leaders of many nations, both political leaders and leaders in spiritual life, that the views expressed, the hopes nourished and the trust reflected, in the direction of reconciliation, go far beyond what is usually heard in public. What is it that makes it so difficult to bring this basic attitude more effectively to bear upon the determination of policies? The reasons are well known to us all. It might not be understood by the constituency, or it might be abused by competing groups, or it might be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness by the other party. And so the game goes on—toward an unforseeable conclusion.

—Speech in Miami, Florida. Same, pp. 14, 15, 21.

#### AFGHANISTAN (Pazhwak) September 25, 1959

80. We have carefully studied the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization [A/4132/Add.1] particularly the part dealing with the role of the United Nations. We do not wish to express any disagreement with his interpretation of the role of the United Nations in the face of the developments and activities concerning international problems. We do not disagree, because under the circumstances it is a wise interpretation. But we shall not refrain from saying that we would have wished the circumstances to be different, so that this Organization could play its full and rightful role in the peaceful solution of all international problems.

81. To be satisfied that a certain activity does not go so far as to abolish the aims of the Charter of the United Nations is not enough. What is required is the strengthening of the United Nations by increasing the confidence of Member States in the organization so that they will consider it the best place for the negotiation of all international problems with a view to reaching agreements which will have the support and consent of all nations.

82. In an age when no nation remains unaffected by any event in any part of the world, it is wrong to think that international problems could be the concern only of a group of nations and not of a world organization, such as the United Nations, dedicated to their solution.

83. Processes exclusive of the United Nations can hardly be considered fully consistent with the aims and purposes of the Charter. It is not only the question of such processes which should be considered, but their results and consequences. These concern the small countries, which, with their deep faith in the United Nations, can place their hopes and their confidence only in this Organization. There-

fore, it is not very easy to accept as a general rule that the extra-organizational solution of problems of world-wide interest concerning humanity as a whole can be definitely or completely free from implications which would impair the position of the Organization in principle.  
(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., pp. 197-98)

**AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 30, 1959**

11. Some thoughts about this will come to mind by reason of developments on disarmament last month. A Ten-Power Committee has been established outside the United Nations with parity of representation between the countries of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty—or, in the current but quite inaccurate term, between East and West. This poses two important questions: To what extent should international activities be conducted through the United Nations? And what place should a doctrine of "parity" occupy in our work?

12. It is quite clear that the drafters of the Charter did not intend everything to be done in the United Nations. The Charter is full of references to activities which not only can, but even should, be conducted outside of the United Nations itself. For example, under Article 33 of the Charter, parties to any dispute are told first of all to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, or other peaceful means. There are a number of references to activity outside the United Nations—for example, reference to regional arrangements and to the right of individual and collective defence. Such references illustrate that it was never intended at San Francisco that every act of international negotiation and of international conduct should be made through the United Nations.

13. But the Charter lays down in Article 1 that the United Nations should be "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends," that is to say, the ends set out in the Charter as the purposes of the United Nations. The Charter also states in Article 103 that, "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." It is clear, therefore, that even where the machinery of the United Nations is not directly involved in the discussion of a problem the over-all purposes and principles of the United Nations are still intended to prevail.

14. If every question was brought before the United Nations, its machinery would be brought to a stand-still, just as a river can be clogged with weed so that the passage of ships is impeded. We have to approach this in a practical way, treating each subject on its merits. It has, for example, been a generally accepted practice, specifically kept in mind at the San Francisco Conference when the provisions of

the Charter in relation to regional organizations were drafted, that disputes inside Latin America should be settled through the Organization of American States and not brought directly to the United Nations. The idea of trying to settle some things regionally is a sound principle which has worked very well in Latin America, and is one which, I believe, could often be followed with advantage in other parts of the world. (Same, p. 258)

CANADA (Smith) September 25, 1958

102. We recall first that the General Assembly which met in emergency special session last month was a deeply divided and anxious body, many of whose members felt that their interests were vitally at stake in the proceedings. The discussion was, in general, reasoned and moderate in tone; and, as we all know, the result was a resolution adopted unanimously, to the credit of all member nations. There are grave subjects on our agenda now on which opinion is also deeply divided, but surely we can hope and expect that the debate on these subjects can be conducted with a similar lack of polemics and with a similarly reasoned approach. The third emergency special session has shown us that this is possible, and it has provided an example—I think an outstanding example—of the ability of the United Nations, in the words of the Secretary-General last year [A/3594/Add.1, p. 3], to “serve a diplomacy of reconciliation” and, so to speak, “to blunt the edges of conflict among the nations.” The Secretary-General has defined the United Nations as “an instrument for negotiation among, and to some extent for, Governments.” The adoption of the resolution of 21 August, submitted by the Arab States, was a recognition that this “instrument for negotiation” is beginning—perhaps more than beginning—to constitute a separate entity which is somewhat more than the sum of its eighty-one parts, something to which the nations can turn when other more traditional means of negotiation and mediation are exhausted. (UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 759 mtg.)

DENMARK (Krag) September 25, 1958

199. . . . At the cross-road between destruction and peaceful constructive possibilities there is no doubt which course mankind will wish to follow. The question is, which road will lead to the goal? Traditional diplomacy can undoubtedly help us on our way. But I think that all the eighty-one countries which are represented here will note with satisfaction that the United Nations itself during recent events in international policy has proved itself to be a world political instrument of increasing significance. We are still at the beginning, but we are hopeful that this constructive evolution will be further pursued.

(Same, 759 mtg.)

**ECUADOR (Tobar-Zaldumbide) September 29, 1958**

98. Much criticism has been levelled at the United Nations, time and time again, by different sectors of world opinion, and in most instances, the motive has been a logical and justifiable desire for effective action. However, although admittedly we have at times been disappointed we must nevertheless recognize that hopeful prospects have frequently opened before us. By their very nature, human achievements can never be perfect, and this is particularly true in the case of a world organization like the United Nations, which daily has to face tremendous difficulties, conflicting interests, excessive ambitions, and the countless problems which all humanity fervently desires to see solved.

99. We believe, nevertheless, that much has been achieved and we must recognize that this new multilateral diplomacy has produced results which give promise of a better world to come. The least we can do is to direct our hopes, and of course our efforts, towards that future.  
(Same, 762 mtg.)

**FINLAND (Enckell) October 2, 1959**

My delegation does not share the view that recent trends need mean a diminution of the role of this Organization. In this context I wish to recall the significant words of the Secretary-General in his excellent introduction to his annual report. He pointed out that:

"The various diplomatic and political activities in the course of the past year are in full harmony with the intentions expressed in the Charter. They may even be said to reflect obligations which Member nations have assumed in the Charter. Also, irrespective of this formal aspect of the matter, those who support the work of the Organization must welcome all such serious efforts to further the purposes for which it was set up, whatever the specific form such efforts may take."

In another connexion, the Secretary-General described the United Nations as "an added instrument providing, within the limits of its competence, a further or ultimate support for the maintenance of peace and security."

We have at this stage a great responsibility for using this instrument to its full advantage.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 819, p. 41)

**HAITI (Auguste) October 2, 1959**

The United Nations represents, it seems to me, a great crossroads with the capacity to make possible this magnificent work of bringing men and peoples together. Being a meeting place for all political creeds, the United Nations has accustomed man to contradiction, to disagreements, to conversations which may appear meaningless but which so



often have permitted and facilitated the elimination of certain silly misunderstandings and enabled us to discover common ground.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 819, p. 7)

**INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 6, 1959**

There has been a degree of criticism and, on the part of the Secretary-General, what sounds somewhat like an apology for the development of events outside the United Nations. So far as the Government of India is concerned, we do not look upon this as though we have to suffer through things as they are or make the best of a bad position. We think that the developments that have taken place in what is called outside the United Nations, in so far as they are developments which contribute towards the progress of humanity, towards world peace and co-operation, are inside the United Nations, in so far as the United Nations is not bound by the limits of this Organization but by the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Secretary-General has already pointed out the constitutional and other reasons which justify this kind of negotiation.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, p. 57)

**INDONESIA (Sastroaoudjojo) September 30, 1959**

As regards the functions and activities of the United Nations, I have read with great interest the views expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization. Mr. Hammarskjöld points out that:

*"while the Charter establishes for its main organs the primary responsibility for the achievement of the purposes of the Organization, and gives access to its procedures to any State which appeals for its assistance for these purposes, the United Nations is not intended to be a substitute for normal procedures of reconciliation and mediation but rather an added instrument providing, within the limits of its competence, a further or ultimate support for the maintenance of peace and security."* [A/4132/Add. 1, page 1].

Indeed, this conception clearly emerges from the fact that the United Nations is an organization composed of sovereign nations. It is implicit in the provisions of the Charter. Moreover, numerous resolutions of the Organization, especially on political issues, recommend recourse to normal diplomatic procedures, as, for example, negotiations between the countries concerned.

No, there is no question of the United Nations displacing other means of mediation or conciliation. But what does concern us very much is the proper utilization of this added instrument of diplomacy. As also noted by the Secretary-General, it is necessary for us continuously to reconsider the ways in which the United Nations can best function and fulfil its purposes.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 274)

## ITALY (Pella) September 23, 1959

135. In recent years new procedures and methods of action have been tested by the United Nations with encouraging results. I refer to the activities, in various forms and in various circumstances, involving what has come to be called the "presence" of the United Nations. This is a further proof of the flexibility of our Charter and of the great scope for action by the United Nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 121)

## NORWAY (Lange) September 24, 1959

150. Bilateral contacts, or discussions and negotiations directly between the parties concerned, should of course not be viewed as a substitute for the use of the universal instrument of the United Nations, for utilizing the capabilities which have been developed and are continuously growing within this Organization. On the other hand, I also want to associate myself with the Secretary-General statement in the Introduction to his annual report, to the effect that:

"... the United Nations is not intended to be a substitute for normal procedures of reconciliation and mediation but rather an added instrument providing, within the limits of its competence, a further or ultimate support for the maintenance of peace and security." [A/4132/Add. 1, p. 1.]

151. Over the last few years the United Nations has proved to be indispensable in a variety of situations which threatened to get out of hand and which, without the assistance of the United Nations, might well have grown into catastrophes. This use and serious testing of the United Nations has also brought out the remarkable viability of the Organization and its ability to adapt its procedures and actions to prevailing needs and rapidly changing circumstances.

(Same, p. 172)

## Chapter 2. ARMS AND ATOMS

### *Introduction*

The slow progress the atomic powers made in their disarmament talks cast a pall over 1958 and 1959, although there were some significant agreements on nuclear tests and advances on other fronts.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's increased technical assistance and publishing activities justified the optimistic assessments of 1958, with which only the Soviet Union dissented. So, too, the reports of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Radiation, which since 1955 has kept a wary eye on both national and man-made radiation, commanded universal respect. Even the more controversial United Nations Emergency Force received almost unanimous praise. Less, however, could be said for the *ad hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which in 1959 found itself, because of East-West disputes over membership, limited to discussing only the technical and legal aspects of its subject.

Disarmament negotiations were exceedingly complex. The Secretary-General remained convinced that both sides wanted to disarm, but the principal parties did not always share his confidence. No general talks aimed at a "package" disarmament agreement took place in 1958 and 1959 because the U.S.S.R. would not participate in the Disarmament Commission after the twelfth Assembly refused to enlarge the group to include all U.N. Members and created instead a 25-member body. The thirteenth assembly yielded to the Soviet demand (Res. 1252D), but the principal negotiations during these years, using U.N. facilities in Geneva but not U.N. organs, focused on measures to prevent surprise attack and means of ending nuclear tests. The surprise attack talks came to nothing, but the discussion of tests produced agreement on many specific points. At the end of 1959 the powers were still divided, however, on such major issues as the make-up of the international control staff, voting procedures in the controls commission, and adequate procedures for detecting underground explosions. Much to the annoyance of some U.N. members, the Big Four created in September 1959 a Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which was later to become the main forum for general disarmament talks.

## *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*

UN (Secretary-General) May 19, 1958

The Atomic Conference of 1955 was the first great break in the wall which for long had separated scientists in various countries and slowed down the progress which would have been possible if there had been full international co-operation. In spite of the conflicts which dominated the political scene, the Geneva Conference in 1955 established a very wide exchange of views and experiences. It created contacts which served to promote the practical application of the findings of the scientists and a better international atmosphere in this vitally important field. In doing so, the first Geneva Conference paved the way also for the creation of the new Atomic Agency, which after long negotiations was set up last year in Vienna. In both respects the United Nations proved to be a valuable instrument of negotiation and bridge building. Without the United Nations, this creative process, assuming it would have been possible at all, would undoubtedly have taken much longer and been much more complicated.

—Speech in Miami, Florida. *To-day's World and the United Nations Four Addresses . . .*, U.N. Office of Public Information, p. 16.

U.S.S.R. (Tugarinov) October 30, 1958

The General Assembly has before it the second annual report of the Agency (A/3950). As we can see, during the past period the Agency was occupied basically with administrative matters and did very little, unfortunately, to give practical assistance to the countries concerned. The initial programme of the Agency, prepared by the Preparatory Committee and approved last year at the General Conference, was not carried out. Even the relatively small possibilities and resources that were at the disposal of the Agency were not made use of fully.

Instead of giving real assistance to the under-developed countries, the Agency busied itself with matters which were only of secondary importance to these countries. Unfortunately, too much attention was paid to holding various conferences and meetings, and drafting various plans, and very little was done to promote the noble cause of the utilization of atomic energy in order to raise the standards of living of countries which are not able to settle these matters with their own resources.

Therefore, it is not accidental that during the second General Conference which just completed its work in Vienna, the activities of the Agency were very much criticized by a number of States.

(UN. GA. 13th. Doc. A/PV. 777, pp. 36-37)

UNITED KINGDOM (Beeley) October 30, 1958

Although the International Atomic Energy Agency has now been in existence for more than a year, this is the first of its reports which

the General Assembly has had an opportunity to consider. In that time, as can be seen from the report itself, the Agency has made a solid and workmanlike start on the tasks for which it was made responsible by its statute. Naturally it has been preoccupied in its first year with activities of a preparatory kind such as building up the necessary staff, both scientific and administrative, and laying the organizational foundations for its various practical tasks.

In our view this time has been well spent and should enable the Agency to make the most of its resources in the coming years. We welcome the emphasis laid in the Agency's initial programme on the fields of basic training and the application of radioisotopes.

(Same, p. 42)

#### UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) June 26, 1958

I was particularly gratified by the launching of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an achievement of far-reaching importance. . . . The International Atomic Energy Agency shows great promise as an international center responsible for the sharing by all nations of information, technical skills, and radioactive isotopes and nuclear fuels for peaceful pursuits.

—Letter transmitting to the Congress the 12th Annual Report on U.S. Participation in the United Nations, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 4, 1958), 219.

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1958

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which was established nearly a year ago in Vienna, is now a going concern. . . .

This organization has already begun its primary task of promoting the international sharing of benefits of atomic energy. Significant steps have been taken or are under way to this goal. For example:

A mission sponsored by the IAEA has already visited 17 countries in Latin America in an effort to determine training requirements in the peaceful application of atomic energy and is now preparing to report on its findings.

The Agency has 140 training fellowships available for this academic year for training scientists. A similar number is contemplated for next year. Ten students under this program are now arriving in the United States from various countries throughout the world for a course of study at the International School of Nuclear Sciences and Engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory.

A panel of experts has prepared a manual on safe practices in the use of radioisotopes. A survey of the possibility of standardizing terminology in nuclear physics on an international basis is under way. An international catalog of radioisotopes is being prepared. . . .

The IAEA promises great benefits for the future. But these will not

come immediately or without effort. The Agency is only at the beginning of its task. Its accomplishments must now, therefore, be on a modest scale. Precisely for this reason I am convinced that your organization can serve an important purpose in developing support for the Agency during this formative period. The concept of international cooperation to build a better world from the peaceful atom is, and will remain, a great challenge to us all.

—Address before the American Association for the United Nations, DSB, XXXIX (September 29, 1958), 510-11.

UNITED STATES (Dulles) September 18, 1958

70. Ten precious years were lost in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy because full international co-operation was not promptly begun.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 749 mtg.)

### *Outer Space*

UN (Secretary-General) August 25, 1958

The beginning of space exploration as part of the programme of the International Geophysical Year has created a new challenge to the development of international law, just as the ballistic missiles which pass through outer space have created a further challenge to the disarmament effort.

. . . I hope that it will be possible to move ahead toward agreement on a basic rule that outer space, and the celestial bodies therein, are not considered as capable of appropriation by any State, and an assertion of the over-riding interest of the community of nations in the peaceful and beneficial use of outer space. Such steps would help to provide a basis for the future development, in international co-operation, of the use of outer space for the benefit of all.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., *Suppl. 1A*, p. 3)

CANADA (Green) September 24, 1959

69. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which was set up at the thirteenth session [resolution 1348 (XIII)] has made a useful start in considering the scientific, technical and legal aspects of co-operation within the United Nations. Canada served on that Committee and provided the Chairman for the Technical Committee, whose work forms the basis for a large part of the report we shall be considering [A/4141]. Our great regret is that one of the two nations which have the greatest accomplishments in space technology did not participate in the preparation of this initial report. I do not think the report contains anything to which the Soviet Union should take exception.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 166)

**ECUADOR (Correa) October 1, 1959**

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, which becomes all the more urgent since the two Powers that have entered outer space are continuing their fascinating race of progress, has been paralyzed in the United Nations because of the absence of five members of the special committee who did not believe it necessary to participate in the work of that committee until unanimous agreement was arrived at on its composition. The continuation of such an impasse could make any fruitful co-operation too late, whereas, if such co-operation were initiated early enough, we might avoid possible conflict. Notwithstanding this, the committee has submitted a report which reveals a discreet concept, wherein the final goal is kept in view, and that is the need for joint efforts on universal levels.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, p. 46)

**JAPAN (Fujiyama) September 17, 1959**

137. In another field, the United Nations since the thirteenth session of the General Assembly has made a most timely move in taking up problems relating to the peaceful uses of outer space to meet the recent notable advances made by science.

(Same, p. 18)

**PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 25, 1959**

22. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [A/4141], which was set up at the thirteenth session to consider the area of international co-operation and programmes which could be undertaken in that field under the auspices of the United Nations, is a useful exploratory study of the problem. (Same, p. 179)

**SWEDEN (Unden) September 30, 1959**

140. . . . The work accomplished in this field by the ad hoc Committee appointed [resolution 1348 (XIII)] by the Assembly a year ago constitutes, in the opinion of my delegation, a good beginning. But new efforts are now called for in order to arrive at a fully international participation in this work.

(Same, p. 270)

**UNITED STATES (Becker) May 14, 1958**

I have read a number of articles in which it is stated that the only international agreement relating to space or to the atmosphere is the Chicago Convention of 1944, relating to civil aviation matters. I have seen it asserted that there is no international law with respect to space outside the atmosphere.

I regard such statements as incorrect because of the specific provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

. . . Under that provision each of the members of the United Nations

reserved its "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.

—Statement before Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics, *DSB*, XXXVIII (June 9, 1958), 965.

#### UNITED STATES (Cargo) October 24, 1958

A program of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space was undertaken during the International Geophysical Year under the International Council of Scientific Unions. This cooperative endeavor of scientists, including scientists of the Soviet Union, is to be continued. We hope this will set a constructive precedent for the future.

—Address before the Rochester Citizens Committee for United Nations Day, *DSB*, XXXIX (November 10, 1958), 713.

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) March 6, 1959

Some people have questioned the desirability of the United Nations' undertaking a program in the field of outer space. If there was ever an area in which the United Nations had a legitimate interest, the peaceful development of outer space would certainly seem to me to be such an area.

After all, technological developments and scientific breakthroughs are not the exclusive monopoly of any nation or any people. We all know, and the history of mankind amply demonstrates, that ingenuity has never been restricted by national boundaries. Great discoveries have often been made in small laboratories in isolated areas of the world.

In the field of outer space many nations, large and small, are already playing significant roles. Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Iran, India, Australia, and many other countries are part of a worldwide network of tracking and monitoring stations. In these stations hard-working scientists are daily collecting data which is of the greatest scientific and technological value. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that as time goes by many nations will be launching space vehicles of various types.

. . . . .

We do not consider that this is a simple "big power" monopoly. We believe that only by many nations' joining in this endeavor can we hope to provide the fastest, cheapest, and most efficient progress in this important field.

We realize that, no matter what happens, the study and exploration of outer space will go on and will take us where no human being has ever been before. It is our hope that this exploration, which, I repeat, will affect every single person in the world, can be used to benefit all of the peoples of the world.

—Statement before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, *DSB*, XL (March 23, 1959), 403.



**UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1959**

That report [of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space] has now been published. It is impressive not only in its scope and dimensions but also in the objectivity of its scientific, technical, and legal approach.

The Committee reports on: the activities and resources of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international bodies in this field; the nature of international cooperative programs that might appropriately be sponsored by the United Nations; the possible United Nations organizational arrangements to aid international cooperation in this field; and the nature of legal problems which may arise.

I may say that the Committee's recommendations are impressive with far-reaching implications. They indicate useful paths to be explored in the scientific, legal, and organizational fields. I am sure that we, as a nation, are prepared to proceed with their implementation. Regrettably, the U.S.S.R., a member of the Committee, refused to participate in its work because its demands on composition of the group were not met.

—Address before the American Association of the U.N., New York, *DSB, XL1* (September 28, 1959), 444.

### *United Nations Forces*

**UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958**

... [The] United Nations Emergency Force ... has done much to bring quiet to the armistice line between Egypt and Israel and to act as a stabilizing influence in the entire area. You recall that the General Assembly decided to establish UNEF and gave the Force its terms of reference by an overwhelming vote within a couple of days. This was, of course, an emergency situation, but it was possible to achieve this result only because the informal procedures of private diplomacy had been very intensively exercised during the short time available. When the Assembly created UNEF, it also established a UNEF Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary-General on the many questions that arose concerning the operation and functioning of the Force. This committee, meeting in private, has continued to play a most valuable role ever since. We have, in this case, an example of a three-stage operation which is natural in the United Nations and can be very helpful in getting constructive results; private diplomacy preceding public debate and then employed again to follow through.

—Speech to Parliament, London, *To-Day's World and the U.N., Four Addresses* . . . , U.N. Office of Public Information, pp. 7-8.

**UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959**

It is at present impossible to foresee when the operations of the United

Nations Emergency Force might be brought to an end without damage to the valuable results which the Force has achieved. I shall, therefore, submit to the General Assembly, requests for funds enabling the Organization to maintain the Force at its present strength.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs. Suppl. 1A*. p. 5)

UN (Secretary-General) November 24, 1959

... it is my conviction that, for the immediate future at least, UNEF continues to be an indispensable element in the efforts of the Organization to assist member governments in maintaining stable and peaceful conditions in the area in which the Force operates.

In my latest report on the Force (A/4210, which was noted by the General Assembly last Saturday) I pointed out that the presence of UNEF has contributed during the past year in no small measure to the continuing quiet along the entire line between Israel and Egypt.

In that report I noted also that, while there had been few serious incidents in the past year, there were situations which, in the absence of a restraining influence, could have had serious consequences far overshadowing the effort and expense now involved in the maintenance of the Force.

Moreover, in present circumstances, it is impossible for me to foresee when the operations of the Force might be brought to an end without risking loss of the progress thus far made.

The Force, in my opinion, from its inception has carried out effectively and with increasing efficiency its assigned task, and I should like to express my appreciation on this occasion to the members of the Force for their unique service in the cause of peace, to the governments which still make contingents available to the Force, and to Lieutenant General Burns for his consistently fine leadership of the Force.

—Statement to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Press Release SG/876, p. 1.

CANADA (Smith) September 25, 1958

133. We have failed to put into effect the provisions of the Charter under which it was envisaged that the United Nations would have adequate force to intervene in any case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and take effective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. There is no immediate prospect, as I see it, of our reaching agreement on the provisions for the United Nations of forces available to act against any country which the United Nations should declare to be an aggressor. We can earnestly hope and pray that the need for such a force under Article 43 will never arise.

... The success which has been achieved by the United Nations Emergency Force and by various observer groups established by the United

Nations points to the need of further development of machinery of this kind in order to help the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities. (UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 759 mtg.)

CANADA (Green) September 24, 1959

89. *One other item on the agenda which is of special interest to Canada concerns the United Nations Emergency Force. This Force has for another year admirably carried out the tasks set for it by the General Assembly.* (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 168)

DENMARK (Krag) September 25, 1959

24. *Concurrently with the efforts of the Governments directly concerned, the efforts of the United Nations and of the Secretary-General have contributed to promote the development of greater stability in the Middle East. In this connexion mention should also be made of the importance of the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in part of the area. In his report on UNEF [A/3899] the Secretary-General states that the maintenance of peaceful conditions along the entire line between Egypt and Israel is attributable in no small measure to the presence of this peace force.* (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 193)

ECUADOR (Correa) October 1, 1959

*It is sad to have to admit that the renunciation of the use of force, which is one of the basic commitments of the Charter, is not fully observed, as can be seen from events that have taken place lately in certain regions of the world. It is lamentable that the political climate does not as yet allow the United Nations to appear as the moderating force in such events on universal level. However, there are encouraging signs to be seen if we study the fourteen years of life of our Organization. We can say that some form is being given to an international authority which, in certain circumstances, might well turn out to be a guarantee of law and order, and that certainly did not exist prior to 1945. The entire gamut of diplomatic resources for the prevention and solution of international conflicts has been increased considerably as a result of the gradual growth and evolution of the United Nations. The United Nations Emergency Force is still settled in the Middle East as an expression of the resources which this Organization can, if need be, present. The cases of Kashmir, Korea, Lebanon, Jordan and Laos, although some of them may perhaps be insoluble at the moment, are nevertheless proof of the fact that the ears of the Organization were open and that it heard the cries of people who felt the need for international assistance.* (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, p. 47)

FRANCE (de Murville) September 30, 1959

65. . . . *real progress has been made, with the help of the discreet and effective presence of UNEF. It is to be hoped that, as requested*

by the Secretary-General, the Force will be allowed to continue its activities.

(Same, p. 263)

**INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 6, 1959**

The Secretary-General, on the one hand, and various delegations, on the other, have referred to United Nations peace forces; that is to say, the machinery, the instruments, for applying sanctionary powers or carrying out police duties, or whatever it may be called. We, as a country, have participated in this development, and continue to do so and to carry some of its burdens. I hope, Mr. President, that you will forgive us if we take the opportunity of expressing our views.

The Government of India is not at present prepared to participate in a standing force of the United Nations as such and we do not think that it is a practical proposition. We are surprised to find that some countries have proposed that certain units should be allocated and demarcated for United Nations purposes. But if they are so allocated, what do they do when the United Nations does not want them? Therefore, it is not possible, in a defence force of any country, to have troops allocated and demarcated in this way.

Secondly, for political reasons, we think that, with the present state of development in the world and in the absence of world law and of the universality of the United Nations, in the absence of the fact that we as an Organization are free from group politics and capable of taking objective decisions, we do not think that it would be right to place at the disposal of such an organization forces which may be rooved without the consent of the people concerned. The time will come, in a disarmed world, when war is no longer regarded as a machinery for the settling of disputes, when some kind of political organization may be required to deal with those who break the world law; but we think that it is premature at the present time to speak in terms of a United Nations force or to expect countries to shoulder the responsibility from the point of view of personnel or of money.

In this connexion I am sure that the Secretary-General will expect us to say that units of the Indian army today in the Gaza Strip are there as a peace force; and we are happy to participate in this venture. But it imposes considerable burdens upon us, to a certain extent recompensed by the fact that these men, not diplomats, not university men, not men trained in the arts of peace but in the arts of defence, have been the best ambassadors whom our country has ever sent out. They have no quarrels; they have left no social problems behind them, as occupying armies do. They have created no difficulties in the places where they have gone. And this has been our experience in Korea, as well as with the officers who went to Indochina, the forces which Mr. ~~.....~~ in a hurry for UNOGIL in Lebanon, and

now who, for two or more years have stood as a peace force in true Ghandian tradition on the Gaza Strip between Israel and Egypt—giving unfortunate evidence . . . that there is an armistice line and that the two countries are not at peace.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, pp. 74-75)

#### NEPAL (Upadhyaya) October 5, 1959

It is difficult to pay a really adequate tribute to this Emergency Force, in view of the excellent work which it has done. Again, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, to which my own country made some humble contribution of its own, did a really wonderful job along the Syria-Lebanon border last year, and thus not only arrested the worsening of the situation in the area, but was also responsible for restoring or recreating the normal situation that obtains there today. In the light of experience of the fourteen years during which the United Nations has been in existence, it may be claimed that there has been a need for such a force on different occasions, for meeting a sudden and unexpected threat to peace.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 820, pp. 6-7)

#### NEW ZEALAND (Nash) October 3, 1958

30. . . . the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) . . . contribute[s] signally to the maintenance of stability in the Middle East. . . . [It is] . . . beset by great financial difficulties. [It is] . . . efficiently administered and operated, but in a condition of financial emergency and stringency. In UNEF, the number of troops has been somewhat reduced; . . . these reductions do not appear to have impaired its efficiency. . . .

31. Despite these limitations, there is still a reluctance among Members of this Assembly to accept the financial obligations involved in maintaining [UNEF]. . . . This reluctance might be more explicable if [its] . . . value and effectiveness were in doubt. Yet, [they are] beyond question.

32. As the result of UNEF, a condition of quiet has been maintained in the area of the southern armistice lines, and this condition has been reflected in other regions.

. . . . .

34. Were there no UNEF . . . this Assembly would undoubtedly be faced with massive difficulties. These would not be solely financial—but, in financial terms alone, they would far outdo the demands at present imposed.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 770 mtg.)

#### NORWAY (Lange) September 24, 1959

171. In the Middle East, the United Nations Emergency Force has successfully continued to contribute to the maintenance of peace and

quiet along the entire borderline between Israel and Egypt, from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea.

172. To secure peace and stability in this area is a task of the greatest importance, and the cost of operating the Force is indeed small compared to what is at stake and the far-reaching consequences which a renewed outbreak of hostilities in the area might have. It is therefore a matter of serious concern to my delegation that the continued operation of the Force at its present minimum strength is being jeopardized because of financial difficulties. (UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 174)

**PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 25, 1959**

51. . . . the United Nations Emergency Force, . . . born in the midst of turmoil, has lived to play a vital part in the maintenance of peace in that region. Its success should enable us to give further consideration to the idea of a United Nations stand-by force. (Same, p. 181)

**PANAMA (Moreno) September 18, 1958**

165. The success of the patrol work done by UNEF gives support to the repeated desire expressed in this Assembly by many voices of great authority that the United Nations should have at its disposal a police force whose services could be made available without loss of time whenever circumstances so required. The existence of such a police force would enable the Organization to forestall aggression or to take immediate action to prevent its continuation or extension if it had already occurred. (UN. GA. 13th. OR., 749 mtg.)

**UNITED STATES (Wilcox) July 25, 1958**

Recent events, it would seem, tend to emphasize all the more the need for some kind of permanent arrangements for a United Nations force. . . .

The U.N. Military Staff Committee was charged with working out implementing details, but the work of that group foundered on basic divergence of views between the Soviet Union and the other members of the committee. Among other things, there were wide differences with respect to the size and composition of such a force, its location, and the nature of the command structure. In the intervening years, because of Soviet opposition, it has been impossible to accomplish any progress through the Military Staff Committee.

. . . I hardly need recall that it was the United States which took the lead as the United Nations Command in repelling aggression in Korea. In this instance we stood solidly behind the U.N. military effort. From this experience we learned two important lessons: (1) that a U.N. force, to be most effective, must be such that it can be quickly mobilized; and (2) there must be an acceptable basis of sharing expenses among the members of the U.N. . . . The UNEF experience has shown clearly how, under certain circumstances, such a force can serve an

extremely useful purpose. For many months the frontiers between Egypt and Israel have been free from the kind of hostile incursions which formerly troubled the area.

The Department of State shares the view of this committee that a similar force, established on a permanent basis, could be an important instrument for observing and reporting, and for assisting in the maintenance of international peace and security.

. . . However, in examining this question, there are a number of very fundamental problems which must be considered carefully. The problems involved include the following:

(1) What would be the objective of a U.N. force? Should it be a military establishment able to repel armed attack; should it be a force, such as UNEF, designed to serve as a buffer between two hostile camps; or should it be merely a group of observers, such as the U.N. Observer Group has been in Lebanon? Or what other function, consistent with the charter, could such a force usefully perform?

(2) The next major question relates to the size of the group which may be necessary to accomplish whatever may be agreed upon as its fundamental objectives. Recommendations on this point range from small teams of observers or police units up to permanent contingents of from ten to twenty thousand armed men.

(3) Where would these forces be stationed? Should they be located at one central point, or should contingents in each country be earmarked and readily available for dispatch as necessary?

(4) The next question—and this a very important one—relates to the control of the force and the authority to use it. Presumably it would be subject to the control of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We must keep in mind, however, that the decisions of the Security Council are subject to the veto, and the recommendations of the General Assembly, in this respect, require a two-thirds majority. Control by the Secretary-General, of course, is another possibility if some formula could be worked out which would be acceptable to the Security Council or the Assembly.

(5) Obviously, the problems connected with the financing of a permanent U.N. force are extremely difficult, particularly if one takes into account the lessons taught by the U.N. undertaking most closely resembling the concept of a permanent U.N. force, i. e., the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The UNEF operations, so far, have been one of the most eminently successful undertakings of the United Nations and have demonstrated clearly the U.N.'s capacity for effective action in certain types of situations.

Yet, in terms of budgetary considerations (the total regular budget of the U.N. is about \$50 million), the establishment and continuation of

UNEF has presented problems of a financial nature that have not as yet been solved in any lasting fashion. Estimated UNEF expenses during its first 2 years were placed at \$30 million annually, which is an amount equal to more than half of the regular U.N. budget. Inspired by the high purposes of the UNEF undertaking and encouraged by special contributions from the United States amounting to \$13 million, the General Assembly has assessed itself a total of \$40 million for UNEF. However, without the additional support from the United States which I referred to, it is doubtful whether the U.N. would have been able to bear the heavy financial burden of the total cost of UNEF. Our voluntary and assessed contributions account for almost 50 percent of UNEF's expenses for the 2-year period.

Moreover, the figures I have just cited do not cover the base pay and normal equipment of the national contingents in UNEF. These considerable expenses are borne directly by the individual governments contributing the contingents. They are thus not a charge, either directly or indirectly, upon either the U.N. or the U.S.

These financial facts pose inescapable problems which are associated with the establishment and maintenance of a permanent U.N. force.

The conclusions to be drawn from them would depend greatly on the contribution which we believe such a force would make to the national interests of the United States. They would also depend on the value we place on imparting initiative, leadership, and assistance to the community of nations in the struggle to maintain world peace. One conclusion, however, is unavoidable in light of past experience and present circumstances, namely, that a permanent U.N. force probably would not come into being if the United States contribution to it were limited to the percentage we pay under the regular U.N. budget. Whether our participation should be based on a strictly capacity-to-pay formula or on some other formula is difficult to say, but it is evident that some new approach to the problem must be made if such a force is to be created.

—Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs during hearings on H. Res. 367 "recommending the creation of a permanent United Nations Emergency Force," *DSB*, XXXIX (August 25, 1958), 324-27.

UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1958

The United Nations Emergency Force has clearly demonstrated that it is possible for a truly international force to assist in preserving the peace. In the case of the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon there have, of course, been limitations on the scope of its operations. The significant thing, however, is that United Nations presence in



Lebanon has had a stabilizing effect and reduced the threat to the peace. Our experience with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), and the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) has underscored the need for personnel available on short notice to deal with emergencies which may threaten the peace. When a nation's freedom is in jeopardy, time becomes precious. As Secretary Dulles declared at the time of the debate on Lebanon and Jordan, "The preferable solution would have been collective action of the world community represented by the United Nations." But that would have taken time.

Naturally, any United Nations standby peace force should be prepared to meet a wide range of situations. It should also be ready to move quickly. This would necessitate some kind of permanent staff in the United Nations Secretariat to act as a planning center. This is the first step that should be taken.

We recognize that there are many problems connected with the establishment of such a force, such as organization, control, and financing. However, we consider progress toward a standby United Nations force is highly desirable. In this connection the small powers can play a significant role.

—Address before the American Association for the United Nations, *DSB*, XXXIX (September 29, 1958), 508.

#### UNITED STATES (Cargo) October 24, 1958

In its efforts to preserve the peace and to prevent small incidents from becoming major ones, the United Nations has developed a flexible technique of employing military personnel in observation or patrol work. Many of these groups are now widely known by their initials: UNEF, the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez area; UNTSO, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Palestine area; and UNOGIL, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. Beyond the value of their specific duties, it has become apparent that the interests of peace are well served by the symbol which such groups provide of a "United Nations presence" in a troubled area. This in itself is testimony to the stature which the United Nations has achieved not only here but in distant places throughout world.

—Address before the Rochester Citizens Committee for United Nations Day, *DSB*, XXXIX (November 10, 1958), 731-33.

### *Weapons Control*

#### *General*

UN (Secretary-General) March 20, 1958

I would lack in sincerity if I did not say that I firmly believe in the

sincere wish of both sides to get results in the field of disarmament. I add that I do say this with all sincerity because it would be such a facile routine reaction from my side to give an assurance about sincerity. It is not that. It is seriously meant when I reply "yes" to this question of yours. . . . but you well know that even on the basis of a sincere wish it may sometimes be difficult to reach results. There are very many reasons for that. One of them is that both parties have to combine, in their thinking and their reactions, considerations of a general nature, such as the wish for success for disarmament and for peace, and considerations of national security. When those two things have to be combined it does happen—and it is quite natural that it should happen—that one runs into considerable complications in attempts to translate the wish for peace and disarmament into practical terms which are acceptable to all parties.

—Notes for Correspondents, No. 1760, p. 4.

#### UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958

It is obvious that controlled disarmament will be possible only through the United Nations, because any disarmament system has to be adopted and administered by a world organization whose members include practically all nations of the world. However, that does not exclude the use of private diplomacy both within and outside the United Nations. Indeed, such diplomacy is necessary in preparation of decisions in the United Nations on disarmament.

How it can best be exercised is a matter for the governments principally concerned to decide. What is of the utmost importance and, indeed, of the utmost urgency, is the exercise of diplomacy at whatever levels may be necessary, within or without the United Nations, to win agreement upon some first step or steps which would put some brake upon the armaments race and contribute to the real national security of all concerned.

—Speech to Parliament, London. *To-day's World and the U.N. Four Address . . .*, U.N. Office of Public Information, p. 9.

#### UN (Secretary-General) May 1, 1958

You know that I have expressed myself many times in press conferences on disarmament. It is, of course, an extremely complicated problem and it is bound to develop with slowness. But there is a point in the development of disarmament where every time an initiative is taken in good faith and its possible consequences, its possible values, are not fully explored, I have the feeling that we have missed the bus. And we should not be too sure that the road will remain open for busses in all the future. That sense of urgency, that sense of responsibility, in the face of every new opening, from wherever it comes and whatever its immediate limited substance, was what prompted me, what made

me feel that it was one of those occasions where public statements by the Secretary-General are very much part of his duty and a very adequate supplement to private diplomacy.

Even if tomorrow's debate and the outcome of tomorrow's debate would not break the log jam, the very debate itself, with the elements introduced, has moved the base lines sufficiently to make me feel that there is every reason to continue the efforts all over the field. And it is a matter of course that what I have said concerning two initiatives, the Soviet decision and now the American proposal, applies to any forthcoming initiative which gives similar possible promises.

—Notes for Correspondents, No. 1794, pp. 11, 16.

UN (Secretary-General) May 19, 1958

. . . In a situation where, for years, we have had to register no results at all, the first break is bound to be limited, if regarded by itself alone, but its significance may be unlimited when considered as an opening to further exploration of possible areas of agreement. In this exploration the United Nations will remain at the centre of the picture, whatever the procedures chosen for specific questions or situations. I firmly believe that the possible value of the contribution of the Organization to progress in the field of disarmament warrants such a position.

—Speech in Miami, Florida. *Today's World and the U.N. Four Addresses* . . . , U.N. Office of Public Information, p. 17.

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

The disarmament question was also raised among the four Powers during their discussions in Geneva regarding the Berlin problem and related matters. Since the adjournment of those discussions, further consultations have taken place regarding the way in which negotiations on disarmament might now be re-activated. It has been felt that work on this problem in the General Assembly, or in a disarmament commission organized as a committee of the whole, could be fruitful only if preceded by consideration within a smaller group with the participation of countries which have a position of particular responsibility in this field. Such a preparation, obviously, could take place within a body set up by the General Assembly itself or by the Disarmament Commission. Alternatively, it could be organized independently on the initiative of, and by agreement among, some Member Governments. In the latter case, the discussion would not take place under a mandate of the United Nations nor on its behalf. In that sense it would be outside of the Organization. This, however, would not mean that the disarmament question, in any sense, would be withdrawn from the Organization, as in fact it could not be without violating the Charter. Were preparatory disarmament discussions to be taken up outside the

Organization, in the sense just indicated, the question which would arise, thus, would be how these discussions could best be integrated with the work to be pursued by the Organization itself. This question, if it arises, might be considered by the Disarmament Commission.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, *Suppl. 1A*, p. 6)

**AFGHANISTAN (Pazhwak) September 23, 1958**

153. Among the unfortunate factors which have hindered the achievement of satisfactory results in this field is the regrettable competition among nations in the arms race and the lack of confidence which has been standing in the way of disarmament and, consequently, in the way of the advancement of human progress and the maintenance of peace and security.

154. The obstacles preventing the peaceful uses of new energies for the purpose of achieving a better life for the people on the world are an integral part of this great impediment to the fulfilment of the common aspirations of man.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.*, 755 mtg.)

**AFGHANISTAN (Pazhwak) September 25, 1959**

87. It is encouraging that the way for a fresh start in dealing with the disarmament question seems not to be considered closed.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 198)

**ALBANIA (Shtylla) September 29, 1958**

19. An important factor in the increase of international tension is the armaments race, which has now passed the bounds of all imagination.

20. Disarmament is still the great question of the hour. Several years have gone by and no concrete result has been achieved either inside or outside the United Nations, owing to the fundamentally negative attitude of the Powers belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aggressive bloc and above all of the United States, which bears full responsibility for this state of affairs.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.*, 763 mtg.)

**AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 25, 1958**

26. A year ago the outlook for disarmament was very discouraging. In the past discussions have broken down, often apparently on technicalities, but in plain fact by reason of lack of mutual trust between countries, and their refusal to give up any existing advantages in return for concessions that may turn out to be illusory. At the same time, the clear possibility of mutual annihilation has driven the great Powers to continue despite the lack of progress. This determination to press on until worth-while agreement is reached is undoubtedly right. It is easy to say that there cannot be disarmament until there is mutual trust. This is true. However, the reverse is also true—that there cannot be mutual trust while the possibility of unrestrained military threat exists,

particularly the risk of surprise nuclear attack. Mankind cannot achieve disarmament in one step, but we may be able to edge forward by making simultaneously several carefully chosen, co-ordinated steps. . . .

27. *In spite of the continued tensions in many parts of the world, I believe the outlook for disarmament has improved since the twelfth session. During the past twelve months there have been a number of developments in the disarmament field. Some of them bring fresh problems, but on balance there has been progress. These developments include: agreement in Geneva between the representatives of the two major power blocs on the technical possibilities of detecting nuclear explosions; announcements by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom that they are prepared to suspend nuclear tests for the time being; subsequent arrangements to meet in Geneva in order to reach an agreement on suspension of nuclear tests; and now an agreement to begin international discussions on measures to prevent surprise attacks.*

28. I would mention also the continuing breaking-down of scientific barriers and secrecy, which was carried a stage further in the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva this month. The United States and the Soviet Union have succeeded in launching artificial satellites into outer space, with obvious military implications affecting both defence and disarmament. During the year also, there has been a valuable and sobering report on radiation by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [A/3838].

29. All these developments indicate that things are on the move.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., 759 mtg.)

#### AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 30, 1959

19. . . . we must also recognize, as realists, that the most substantial and promising approaches towards a solution on aspects of disarmament have been, not in United Nations bodies, whether small in number or consisting of all of our eighty-two Members, but in the talks this year in Geneva directly between the great Powers, particularly those talks on the control of nuclear tests, on which there is reason to believe that agreement may be close.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 258)

#### BELGIUM (Wigny) October 1, 1958

149. Politicians undoubtedly have more responsibility than they have technical knowledge and therefore cannot be reproached for not understanding at once all the implications of an invariably complicated disarmament plan. When in doubt, the obvious course is to abstain; but rather than hide behind inaction, might we not resort more widely to a procedure that has recently been tried and found to have merit? If politicians are reluctant to engage, even conditionally, in perilous

negotiations of uncertain outcome, let them at least entrust to experts the technical aspects of the problem. In negotiations of this kind the judgement of scientists must be relied on, for these men are vouched for not only by their scientific reputation but also by their intellectual integrity.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.*, 766 mtg.)

**BELGIUM (Wigny) September 25, 1959**

46. Much has been said about control and confidence. The West regards confidence as a consequence of control whereas the Soviet bloc consider rather that confidence is a prerequisite of control. Paradoxically, confidence alone, if achieved, would obviate the need for control and even for disarmament. The word given by either side would provide sufficient reassurance and would not need to be checked. The existence of dangerous stockpiles would be no cause for disquiet because everyone would know, for instance, that rockets are intended for trips to the moon and not for the annihilation of cities. But where there is no confidence at all, control by a potential aggressor is unacceptable. The first step must be conciliation.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 195)

**BULGARIA (Lukanov) September 30, 1958**

25. Disarmament is universally recognized as the most serious problem of our time. Our Organization rightly gives the closest attention to that problem at every session of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, however, no agreement has so far been reached on the cessation of the arms race or on disarmament. The cause lies in the enormous influence which the capitalistic monopolies manufacturing armaments exert on the policies of certain Western States.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.*, 765 mtg.)

**BURMA (Tun Aung) September 29, 1959**

146. We regret that the question of general disarmament had to be shelved during the year that has elapsed since the Assembly last met. But, it is certainly a matter for gratification that the Big Four Powers have come to an agreement on the imperative need for a fresh round of negotiations by a newly-formed ten-nation Committee. For the first time in the lengthy and turbulent years of disarmament negotiations, membership in the new body is divided evenly between the Western and Eastern blocs.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 248)

**CANADA (Smith) September 25, 1958**

115. Despite an uncompromising situation at the conclusion of the twelfth session, the course of events in 1958 has been such as to encourage those Governments which, like mine, hope to find greater security through an agreed programme of disarmament. The regular processes of negotiation within the United Nations were unfortunately disrupted by the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the work

of the Disarmament Commission. We deplored that Soviet decision last year *and we did so with a deeper conviction by reason of the efforts which we from Canada made, in cooperation with other delegations, to reconstitute the Commission in a way which would warrant the approval of the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations.* We continue to regret that decision of the USSR, not only because it has meant that no negotiations within the United Nations have taken place, but also because it was an additional illustration of the slight regard in which the Soviet Union holds resolutions, passed with large majorities, of the General Assembly.

116. Notwithstanding these procedural difficulties within the United Nations, there have been concrete negotiations through other channels. We all take satisfaction from the fact that agreed conclusions were reached at the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held in Geneva during July and August 1958. We in Canada were pleased to play some part in those discussions. We have welcomed the statements of the USSR [A/3904], the United States [A/3895] and the United Kingdom [A/3896] that negotiations by their representatives would begin on 31 October on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of a control system on the basis of the unanimous report of the experts.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 759 mtg.)

#### CANADA (Green) September 24, 1959

57. The central question of disarmament turns on the ability of States to find a basis of mutual confidence, and this is realistically reflected in Mr. Lloyd's proposals. That confidence must be such as to enable States to strike a balance between the obvious advantages of liquidating the burden of armaments and the political and military risks of reducing defence against aggression. This balance can be reached, I believe, only through supervised disarmament. There is, therefore, an inseparable relationship between disarming and control, and this must be reflected in any practical plan. The two must be negotiated in parallel and must be put into effect together. Without control, the mutual confidence required to disarm would be lacking, particularly in a time of great political and ideological conflict. Without disarmament, control, of course, would be irrelevant.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 165)

#### CHINA (Tsiang) September 29, 1959

75. The United Nations has discussed the problem of disarmament from the very beginning of this Organization. One of the difficulties we have encountered is the ever-present tendency to propagandize, which only beclouds and confuses the real issues involved. . . .

76. . . . the armament race and political conflicts are inextricably

linked. It is idle to speculate now whether political conflicts are the cause and the armament race the effect, or vice versa. Chronologically, it seems to me, political conflicts caused the armament race. However, the armaments race, having reached the stage it has, becomes in its turn the cause of political conflict. (UN. GA. 14th. *ORr.*, p. 242)

CUBA (Roa) September 24, 1959

14. My country also wishes to place on record its dissatisfaction with the fact that a subject of such vital importance as disarmament has been virtually withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Assembly. There is no alternative but to accept the report prepared by the Committee of Ten, to which the four Powers have given decisive powers,

(Same, p. 147)

DENMARK (Krag) September 25, 1959

18. We must admit that, in the years since 1945, detailed and lengthy discussions by experts on the question of disarmament have led to only modest results. I agree with the representative of Norway who stated [807th meeting] that a pragmatic approach has certain advantages; and the diplomatic and technical discussions on various aspects of the disarmament problem, which are already in progress, should, of course, continue. It could very well be, however, that we have now reached a point where decisions concerning the main principles of disarmament and the control thereof should be made at the highest level.

(Same, p. 192)

ETHIOPIA (Deressa) September 24, 1958

92. . . . It is discouraging to note, however, that neither the crushing burdens of armament expenditures nor the terrible threat of physical dangers have, to date, either appreciably slowed down the armaments race or dissuaded the great Powers from the threat and show of force as recurrent arguments in present-day diplomacy.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORr.* 756 mtg.)

FRANCE (Couve de Murville) September 25, 1958

111. In the field of disarmament, the same tendency was apparent from the start and has now been crystallized in the proposals submitted to the General Assembly. In all the texts there is evident the same concern not so much to settle problems as to secure a ratification of the political and military status quo.

112. In saying this I do not mean that it is possible to separate the problem of disarmament from political problems proper. Disarmament, like the armaments race preceding it, is not in itself a phenomenon, and it is clear that the more normal and expedient course, in order to make disarmament possible, would be to begin by creating a climate of confidence and a feeling of security.



113. We have not succeeded in achieving this in the ten years and more during which our Organization has endeavoured to promote a general disarmament plan. At least the efforts that have been made show us, in a concrete manner, the technical possibilities and impossibilities in this matter. They keep alive the spirit of disarmament, in particular by making international public opinion aware of the appalling threat implicit in the very existence of the nuclear weapon. They make it permissible to hope that if, reversing the usual order of things, agreements were concluded on the subject of a general plan, the consequent relief would facilitate the settlement of those political problems which are still pending and thus bring about the genuine relaxation of tension which we all desire.

116. Disarmament is a complex problem. The consequences of each measure taken separately are different for each of the countries chiefly concerned, so that a concern for equilibrium must be a primary consideration if some are not to be favoured while others are put at a disadvantage. Moreover, the over-all view must never be lost to sight, if we wish disarmament to be a dynamic and continuing process, the end result of which will be increased security for all. One last condition is that the proposed measures should be genuine measures of disarmament and not simply create an appearance of disarmament.

(Same, 758 mtg.)

**GHANA (Ako-Adjei) September 24, 1959**

46. On the general question of disarmament, we believe that fear and suspicion are the real bases of conflict and misunderstanding among the nations of the world today, and especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 165)

**HONDURAS (Perdomo) October 1, 1959**

The truth of the matter is that disarmament is still Utopia. But according to Lamartine, "Utopia is the ideal seen from afar"; there might be reasons to believe that that distant ideal could be fulfilled if we take into account the laws of nature and of history, which are those that govern the realizable ideals.

Every year we hear extremely eloquent statements and expressions of good will on disarmament, making this practically the cornerstone of international peace. But we must recognize the fact that arms are not the cause of war, they are only the instruments used by nations to make war. Arms and weapons are the effect, and not the cause. Nations arm because of lack of confidence and because they are afraid. We believe that even though arms were reduced, or were we to eliminate the causes for a war being unleashed, they would still exist. But we also believe that by reducing arms we would be [going] . . . towards the gradual elimination of all that we have called the "cold war,"

which is only international tension, [but which] . . . under certain circumstances might lead to a "hot war."

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, pp. 89-90)

#### HUNGARY (Sik) September 29, 1958

100. . . . The State Department's policy of challenge has brought the United Nations to an impasse also on the question of disarmament and the summit conference. How did this happen in each case?

101. How do the disarmament negotiations that have been going on for years on end appear to the observer? In a nutshell, the representatives of the policy of challenge interpret agreement on disarmament to mean that the Soviet Union should relinquish the arms necessary for its self-defence, while the representatives of the policy of challenge retain their most effective weapons. The twelfth session of the United Nations General Assembly was made an instrument of this conception. Obviously the deadlock on the question of disarmament can be broken—either inside or outside the framework of the United Nations—only if the representatives of the policy of challenge show their unquestionable willingness to discontinue their policy of challenge and sincerely desire progressive, controlled disarmament. The continuation and acceleration of the armaments race is an integral part of the policy of challenge. The picture they had painted was that the armaments race would impose such a burden on the socialist countries as to hamper economic development, which would contribute to making the Western great Powers emerge the victors in the armaments race and enable them to continue undisturbed in their bid for world leadership. But experience has proved this conception wrong. The Soviet Union has won the present round of the armaments race which it was forced to enter and, should the authors of the policy of challenge insist on continuing and even accelerating the armaments race, there is not much hope, given the combined efforts of the socialist countries, of the authors of the policy of challenge gaining any advantage in a next round.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 763 mtg.)

#### ICELAND (Gudmundsson) September 25, 1958

139. As in previous sessions, the question of disarmament will this year be the main problem in our deliberations. Since the beginning of the United Nations activities in 1946, the United Nations has always been greatly concerned about the question of disarmament, or—more correctly expressed—the question of reduction of armaments. This matter has been on the agenda of each of the twelve previous sessions of the General Assembly. It has been discussed here for months. A total period of more than a year must have been devoted to its handling in the General Assembly alone during twelve years, not counting all the months in the various disarmament committees. A whole bunch

of resolutions expressing pious and well-meaning desires for reduction of armaments, for the lessening of world tension and for peaceful coexistence and friendly, neighbourly relations, have been passed year after year—a whole bible of good intentions. But no result has yet been seen. The armaments race has continued and has been intensified and accelerated. New and constantly more effective means of destruction have been invented. We are told that during 1948 to 1956 the nations of the world spent about \$420,000 million on armaments, and in 1957 alone the military expenditure amounted to well over \$100,000 million. Now all the world wonders where we are being led, where we are going, what comes next.

140. Let me, however, admit with a feeling of relief and satisfaction that during the last few months some progress on the road to understanding and co-operation between the big Powers has been made. I refer to three points. Number one is the recent meeting in Geneva of experts from eight countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, to study the technical possibility of detecting violations of an eventual agreement to suspend nuclear weapons tests. The experts reached unanimous conclusions on what would be needed technically and they expressed the opinion that control over nuclear tests was possible and feasible. This should augur well for further steps along this road in the future. Point number two is that the big Powers have agreed to meet in Geneva on 31 October 1958 to consider the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. It is to be hoped that no political manoeuvring will hinder this conference from taking place and that the negotiators will arrive at a successful result. The third ray of hope is due to the fact that the big Powers have further agreed to send technical experts to Geneva on 10 November for discussions on the ways of preventing a surprise attack. All these are steps in the right direction and seem to guide the way for the future. It seems that the most likely method of achieving understanding and removing the political hindrances is for the international scientists and experts first to scrutinize the matters between themselves and prepare the ground for the statesmen to meet to proceed further.

141. It was regrettable that the twelfth session of the General Assembly ended in a deadlock on the work of the Disarmament Commission. . . . (Same, 759 mtg.)

INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 7, 1958

83. The main problem that faces us in this Assembly is the problem of disarmament. The United Nations has been considering this problem for the last ten years without any appreciable results. Indeed at one time it was given up altogether and the Disarmament Commission reconstructed. Some four years ago my delegation initiated the idea

of the establishment of a sub-committee, in the hope that discussions in an intimate body, without all the glare of publicity, would lead to some compromises. But, unfortunately, the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission also became a very public body and when one solution appeared suitable to one side and was put forward, it was not suitable to the other side. The same solution is advanced the next year by the other side and is not suitable to this side. So it goes on in this way. No one imagines that the establishment of disarmament is possible by waving a magic wand. The problem has got to be approached realistically, and the United Nations knows that there has been no abandonment at any time of the fundamental objectives.

84. I should like to submit with great respect that the passing of resolutions, even by large majorities, has not taken us anywhere nearer disarmament. It is one of those problems where the parties [must] consent, and therefore there can be no settlement without co-operation.

88. Last year, by a considerable majority, the United Nations voted for the reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission [resolution 1150 (XII)]. In the last twelve months, the Disarmament Commission has not met, that is to say, the whole machinery has not functioned apart from this ad hoc arrangement that was made and was successful.

89. The latest reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission was a step forward, as far as the General Assembly recognized that some new move had to be made, but that move either did not go far enough or somehow went in the wrong direction. . . . (Same, 774 mtg.)

INDONESIA (Sastroamidjojo) September 29, 1958

69. . . . After these many years, the question of disarmament not only still remains as the foremost item on our agenda, but at each session the world appears weighted down with more costly and complex military hardware, offering dire prospects for future survival. It is, however, not only a question of the terrible risk we run in piling up these military arsenals, which may be triggered off—even by accident—in a chain reaction ending in disaster. But should we avoid this, the enormous cost of modern military weapons and installations still condemns the greater part of the world's population to live at the lowest possible level of existence, increasing the danger to peace caused by mass poverty and want. The armaments race means for us of the less developed countries nothing less than a situation in which we are denied funds necessary for promoting the welfare of our people so that those funds may be used instead for building instruments of mass destruction. And to make it even worse, this situation is contributing at the same time to the ever widening gap between the so-called "have" and "have-not" countries.

(Same, 762 mtg.)

## IRAN (Hekmat) September 19, 1958

110. The mistrust of the great Powers towards one another has indeed created an atmosphere which has not only caused postponement and delay in the creation of a proper international system for the control of armament, but has also engendered a race in the production of weapons of mass destruction. In such circumstances, the small nations have been left with no alternative but to expend a substantial portion of their resources on the procurement of arms rather than directing them towards their social and economic development.

112. We are not, however, pessimistic about the ultimate prospects for disarmament. The earnest desire of the world community to see the establishment of an enduring peace will ultimately bring about the end of the arms race. It is most promising that the East-West Conference of Scientific Experts, in Geneva, reached agreement on a detection system to enforce an international ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The recent report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [A/3838], moreover, strikingly illustrated the imperative need to cease the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

113. Moreover, the results achieved at the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy have strengthened our hope that this power at mankind's disposal will not be employed as a weapon of mass destruction, but will be used solely for the promotion of progress in human society.

(Same, 751 mtg.)

## IRELAND (Aiken) September 23, 1959

68. The risk of nuclear war will, of course, remain so long as nuclear weapons exist, but it seems to us that nothing we can do will eliminate it entirely, until we change the political conditions which caused the nuclear stockpiles to be built up.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 132)

## ITALY (Piccioni) September 25, 1958

26. The method of separating the technical and scientific aspects from the political facets of nuclear disarmament has already yielded its first positive results in the control of nuclear tests.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., 758 mtg.)

## JORDAN (Rifa'i) September 23, 1959

89. Although no concrete conclusions have yet been achieved on the subject of disarmament, the impressive development along this line is that this issue is moving ahead in all directions to find a definite, practical and effective method for serving this purpose.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 134)

**LIBERIA (Cooper) September 30, 1959**

75. . . . The problem of disarmament has been discussed for many years, but no solution has been reached. Fears and suspicions still hover around us and we have to seek to remove the causes which create distrust and tension so that progress towards disarmament may be made possible.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 279)

**MEXICO (Padilla Nervo) October 6, 1958**

78. . . . peace depends fundamentally on what progress can be made towards disarmament. In accordance with this unshakable conviction, we have spared no effort at the various sessions of the General Assembly to help to bring the great Powers, and particularly the "nuclear Powers," closer together. Convinced that the only thing which can get us out of the impasse in which we have unfortunately been for some time, is not oratory but valid practical suggestions, however modest they may appear at first sight, we now wish to submit to this Assembly a few concrete ideas, the fruits of our reflections on some outstanding aspects of the disarmament question.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 771 mtg.)

**NEPAL (Shah) October 6, 1958**

11. It is indeed a sad state of affairs. The failure of the disarmament talks might eventually lead to the failure of the United Nations itself. We all know that the failure of the Disarmament Conference in 1930 eventually led to the collapse of the League of Nations and to the outbreak of the most disastrous war the world has so far seen. Let us hope that the agreement that has been reached between the scientists of the East and the West on the feasibility of setting up systems for the detection of atomic tests and the outcome of the conference between the representatives of the East and the West this month on a workable system for the prevention of surprise attacks might have an impact on the nations which will prove strong enough to compel them to resume disarmament negotiations in all seriousness.

(Same)

**NEPAL (Shah) September 21, 1959**

88. Disarmament is the primary function of the United Nations. The success or failure of the Organization depends largely on the extent of the progress made in the field of disarmament. The Geneva talks which began more than ten months ago gave us reason to hope for an early and effective cessation of nuclear tests. However, it is only too apparent that no effective solutions of problems related to disarmament can be achieved without the co-operation and participation of China.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 47)

**NEW ZEALAND (Nash) October 3, 1958**

20. . . . What has frustrated and embittered the disarmament negotia-

tions so far has been lack of confidence, warranted or unwarranted. It is that lack of confidence that today is destroying the possibility of building something better. It has sometimes been said that until confidence has been re-established through the solution of some of the major political problems besetting the world, no progress can be made on disarmament. That is a counsel of despair. . . .

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 770 mtg.)

**NORWAY (Lange) September 30, 1958**

50. Turning now to disarmament and related problems, I hope I am justified in describing the present situation with a fundamentally optimistic paradox; never has so little been accomplished within the United Nations with regard to disarmament as during the last year, and maybe never in the last ten years have the prospects for realistic progress in at least some fields of disarmament been better.

51. The Disarmament Commission, as established last year [resolution 1150 (XII)], has not been able to work. On the other hand, the great Powers have had successful talks on a technical level regarding the kind of control system which will be needed to observe compliance with an agreed stop in the testing of nuclear weapons. For the first time we are not limited to discussing the control issue in the abstract. We now know that control in the field of nuclear tests is feasible, what it should consist of and its degree of effectiveness. We are gratified to note that the method of taking up the technical aspects of specific disarmament problems has led to such good results. As will be recalled, this approach was recommended in a suggestion put forward by Pakistan and Norway during the twelfth session [A/3729, para. 20]. We are glad that similar technical discussions concerning measures against surprise attacks are about to commence. (Same, 765 mtg.)

**NORWAY (Lange) September 24, 1959**

167. The fact that the Powers chiefly concerned during the last year have discussed separately various elements of the very complex problem of disarmament is a promising development. A pragmatic, down-to-earth approach to the problems, starting with discussion of the technical aspects in particular, is, we believe, the method best suited to achieve in the end over-all and complete disarmament.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 174)

**PAKISTAN (Prince Aly Khan) October 3, 1958**

104. Despite the apparently complete deadlock on both the procedure and substance of the disarmament negotiations in the United Nations since the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the prospect for reduction of armaments is not a picture of unrelieved gloom.

105. It is encouraging to take note of three developments outside the

United Nations in the field of disarmament: first, the successful conclusion of the Conference of Experts affirming the technical possibility of setting up an effective supervision and enforcement system to detect nuclear weapons tests; secondly, the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other to join on 31 October 1958 in negotiating an agreement to ban further tests and to establish an international control system based on conclusions of the Conference of Experts; and thirdly, the accord between the two sides to start technical talks on the measures of inspection necessary to reduce the possibility of surprise attacks.

106. These developments entitle us to a measure of optimism in viewing the prospects for a reduction of armaments despite the discouraging failure to utilize the machinery of the enlarged Disarmament Commission for the purpose of negotiations.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 769 mtg.)

#### PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 25, 1959

13. It is on this rock of effective inspection that many a scheme of disarmament, whether comprehensive or partial, has foundered. The record of the disarmament negotiations shows that a control system to ensure the complete elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons of mass destruction is not yet feasible. If it is true that any kind of inspection which it may be possible to agree upon in this field would leave a margin of error which would expose one side to the risk that the other might evade it, it would seem that the prospects for total disarmament are no nearer than before.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 178)

#### PANAMA (Illueca) November 25, 1958

The resolution recently approved by the General Assembly to establish a disarmament commission composed of all eighty-one Members of the United Nations implies the necessity that the members of the Council and the Secretary-General study the manner of co-ordinating the work of that disarmament commission with the functions that the Charter has assigned to the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee. Although according to Article 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly can make recommendations to Members or to the Security Council, or to both, regarding the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, these powers cannot be taken to mean that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee may abdicate the functions which are specifically assigned to them in Articles 26 and 47 of the Charter regarding the working out of plans for the regulation of armaments and for possible disarmament.

(Doc. S/PV. 840, p. 3)



PERU (Porras) October 2, 1958

95. The disarmament question is without doubt the most urgent and important problem before the United Nations and the one which most seriously jeopardizes human progress and the cause of peace. Its solution is essential if there is to be any kind of legal order in the world, for legal order presupposes a regulation and limitation of power.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 767 mtg.)

PHILIPPINES (Serrano) September 23, 1958

116. Disarmament, in the view of my delegation, is not one of those questions which can be negotiated on the principle of "the more, the merrier." Four recent developments, however, add considerably to our hopes that a "breakthrough" might be developing in the interminably protracted discussions: first, the apparent understanding among the principal Powers to suspend, on a provisional basis, further experimental explosions of nuclear weapons; second, the Geneva accord on the feasibility of policing a ban on nuclear test explosions; third, the report of the United Nation Scientific Committee on the effects of Atomic Radiation concerning the hazards of radioactivity resulting from such explosions; and, fourth, the projected meeting in Geneva of technical experts from the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Pact on the problem of preventing a surprise attack.

117. It may be stated that none of these developments has a direct bearing on actual disarmament measures. But if it is accepted that the safest way to test the workability of any disarmament measure is to place it on an empirical basis, and that only such schemes as could be properly controlled at a given time should be adopted, then we submit that any agreement on enforcing the temporary cessation of nuclear tests, which may be reached by the Powers principally concerned cannot fail to yield the widest implications for the disarmament problem as a whole.

(Same, 755 mtg.)

PORTUGAL (Garin) September 26, 1958

88. Recent months have shown some progress on certain problems connected with the central problem of disarmament. In the words of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Dulles, "a significant break-through" was made at Geneva on the arms control front, after the successful conclusion of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests; and there is hope that a substantive agreement may now be negotiated. There are also expectations that other technical studies on atomic fall-out and on measures to reduce the dangers of surprise attack may be undertaken.

89. All this can be perhaps considered as the first rays of hope in what the Secretary-General calls "marginal approaches" to the central

problem of disarmament itself. While not wishing prematurely to raise our hopes too high, we certainly welcome those developments with a renewed conviction that the difficulties encountered on the path towards disarmament with security will sooner or later, and through constant efforts, be overcome; for such is the moral mandate that all Governments, without any exclusion, have received from their peoples. (Same, 761 mtg.)

ROMANIA (Bunaciu) September 25, 1958

84. . . . it has become clear that our debates, as well as the talks on disarmament, can be fruitful only if the legitimate interests of all parties in their own security are taken into account, without one side seeking to obtain advantages at the expense of the other. This principle of justice should be reflected in the composition of the United Nations organs concerned with disarmament as well as in the composition of the delegations which take part in the meetings between statesmen, diplomats or experts.

85. It is an accepted fact that certain measures can be dissociated from the general question of disarmament measures and can be discussed and adopted separately, if they are immediately applicable and if the method does not entail insuperable practical difficulties. Experience has shown that any other course is tantamount to deliberately preventing the adoption of any measure of disarmament. On the other hand, the acceptance of only a partial measure of disarmament opens the way for wider agreement, contributes to the relaxation of international tension and answers the unanimous wishes of the people.

(Same, 759 mtg.)

SAUDI ARABIA (Shukairy) October 1, 1958

90. Disarmament, as we all know, has progressed in every direction except disarmament. Commissions and sub-commissions were established; conferences and meetings were held in camera and in public. Resolutions were adopted and declarations made, and piles of records have grown in volume. But all this labour did not produce disarmament, rather it stepped up armament. It brought not a balanced reduction of arms but an unbalanced increase of military expenditure. It led not to a prohibition of atomic weapons, but to a stockpiling of hydrogen bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. It brought not the cessation of nuclear tests but the continuation of tests of all types and forms.

91. This year disarmament suffered another setback. There was a deadlock of default; no meetings were held and no deliberations took place. It was a deadlock that came after years of United Nations failures, preceded by a League of Nations frustration.

92. This has been a long and weary way, but the catastrophe is that it has no end in sight. What is more, the way seems to lead to a

precipice of despair, not to a plateau of hope. Disarmament is becoming the growing literature of the United Nations and nothing more. We admit, however, that some disarmament is taking place, but only through substitution and replacement. Hence, by chemists and physicists, and by arms, troops have been reduced. Conventional weapons have yielded to atomic weapons, and these in turn are giving way to nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Now, with the age of space, weapons of inner space are on their way to surrender to weapons of outer space.

93. This is the disarmament we have been watching in the life of the United Nations—disarmed from the old, to be armed with the new; abandoning the less destructive for the more destructive; in a word, deserting the humanely barbarous for the ghastly barbarous. This is the balance-sheet of disarmament, whose only balance is, I am afraid, turbulence, anxiety and frustration.

(Same, 766 mtg.)

#### SAUDI ARABIA (Shukaiky) September 25, 1959

66. By the force of living realities the United Nations role in this field is very much limited. No resolution or heap of resolutions would lead to disarmament. This is an item on which all efforts of the United Nations have thus far failed, and miserably failed. A discussion between the two "tête-à-tête," and heart to heart as we hope, is more likely to produce agreement. We believe that the United Nations at present can do very little, if anything at all, on this subject. Let us leave the great two to iron out their differences. This is no abolition of the United Nations, but a Charter method to facilitate the task of the United Nations. There is a stage when the Secretary-General can participate in such discussions with his usual exemplary ability. There is another stage when the United Nations in full can play a useful role.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 182)

#### SPAIN (de Lequerica) October 6, 1959

The most general and the most bitter political problems have to be settled in concrete form—and I refer particularly to disarmament. As far as we can see, nothing has become concrete. In past days negotiations on disarmament were undertaken in 1927 and 1932 in the now defunct League of Nations. Since the beginning of the century the armaments race has become a cause for concern, and it was only at the end of World War I that the problem of disarmament war formally considered and negotiations begun in Geneva. For many years the negotiations stagnated. The World War II beset the world. The United Nations was created and the problem came up again. Now we have hope in new negotiations. In the last few months, despite serious tensions, we still have hope. The magnitude of modern weapons

obviously has led many to wish to change the state of mind of people because of the fear of the possible consequences.

What was not achieved in the matter of conventional weapons is now perhaps to be included in negotiations which may lead to success. In this Organization we have noted signs of a new effort. Although it is true that at the recent conference in Geneva, definite results were not arrived at, at least one reason for encouragement has been the suspension—which is de facto maintained—of nuclear weapons tests, which have not as yet been renewed since last November. The constitution of the committee of ten, within which the principle of parity applies in the representation of the two military blocs and which, in its formal aspect, gives full satisfaction to one of the groups, is obviously another step forward.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 822, p. 33)

U.S.S.R. (Gromyko) September 18, 1958

14. Never before in peace time have such vast numbers of human beings been involved in war preparations. The following figures may be cited for purposes of comparison: whereas in 1929, during the temporary lull between two world wars, the direct military expenditure of all countries amounted to \$4.2 thousand million; in 1957, twelve years after the end of the Second World War, this expenditure rose to over \$100 thousand million. It should be noted that of this latter sum over \$60 thousand million represents the share of States members of NATO.

15. Other figures are equally significant. The number of men in the armed forces of States today is known to be in the tens of millions. It is also well known that for every individual serving in the armed forces there are several others working for the forces—in industry, agriculture, transport, communications, scientific research institutions, and so forth.

16. According to the most conservative estimates by economists, at least 100 million individuals are now directly or almost directly involved in war preparations. They are, as a rule, the most active and highly skilled individuals who are at the peak of their creative abilities. . . .

18. Today we thus have not only a build-up of armaments by individual States, which has reached dangerous proportions, but a whole system of military and other commitments which are used to expand the arms race, to impel other States into undertaking increasingly intensive preparations for war. . . .

19. The immense harm done to mankind by the arms race is in no way limited to the fact that it creates and, as each day goes by, increases the material resources without which an aggressor would be incapable of starting a war. The production of armaments, which is

continuing on an ever-growing scale, is causing suspicion and tension in international relations, as is quite understandable in the circumstances, and those States which would like to devote all their energy and resources to peaceful construction and to improving the level of living of the people, are compelled to be constantly on their guard and to counter the arms race imposed upon them by taking the necessary measures to strengthen their own security. . . .

22. Can the United Nations content itself in such a situation with the role of an outside observer? I can well imagine that there are some in this hall who will deny that the United Nations has played such a role. Yet that view cannot be upheld without contradicting the facts. It is, after all, a fact that, because of the position taken by the Western Powers and particularly the United States it has not been possible for the United Nations to act as a body directing the efforts of States towards the implementation of disarmament—that is, of course, if we are talking about practical results and not about disarmament negotiations and the many tons of paper consumed by the records of the meetings held on this question. . . .

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 750 mtg.)

U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) September 18, 1959

62. The problem of disarmament has been under discussion in the United Nations and other international forums for over fourteen years, but thus far no practical results have been achieved. . . .

63. Experience in disarmament negotiations has made it clear that one of the fundamental obstacles obstructing agreement is the question of control.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 35)

UNITED KINGDOM (Lloyd) September 25, 1958

64. I wish now to deal with the topic of disarmament. That is another matter where the interdependence of the world is very obvious. The consequences of modern armaments are such that they affect peoples far away from the scene of actual hostilities. The cost of modern armaments is such that to build them up throughout the world means a diversion of physical effort and resources from more worthwhile tasks. It is bound to affect the living standards of all. . . .

65. At its twelfth session, the General Assembly paid deep and serious attention to this problem, and recommended, in resolution 1148 (XII), which was approved by 56 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions, the lines on which the Powers concerned should continue to negotiate. The resolution suggested the outline of a disarmament programme, and the United Kingdom Government and fifty-five others supported this outline as forming a reasonable basis for further negotiation towards a partial disarmament agreement which could be put into effect in the world as it is today.

66. That resolution has remained almost a dead letter. Indeed, the Disarmament Commission, to the improvement of the composition of which much attention was given at the twelfth session, has not even been able to meet, nor has its Sub-Committee.

67. The Assembly will be aware that this deplorable situation has in no way been the fault of the United Kingdom Government or of our friends and allies. We have been ready at all times to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union on the lines so clearly marked out by the Assembly at the twelfth session. As the meeting of the Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers made clear in December 1957, only a month after the General Assembly approved resolution 1148 (XII), we were ready at any time to resume negotiations in the properly constituted United Nations bodies and to welcome suggestions from no matter what source provided they pointed to our goal of balanced, controllable disarmament.

68. But for nearly a year the Soviet Union has blocked the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The Soviet Government can do this because it is relatively impervious to the feelings of public opinion. I do ask the Assembly to consider, however, what would have been the reaction throughout the world if a Western Government had behaved so obdurately and had declared such a boycott of the United Nations machinery, as did the Soviet Government after the twelfth session of the General Assembly. The fact is that no democratic Government would be allowed by its public opinion to act in such a way. . . .

75. Another encouraging development is that the Soviet Government has recognized the need for technical discussion in another field, that of measures of inspection to reduce the possibility of surprise attacks. This also is something for which I appealed to the Assembly a year ago. If technical progress can be made on these measures, as it has been on the control of nuclear tests, then it should facilitate an agreement that could bring a real and invaluable increase of confidence in international relations; and this could in turn lead to other things. My Government greatly hopes, therefore, that the correspondence now proceeding between the United Nations and Soviet Governments on this subject will lead to a meeting of experts in the near future.

76. As a result of these various developments, we hope that the United Nations will itself be very soon able to resume fruitful work on disarmament through its own established machinery.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR. 758 mtg.)

UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) June 26, 1958

The United Nations can justly take credit for a record of solid achievement in 1957. The General Assembly was faced with a series of grave

issues. It met these challenges in a spirit of moderation and with responsible action. In most instances, painstaking effort and patient diplomacy produced *satisfactory solutions based on reasonable compromise*. Thus, peace was maintained in areas where existing tensions ran high, and substantial gains were achieved in the promotion of the social and economic well-being of mankind.

In the period under review a major step forward was taken in the field of disarmament when the General Assembly endorsed by a substantial majority the Western proposals for arms limitation and control.

. . . . .

These United Nations actions constitute a most encouraging world endorsement of the positive program of disarmament set forth by the United States—an endorsement of great significance in future discussions of the subject.

—Letter transmitting to the Congress the 12th Annual Report on U.S. Participation in the United Nations, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 4, 1958), 218-19.

#### UNITED STATES (Cargo) October 24, 1958

The United Nations has had, and will continue to have, an important role to play in the search for meaningful disarmament. The United Nations has provided an opportunity for all members to contribute their ideas on disarmament. It has facilitated actual negotiations by establishing bodies such as the Disarmament Subcommittee, through which *extensive negotiations were carried out in London between the Soviet Union and Western states*. The United Nations, by resolutions it has adopted, has recognized the importance of balanced measures of disarmament under appropriate safeguards. The United Nations might well provide the framework within which a control and inspection system might be established under the provisions of any disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union.

—Address before the Rochester Citizens Committee for United Nations Day, *DSB*, XXXIX (November 10, 1958), 729-30.

#### UNITED STATES (Murphy) November 11, 1958

Disarmament has been a prime concern of the United Nations since its inception, and the United Nations has played a central role in efforts to achieve it. The subject is considered each year in the General Assembly. In order to give continuous attention to the problem, however, the Assembly created a United Nations Disarmament Commission, whose membership within the last week was raised from 26 to 81 representatives, the entire membership of the United Nations. The Commission, when it was a 26-member body, did not meet last year because of a Soviet boycott on the question of the composition of mem-

bership. This new composition should now break the deadlock which has hampered the United Nations in playing its rightful role.

Prior to last year's boycott of the Commission by the Soviet Union there had been established within the Commission a Disarmament Subcommittee composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The Subcommittee functioned as a practical working group which attempted to hammer out some agreed-upon formula for a disarmament agreement.

The Subcommittee in 1957 held an extended meeting in London and seemed to be making excellent progress—unprecedented progress—leading toward an agreed-upon pattern of disarmament. The Soviet Union seemed more reasonable than ever before. Then suddenly the Soviet Union reversed itself and broke off the negotiations. The matter then reverted to the Kremlin, although what connection there may have been we can only speculate.

However in the Assembly the Soviet attitude persisted and further useful efforts there, particularly after the Soviet Union announced its boycott of the Disarmament Commission, were fruitless. We felt that the important thing was to continue pushing ahead, in spite of the Soviet attitude, even if this meant doing our work outside the established U.N. machinery.

Accordingly on April 28 President Eisenhower proposed that scientific experts from both sides of the Iron Curtain meet to consider the feasibility of detecting nuclear explosions. These technical talks were eventually agreed to by the Soviet and began on July 1. After 7 weeks they resulted in agreement on a set of recommendations which could serve as the basis for the establishment of an international control system. The conference concluded on August 21.

—Address at the Milwaukee County War Memorial Center, DSB, XXXIX (December 1, 1958), 875.

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) October 18, 1959

A new committee has been established outside the United Nations consisting of five representatives from the Western states and five Soviet bloc members. This group will begin its discussions in Geneva early next year.

All of you know how persistently we have tried to engage in fruitful disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union in the United Nations. These efforts have not been successful. We have decided that we cannot and must not allow a matter as basic to the survival of our civilization as our disarmament efforts are to collapse because of procedural difficulties.

On the assumption that no stone should be left unturned which might bring some progress, we agreed to the creation of this new committee.



There is not the slightest intention on our part to bypass the United Nations. We recognize fully that ultimate responsibility for disarmament continues to rest with the United Nations. And we sincerely hope that results achieved by the new committee will provide a useful basis for the renewed consideration of disarmament in that Organization. —Address at Miami Beach, Florida, *DSB, XLI* (November 9, 1959), 666.

**YUGOSLAVIA (Popovic) October 2, 1958**

51. It must be noted with regret that during these past twelve months United Nations activity in connexion with disarmament proper has come to a halt. Such a situation cannot be considered normal from the standpoint either of disarmament or of the role or responsibilities assigned to the United Nations by the Charter.

52. Technical studies and preliminary work by conferences of experts have an important role to play in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem. We are convinced, however, that the problem of disarmament is by force of circumstance essentially a political one and that efforts to solve it must therefore be made on that level.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 767 mtg.)

*Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee*

**ALBANIA (Shrylla) October 1, 1959**

111. . . . Our Government considers that the establishment of the ten-power committee represents an important step on the way to the solution of the problem of disarmament. The programme of total disarmament, submitted by the Soviet Union, has this great advantage that it would resolve the deadlock in discussions which have been lasting for some fourteen years with regard to this problem and it points to a radical and concrete solution. Heretofore, the Western Powers have frequently wished to justify their refusal to consider the many proposals and concrete steps suggested by the Soviet Union to solve this problem, by claiming as their major pretext that control was necessary. It is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union has always had a realistic and constructive attitude on this matter. It is clear that one cannot speak of control without disarmament; what is necessary is to have controlled disarmament. [Translated from the French].

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 298)

**EL SALVADOR (Urquiza) September 29, 1959**

115. Four of the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—recently made a curious approach to the problem of disarmament by setting up a disarmament committee consisting of themselves and of Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland and Romania.

Committee—is so limited in practice that it does not cover the suggestion raised, I think, by Dr. Libby.

—Notes to Correspondents, No. 1760, pp. 5-6.

UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958

The United Nations Radiation Committee established by the General Assembly is another organ on which East and West are represented which also has met consistently in private in the preparation of its forthcoming report. There has been, in this committee of specialists, a consistent effort to arrive at conclusions which will represent the consensus of the best scientific thought of the whole world, regardless of political considerations, about a problem which deeply concerns all the peoples of the world.

—Speech to Parliament, London *To-Day's World and the U.N. Four Addresses . . .*, U.N. Office of Public Information, p. 7.

AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 25, 1958

35. With regard to atomic radiation, the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation presents in some ways a less frightening picture than some of us may have feared. But, even so, it does not reflect a situation that any of us can accept with complacency. The report shows that we have not stepped over the precipice. But the precipice is there, whether it is an inch or a mile away. One point which emerges from the report is that the exposure to radiation resulting from nuclear explosions so far, or even in the foreseeable early future, is very much less than that which arises from existing natural causes and from industrial, research and medical application for peaceful purposes. Contamination could well become more significant as the peaceful application of atomic energy proceeds.  
(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 759 mtg.)

CANADA (Green) September 24, 1959

71. I should like now to touch upon another question of vital importance: the hazards resulting from the addition of man-made radiation to that which already occurs in nature. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, in its report this year to the General Assembly [A/4119], has outlined what appears to my delegation to be an admirable and useful programme for the next few years.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., pp. 166-67);

YEMEN (Rahim) October 6, 1959

The sinews of peace have also been healthfully exercised in wrestling with the problem of nuclear experiments. Their temporary suspension to the end of this year may spur this session of the General Assembly to lay a firm foundation for the absolute and permanent prohibition of these experiments, as well as to provide for the necessary controls

over this prohibition. My delegation, however, views with deep concern the announcement by France that it plans to carry out atomic experiments in the African Sahara. Such plans create fears of great danger, especially to the northern half of the African continent. In spite of assurances by the French representative last week that precautions will be taken to eliminate all risks, the report of the Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation clearly reveals the futility of such precautions. Since the atomic Powers have temporarily heeded the collective appeal of the world to end these experiments which endanger the human race, we cannot suppress our hope that France will be persuaded to abandon the Sahara tests.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 822, pp. 2-3)

### *Surprise Attack*

UN (Secretary-General) April 29, 1958

84. You may recall that some time ago, in a press conference, I found reason to welcome the decision of the Soviet Union to suspend unilaterally tests of atomic bombs. I did so solely on the basis of an evaluation of the possible impact of this move on the stalemate reached in the disarmament debate. In the same spirit and on the same basis, I wish today to welcome the initiative taken by the United States in presenting a proposal which might break up the stalemate from the angle of a limited system of inspection. I note that this is in response to the expressions by the Soviet Union of its fear for the possible consequences, in a direction of immediate concern to it, of the present state of extreme preparedness in the field of armaments. . . .

The stalemate in the field of disarmament has been permitted to last far too long. Attempts to break it through negotiations have so far proved of no avail. I think there are reasons of different kinds behind this deeply worrying failure. One is that in a sense Governments have been too ambitious, not being satisfied with just making a dent in this intricate and vital problem from which a rift could develop, opening up the possibilities of a true exchange of views.

86. Another reason has been a tendency for each Government to wait for others to take the first step. Still another reason, and of course the basic one, is the crisis of trust from which all mankind is suffering at the present juncture and which is reflected in an unwillingness to take any moves in a positive direction at their face value and a tendency to hold back a positive response because of a fear of being misled.

87. Such initiatives as those to which I have referred, one of which is today being considered by the Security Council, are steps which could make a dent in the disarmament problem. They might have a major

impact if treated in good faith which is, of course, not the same as to let down one's guard. And they could, if followed through, provide a first frail basis for the development of some kind of trust.

88. Each Government is in close contact with the opinion of the man in the street in its own country. For that reason, I am sure that all Governments are in a position to confirm my statement that the peoples are eagerly and anxiously expecting leadership to bring them out of the present nightmare. The Government taking a fruitful initiative will be hailed as a benefactor by the peoples. The Governments responding in a positive spirit so as to give effect to such an attempt to reverse present developments will share the merit with the one who took the first step.

89. I have felt it incumbent on me to state these few simple reactions, I have done so, as I said, under my obligations to the peoples whose voice is reflected in the Charter under which I am acting. I trust that my intervention will not be misinterpreted as a taking of sides, but merely as an expression of profound feelings which are current all over the world and which have a right to be heard here also, outside the framework of Government policies.

90. I hope that each one of the Governments represented around this table will wish to try out the line of trust as a way out of the disintegration and decline under which we now all suffer.

(UN. SC. ORs. 815 mtg., pp. 17-18)

#### CANADA (Ritchie) April 29, 1958

... fear and anxiety derive not from the scientific developments themselves, but from the doubt and suspicion which characterize the relations between the States mainly concerned. This condition of suspicion and fear, this wariness about the intentions of the opposite side, this lack of confidence in international dealings, has led the world along the path of armed preparedness. Moreover, as was amply explained at our meeting, as long as the nations of the West consider that their security is threatened, they will insist that definite preparations continue and improve in accordance with scientific discovery.

4. I have no doubt that this attitude finds corresponding expression on the Soviet side. During the past few years, however, there has been some sifting of this problem through international study in the General Assembly, in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, and elsewhere. We believe that this process has made it more possible for us to define a principal cause of doubt and anxiety in international relations.

7. It is just because we recognize surprise attack as perhaps the most ominous of the dangers facing the world that the Canadian Govern-

ment warmly welcomes the initiative which the United States has taken in the Security Council today. In our view, the proposal for the prompt establishment of a system of inspection in northern areas to provide safeguards against the danger of surprise attack represents a practical attempt to deal with this most deeply-rooted cause of anxiety and tension.

8. *Before I enter further into the substance of the draft resolution now before us, I should like to call attention to the somewhat novel situation in which the Security Council finds itself. I think that I am right in saying that this is one of the few occasions—if not the first occasion—on which a member has requested the Council to convene to consider, not a complaint nor the action consequent on a General Assembly resolution, nor the report of a subsidiary organ or of some agent of the United Nations, but a positive and constructive proposal which is designed to assist the Council in maintaining international peace and security. It is the Canadian Government's hope that these proceedings will show that the Council can act constructively through the adoption of preventive as well as remedial measures.*

\*     \*     \*     \*     \*

10. We should like to think that the proposal now before us is only a first step, to be followed both by disarmament measures relating to nuclear and conventional weapons and forces and by a further extension of safeguards against surprise attack. It is our hope that co-operation in the development of security in the Arctic can provide a basis for larger agreements relating to disarmament and other questions which could be examined jointly with the Soviet Union. Among these other measures which might be discussed are, for example, those which would be necessary to verify compliance with an agreement to suspend nuclear tests.

11. I must say that the reception given to the United States proposal by the Soviet Union representative at the previous meeting was depressing: in our views, the position taken by the Soviet Union representative was in some ways incomprehensible. If the Soviet Union Government is seriously worried about developments in the Arctic, why does it reject a proposal designed to set up inspection in that area? It may estimate that such inspection can serve no useful purpose and cannot diminish insecurity, but how can it know this in advance? The United States draft resolution calls on the States mentioned "to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required." Surely, it is in such discussions that the scope of inspection required and its objectives could be examined. Does the Soviet Union Government refuse even to discuss these problems? And, if I may ask, what harm

could it do the interests of the Soviet Union Government to participate in such discussions? That Government would have at least demonstrated its willingness to examine all possibilities of decreasing international tension. (Same, pp. 2-4)

#### CHINA (Tsiang) April 21, 1958

. . . an international agreement to prevent surprise attack is the most constructive and fruitful single step that the nations can take to relax international tension and to strengthen world peace. . . .

67. The complaint is, of course, related to the problem of the armaments race. The General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have all dealt in great detail with the complicated problems of disarmament. It is generally recognized that the problems of disarmament are intimately linked with certain political problems. It is also recognized that one type of armament is linked to other types of armaments. It would not be easy to single out any phase or any particular problem, either in the political or the military field, as the most important of all.

68. But it has seemed to my delegation, and in fact to many delegations, that in this concatenation of problems there is one step which we can take, and which if taken, will deal to other beneficent political and military steps; and that step is an agreement to prevent surprise attack.

(Same, 813 mtg., p. 16)

#### CHINA (Tsiang) April 29, 1958

The present proposal limits international inspection to the Arctic Circle, together with Alaska, Kamchatka and the nearby islands. Now, the usual objection, whether expressed or implied, to any effective international inspection system is that such international inspection opens the way to international espionage and to foreign interference in domestic affairs. The Arctic Circle—whether the part that belongs to the Soviet Union or the part that belongs to other countries—has, I should think, very little to be spied upon and very little to be interfered with. This region seems to be the logical region in which to start this system of international inspection. Certainly, such a system in the Arctic Circle would impose the least burden and the least risks on the countries participating.

(Same, 815 mtg., pp. 14-15)

#### FRANCE (Georges-Picot) April 21, 1958

. . . resolution 1148 (XII), on disarmament . . . provided for the convening of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and the establishment of groups of technical experts composed of one expert from each of the States members of the Sub-Committee and one expert for each of three other States Members of the United Nations to be

designated by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Sub-Committee.

79. The groups of experts were to study inspection systems for disarmament measures and the Sub-Committee was to report to the Disarmament Commission by 30 April 1958. Resolution 1148 (XII) also provided, in paragraph 1 (e)—and I quote this important text—for “the progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack.”

80. These recommendations are a dead letter because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has assumed the grave responsibility—and may I say in passing that this does not strengthen the authority of the United Nations—of paralysing for four months the preparatory work necessary for the conclusion of an agreement on disarmament which would furnish appropriate controls and guarantees and provide for the establishment of a system that would make it possible to avoid situations of the kind to which the Soviet complaint [against “flights by United States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union”] refers.

(Same, 813 mtg., pp. 17-18)

FRANCE (Georges-Picot) May 2, 1958

The watchful eye of the United States Strategic Air Command in the Arctic zone is, in the present circumstances, the best guarantee against a surprise attack and must therefore be maintained so long as there is no change in the world situation. Only when a system of international inspection has been established in this area by joint agreement—then and only then—will it be possible to relax our vigilance. . . .

17. We are aware, of course, that an international inspection zone will not be sufficient in itself to restore confidence and to provide lasting security. That is why my Government still adheres faithfully to the constructive proposals on controlled disarmament put forward by the Western members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission on 29 August 1957 and approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957. The establishment of a special system for the Arctic area should not, in its view, be regarded as a departure from the principle of the indivisibility of the disarmament measures. . . .

. . . the decision which the Council is asked to take today in the United States draft resolution could, as Mr. Lodge pointed out, be the significant turning-point that mankind has been long awaiting, if the Soviet Union were willing to join in it. There is no question of any measure being imposed by a majority vote, as Mr. Sobolev claimed; we are only asked to decide unanimously on the opening of negotiations in which each one would be free to reject or accept any measure examined. . . .

(Same 816 mtg., pp. 5-6)

**IRAQ (Khalaf) April 29, 1958**

73. Although we realize that only those countries directly concerned would take part in the proposed discussions to establish the northern zone of inspection against surprise attack, we nevertheless are convinced that every country will be both interested in seeing to it that those discussions are started immediately and well advised to do so.

(Same, 815 mtg., p. 16)

**JAPAN (Matsudaira) April 29, 1958**

The draft, if adopted, will certainly serve to allay the fear of surprise attack across the Arctic area. We must admit that the scope of the draft resolution is rather limited. It covers geographically only a narrow area. It envisages specifically an inspection system to guard against surprise attack. However, as I understand it, this system of Arctic inspection would only be a first step toward a broader inspection system to prevent the possibility of surprise attack over other regions as well as the Arctic. It could also pave the way for a broader inspection system which would cover all the other aspects of disarmament problems. It would undoubtedly be conducive to the setting up of a body or bodies of experts to study such an inspection system, including the one provided for in General Assembly resolution 1148 (XII). In short, we welcome this measure as a significant move towards disarmament.

(Same, p. 8)

**JAPAN (Matsudaira) May 2, 1958**

. . . I wish to pay tribute on this occasion to the Secretary-General for making the statement he did during the last meeting of the Security Council. We are grateful indeed for that part of his statement in which he so forcefully dwelt upon the importance of breaking the stalemate in the field of disarmament. We admire the moral courage and the sense of responsibility, equal to his stature, he displayed when he put forward the view that the basic reason for this stalemate is the crisis of trust from which all mankind is now suffering. This statement reflects exactly the feelings of the Government and people of Japan on this issue. It reflects also the voice of broad humanity. . . .

37. My delegation deems it the supreme duty of the Security Council as a whole to exert strong leadership in order to break, at this juncture, the disarmament stalemate and to restore confidence among peoples, thus delivering nations from fear and confusion. Though limited in scope, the inspection system proposed for the Arctic area would be the entering wedge in what has been heretofore a deadlocked situation and would set moving the slow and cumbersome machinery of disarmament.

38. The most important thing is not to give the entire world, which is watching the Security Council, the sight of one more spectacle of antagonism, split leadership, and inefficiency in this body. It is my



delegation's considered opinion that the Security Council cannot afford, when faced with the menace of mankind's annihilation, to be paralysed by the national interests, military or otherwise, of its members. There is a consideration superior to such interests on such an issue as that which we are dealing with. No member of the Council, however powerful, has the right not to be constructive. Each member has, my delegation feels, a moral obligation to say more than just "no." Each *must advance his share of specific measures to attain the common ideal.* If need be, we shall have to be satisfied with a half-way solution. In this sense, the Security Council is duty-bound to find positive answers to the problem. *Under these circumstances, we should like to appeal to the members concerned not to use their veto power on this specific issue.* I feel, on the other hand, that the Security Council should strive to create an atmosphere which will preclude the necessity for the members concerned to resort to the use of the veto power.

39. I am saying this, because, as I understand it, the United Nations is the last bulwark of peace; it is the last hope of mankind. I am convinced that the important issues, such as disarmament, will have to be settled under the aegis of the United Nations.

(Same, 816 mtg., pp. 9-10)

PANAMA (Illueca) April 29, 1958

41. The measures we adopt to avoid a surprise attack will open the way to disarmament. I have previously had occasion to emphasize that if there is a real desire to free the world from the threat of another war, there must be disarmament; but before disarmament can be attained mutual trust between peoples must be established. There could be no better source of such trust than the certainty, through the adoption of international measures to that end, that they will not be victims of surprise attack. . . .

46. The draft resolution takes note of the statements made by various members of the Council at the preceding meeting regarding the particular significance of the Arctic area, not only for the countries that possess territories there, but for all those who feel that an atomic encounter in that area would unleash a total war which would be the death-blow to world peace.

47. This has from the very outset been the attitude of the vast majority of the Council, as we have said before. The dangers inherent in a surprise attack were the crux of the debate at our earlier meeting. On behalf of my country I expressed the certainty that there would have been no occasion for the Soviet complaint if the preliminary talks had been held.

(Same, 815 mtg., pp. 10-11)

SWEDEN (Jarring) April 29, 1958

50. It is therefore gratifying that the question of measures aimed

at achieving safeguards against surprise attack has been brought up for international discussion and that the Security Council is now to give this question thorough consideration. (Same, 814 mtg., p. 9)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) April 29, 1958

65. The action of the United States Government in raising the question of inspection of territories north of the Arctic Circle not only does nothing to eliminate the threat of a surprise attack and to reduce tension among States, but, on the contrary, reveals once again its real purposes. The authors of the proposal wish to divert the Security Council from the important question raised by the Soviet Government. At the same time, they wish to obtain intelligence data concerning a large part of the territory of the Soviet Union, which is not sending its bombers in the direction of the frontiers of the United States and which is not causing any threat either to the United States or to any other State.

. . . . .

69. The United States proposal to separate the question of an Arctic zone of inspection from the general problem of disarmament does not indicate a readiness to put an end to this dangerous playing with atomic weapons nor a desire to solve the problem of disarmament.

78. The submission of the United States draft resolution to the Security Council can be interpreted only as an attempt to impose a decision on one aspect of the disarmament problem by holding a vote in a body the majority of whose members are linked by military agreements. However, such methods cannot succeed. The entire course of disarmament negotiations in the United Nations has shown that imposed decisions by no means lead to a solution of the disarmament problem, and remain on paper. The disarmament problem cannot be solved by a vote. The only real road to a solution is that of negotiation on the basis of equality and mutual recognition of the need to guarantee the security of both sides. (Same, pp. 12-14)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) May 2, 1958

22. It was . . . difficult to understand that a statement in support of the United States proposal should have been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations [815th meeting]. The addition of Mr. Hammarskjöld's voice to the chorus of representatives of NATO countries and their allies glorifying the United States propaganda manoeuvre did not alter the character of that manoeuvre or make it any more attractive; nor did the Secretary-General's statement contribute towards strengthening his own authority. Indeed, quite the contrary.

24. The Soviet Union long ago stated, and firmly holds to the

position, that it will take part only in those disarmament commissions or committees at least half of whose members consist of socialist States and of countries which do not belong to military groupings. The present United States proposal provides for the creation of a group composed of the Soviet Union and six NATO members to discuss questions of Arctic inspection. Is this a serious, constructive approach to negotiations? (Same, 816 mtg., p. 6)

UNITED KINGDOM (Sir Pierson Dixon) April 29, 1958

23. It is the firm opinion of my Government that the best way to make progress with the complex problems of security and disarmament is for those concerned to hold practical discussions of the kind proposed in order to establish what could and should be done. In our view, the mere fact that all the Powers concerned had agreed to co-operate in technical discussions on international inspection for the Arctic area would in itself help to allay mutual fear of surprise attack and thus diminish international tension and promote confidence.

24. In this connexion it is noteworthy that what is being proposed is *international inspection carried out by international teams*, and that it is the intention that the teams should always include a representative of the country on whose territory the teams are working. The establishment of such an arrangement could therefore involve no threat to the security of the countries concerned.

(Same, 815 mtg., p. 7)

UNITED KINGDOM (Sir Pierson Dixon) May 2, 1958

... The fact is that, if all the Powers concerned agreed to co-operate in technical discussions on international inspection for the Arctic area, this would have a value extending far beyond the value of the agreement itself. By helping to allay mutual fear of surprise attack it would diminish international tension and promote international confidence. ...

9. I find it difficult to understand the reception which hitherto has been given by the delegation of the Soviet Union to the proposal put forward by the United States. That proposal is designed expressly to allay fears of surprise attack over the Arctic area by establishing, with the agreement of all the States concerned, a zone of international inspection in that area. It was put forward to meet the anxieties on this score which had been expressed earlier in the Security Council by the representative of the Soviet Union.

... It is the hope of my delegation that the Soviet Union Government will now have taken account of the support for the United States proposal which was so widely expressed at the last meeting of the Council, and that the Soviet Union will not reject a proposal which has been put forward in so evidently sincere a desire to meet Soviet anxieties, and with the object of making some progress which

could contribute to a lessening of mutual distrust and to an international agreement on the wider issues at stake.

(Same, 816 mtg., pp. 2-4)

#### UNITED STATES (Lodge) April 29, 1958

. . . As the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, said on 29 May 1957, we were "trying to get something started quickly; and as far as we are concerned we will take any area which is sufficiently free of political complications so that the whole process does not get bogged down." To this end the United States suggested that we make a beginning in the Arctic region where Soviet and American territory significantly adjoin.

32. No action was taken at that time. Then, last week, the Soviet Union raised the item placed on our agenda, which clearly gave new significance to this earlier Arctic zone proposal. After careful consideration we concluded that this proposal was applicable to the present circumstances.

33. Let me make clear that this United States proposal is made entirely apart from the general topic of disarmament. The United States is not now attempting to bring the subject of disarmament before the Security Council. There is before the Security Council an alleged threat to the peace. We want to dispel any possibility of fear that the peace will be disturbed even accidentally.

34. The United States has never considered that inspection against surprise attack was in itself disarmament. . . .

. . . . .

47. This meeting of this Security Council here in New York today could mark the turn in the road for which humanity has been looking. Let us reassure the world by reaching agreement on this important matter. Let us rise to the occasion. (Same, 814 mtg., pp. 7-8)

#### UNITED STATES (Lodge) May 2, 1958

. . . The Soviet representative has characterized the United States proposal as merely a scheme for collecting intelligence information. Obviously if this proposal were put into effect, it would be possible to collect new information. But what is of utmost importance is that such information would be collected under international auspices, as part of an internationally approved system to which the States concerned would all have to agree. It is precisely this lack of openness and information about intentions and military capabilities that creates the present tensions and the present fears. As long as we try to maintain this secrecy, the present situation will not improve.

. . . If we could with the aid of the United Nations and the ingenuity of our scientists erect a great wall of vigilance in the Arctic wastes, surely many of our apprehensions would be reduced.

32. Let me add one word of agreement with one of the comments of the Soviet representative. We have never claimed that the disarmament problem can be solved by vote. We agree that negotiations are needed. We have submitted proposals on all aspects of disarmament. We are ready and anxious to begin discussions of this problem again, either in the United Nations Disarmament Commission or as part of the preparatory discussions for a possible conference of heads of Government. But here and now an important start could be made through the discussions which are called for in the pending draft resolution.

. . . Over and over again in the past twelve years, the Soviet Union has rejected proposals made in good faith to improve the chances of peace. Today, it is painfully clear that Soviet opposition to our proposal for Arctic inspection is total. Once again the Soviet Union has turned down a constructive proposal. For the eighty-third time it has used the veto. (Same, 816 mtg., p. 8 and 817 mtg., p. 3)

### *Testing Nuclear Weapons*

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1958

A controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests represents one aspect—and an important aspect—of the disarmament problem as it is now pending before the United Nations. The whole question of disarmament has been a matter of continuing and increasing concern to us all. Your successful resolution of questions connected with the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests will, I have no doubt, be a signal contribution in making an effective dent in the hitherto rather intractable problem of disarmament. It will hereafter lie with the governments concerned and the United Nations to follow through the opening you have created.

—Message to Conference in Geneva, Press Release SG/715, p. 1.

UN (Secretary-General) August 25, 1958

I refer to the meeting this summer . . . of experts . . . to study the technical possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement to suspend nuclear weapons tests. . . . these experts reached agreed conclusions on what would be needed, from the technical point of view. Thus, by isolating certain non-political, scientific elements from the politically controversial elements in the total problem of disarmament, the area of conflict has been somewhat reduced. . . .

With the successful conclusion of the technical talks at Geneva, all the present atomic Powers have now taken initiatives in the direction of a suspension of further weapons tests. These moves must also be welcomed as contributions to a more encouraging framework for a new

approach to the disarmament problem. It is the duty of the United Nations to respond by intensified efforts, so as to make the gains which may be derived from such initiatives lasting gains.

(UN. GA. 12th. *ORs. Suppl. No. 1A*, p.1)

**UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959**

The discussions in Geneva among representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding nuclear tests, which have been going on for over a year, are, quite apart from their general importance, of direct concern to the United Nations, since they cover an aspect of the disarmament question of great significance. Whatever the final outcome, the progress so far made is to be welcomed as a valuable contribution in the direction of efforts towards disarmament, for which the United Nations under the Charter has the ultimate responsibility. At the invitation of the participating countries, the Secretary-General has been represented at the talks from their beginning. Were the discussions to result in the setting up of a control organ, the question would arise whether and, if so, how this organ should be related to the United Nations. It is to be foreseen that this question in due time would be the subject of special negotiations with the United Nations, aiming at an agreement which would maintain an appropriate link for the Organization with this special activity of some of its Member nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs. Suppl. 1A*, p. 6)

**AFGHANISTAN (Pazhwak) September 25, 1959**

90. While it is gratifying that the nuclear Powers have announced that the ban on the testing of nuclear weapons will be extended, it is regrettable that the complete cessation of nuclear tests has not been agreed upon.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 198)

**BURMA (Tun Aung) September 29, 1959**

148. We are also gratified to note that significant progress has been made in the Geneva discussions between the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom on the cessation of nuclear tests. One of the barometers of world tension has been the progress of this Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which has been meeting at Geneva since July 1958 and which adjourned till 12 October, that is, throughout the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks which were expected to deal with this matter, among others. The hopes and fears of many people have concentrated on the projected Geneva Conference which has received more than its share of appeals from official and unofficial bodies. Before adjournment, in an atmosphere of cordiality, the participants cheered the world with happy

tidings. The United States undertook not to hold any tests before 1960. The United Kingdom has agreed not to test while negotiations continue and the Soviet Union promise not to be the first to resume tests. We welcome these assurances, not only for the prospect of poison-free atmosphere, but also for the fact that they herald a broader agreement on disarmament itself. All of us, I am sure, are heartened by the spontaneous decisions of each of these three countries not to resume nuclear tests as long as the others do not resume them. We wish to commend them for this wise and humane decision.

(Same, p. 249)

**CANADA (Green) September 24, 1959**

64. One aspect of disarmament from which we can all draw some encouragement, is the fact that there now exist seventeen agreed articles of a draft treaty—on discontinuance of nuclear tests—which treaty is being negotiated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

(Same, p. 166)

**CEYLON (Corea) September 30, 1958**

35. We welcome the success of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, which was recently held in Geneva, and note with satisfaction that the big Powers now are ready to negotiate about the suspension of these nuclear tests.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 764 mtg)

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA (David) September 23, 1959**

96. The Conference has already achieved certain results but, owing to the position adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations, a number of important questions remain undecided.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 118)

**ECUADOR (Tobar-Zaldumbide) September 29, 1958**

104. In the matter of real achievements, we have noted with satisfaction the success of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, which was held in Geneva last summer. The eight participating States reached unanimous conclusions which demonstrate how, on a strictly technical level, results have been achieved which will contribute to relieve international political tension.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 762 mtg.)

**ECUADOR (Correa) October 1, 1959**

We are happy to note at this renewal of the general debate that significant progress has been achieved, progress which may be of tremendous importance. Nuclear tests did not take place during 1959 because of the unilateral declarations made by the Powers concerned.

May we be permitted here to state again our hope that, for an indefinite time, there will be a world-wide cessation of nuclear tests. The importance of this matter goes beyond the problem of disarmament and enters into the field of the defence of the biological integrity of the human species, which might be seriously affected by radioactive fallout from such explosions. We also hope that negotiations in Geneva on a control system which may establish a permanent groundwork for the cessation of tests will lead to satisfactory results.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, p. 46)

**ETHIOPIA (Alemayehou) October 1, 1959**

The progress achieved in the field of the technical detection of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions at the Geneva Conference is certainly not only which would call for jubilation, but certain it is that the measure of progress achieved could lead—in the light of the present relaxation of tension—to further concrete progress and agreement in this field.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, pp. 8-10)

**IRAN (Aram) September 17, 1959**

85. On the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, the progress attained has been encouraging. By patience and in a spirit of compromise, the participant scientists reached agreement on methods of banning nuclear weapons tests as well as on a system of detection.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 27)

**JORDAN (Rifa'i) September 23, 1959**

91. . . . a setback for our hopes and a challenge to the joint efforts in the direction of banning nuclear tests is to be found in the intentions of the French Government to explode an atomic bomb in the African Sahara, thus exposing the inhabited areas in that region to thermonuclear fallout and its fatal dangers. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 134)

**LIBERIA (Cooper) September 30, 1959**

76. . . . A ray of hope resulted from the fact that during the recent discussions in Geneva, the nuclear Powers have refrained from the testing of nuclear weapons. We are pleased to observe that the test ban has been extended while those Powers are still exploring the possibilities of reaching agreement. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 279)

**MEXICO (Padilla Nervo) October 6, 1958**

83. We share the view expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report [A/3844/Add.1] that the encouraging results obtained by the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held in Geneva last summer, seemed to indicate a way of separating the political from the non-political elements



so that a solution may be found an early stage to the problems entailed in the former, which will undoubtedly increase the possibilities of arriving at a subsequent agreement on the latter.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 771 mtg.)

**NORWAY (Lange) September 24, 1959**

165. One of the most promising developments during the last year is the progress made by the three Powers negotiating in Geneva on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under effective control. A considerable degree of agreement has already been reached, and my delegation believes that a final test ban agreement under effective control will contribute significantly to creating the improved climate required for further effective steps to be taken on the road to internationally controlled disarmament. We are therefore glad that these negotiations will soon be resumed, and we hope that the parties concerned will bend their efforts toward bringing them to a successful conclusion.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 174)

**PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 25, 1959**

18. . . . It is gratifying to note that the great Powers have themselves suspended nuclear tests for the time being, but this suspension rests on a precarious basis.

(Same, p. 178)

**SAUDI ARABIA (Shukairy) October 1, 1958**

95. . . . the Conference of Experts . . . is not without significance. Notwithstanding that the findings were scientific, strictly isolated from political considerations, no doubt the results were a success. We must bear in mind that the possibility of detecting nuclear tests through a network of monitory systems is in itself a great achievement. It is no exaggeration to say that this is a thrilling finding, crowned by unanimous agreement. If the matter is technically feasible and technically enforceable, then to refuse suspension of nuclear tests, or even to procrastinate on reaching an agreement, becomes highly serious.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 766 mtg.)

**UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1958**

One important aspect of this problem is the detection of nuclear explosions. As you know, substantial progress in this field was achieved at a recent conference of experts in Geneva. These experts, who represented both the West and the Communist bloc, reported that "the methods . . . available at the present time . . . make it possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield explosions." They added that "it is technically feasible to establish . . . a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests." . . . This conference represents a significant step forward in the necessary

preparatory work for a meaningful disarmament agreement. It could set the stage for a real breakthrough in the quest for disarmament, for which so many have been hoping.

—Address before the American Association for the United Nations, *DSB*, XXXIX (September 29, 1958), 509.

**VENEZUELA (Arcaya) September 24, 1959**

116. We also welcome as a good omen the apparently successful outcome of the negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the cessation of nuclear tests. Each test has brought home to us the painful fact that we are living in dangerous times and has made us recoil before the inferno it seemed to foreshadow. As the world's most eminent scientists have warned us, each test has involved a grave danger of atmospheric contamination, a danger which has given rise to universal and justifiable alarm.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 170)

**YUGOSLAVIA (Popovic) September 23, 1959**

20. We know that the question of so-called priorities has been the principal obstacle to the success of the negotiations so far held with regard to disarmament. I have in mind the following questions: Does the question of nuclear tests come within the field of disarmament? Can it or can it not be dealt with separately, before the other questions? Which comes first—control or disarmament, nuclear disarmament or disarmament in conventional weapons, intercontinental missiles or bases?

21. It is clear from the facts that the question of test explosions could be settled without delay and apart from the other problems. Furthermore, when the tests are suspended, the status quo is maintained, so to speak, automatically, without the existence of a control organ, and without any doubts being felt on either side concerning the mutual implementation of the undertaking not to carry out such tests entered into separately by both parties. I am merely stating a fact. I do not deduce from it that control is unnecessary. In our view, with the introduction of a healthier international atmosphere, less importance should be attached to so-called priorities than in the past.

22. We have often had the impression that the rigid insistence on certain priorities revealed, on the one hand, a feeling of doubt regarding the possibility of reaching any agreement and on the other, because of the existing circumstances and from a fear of prejudicing their own interests on the part of the parties concerned, a lack of any wish for or even a desire to prevent an agreement.

23. For example, let us take the question of control. Every rational individual understands clearly, that the problem is not that of disarmament as a consequence of control, but of control as a consequence

of disarmament. Hence, to insist upon giving absolute priority to control can only mean *one thing*: the *prevention of the realization of an agreement*. Nevertheless, we are aware—and we do not think anyone can deny it—that appropriate forms of control can and should be established simultaneously with the process of gradual disarmament. This is no vague or indefinite formula. We are firmly convinced of the possibility of and the need for a reasonable and specific agreement in that field. We think, too, that agreement has already been reached at Geneva *on the question of control and inspection of nuclear tests* and that the differences of opinion which remain are not insurmountable. Bearing in mind certain ideas contained in the plans which have already been submitted to us, and considering that there has already been a genuine reconciliation of views on many points, we urge only that the problems which previously appeared insoluble should be reconsidered in the light of the present favourable prospects.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 127)

## Chapter 3. DISPUTES AND SITUATIONS

### *Introduction*

The Members and the Secretary-General differ markedly in evaluating the United Nations' handling of disputes and situations. Their differences arise not only because the Members are sometimes so deeply involved in events as to make it difficult for them to be objective, but also because, where the Secretary-General emphasizes procedures in handling disputes and situations, the Members are pre-eminently concerned with the outcome of events.

The Secretary-General's speech in Copenhagen contains more insights on the way the organization deals with disputes than virtually all other statements in this Chapter. He stresses particularly the United Nations' role in negotiations, emphasizing especially how, informally and without publicity, the delegates have developed the rapport of a continuous diplomatic conference. These informal contacts provide a basis for negotiating issues formally before the United Nations, and disputes and situations not actually on the agenda. According to the Secretary-General, this continuous, informal, and confidential diplomatic conference provides a desirable flexibility. At the same time, the United Nations Charter and procedures remain at hand to help solve emerging disputes. In essence, he argues that the organization has matured and developed into an effective diplomatic instrument.

He also makes clear that, even though he must play his role quietly, his responsibilities require him to speak out to defend the Charter principles and to make them effective in negotiations. But he recognizes that, because he needs the full confidence of the Members, political dangers inhere in his outspokenness.

The delegates, on the other hand, give little evidence that they have reflected on the overall role of the United Nations. They tend, as is natural for them, to speak primarily about disputes with which they are directly concerned. Consequently their assessments always weigh the effect of the United Nations upon the national interest of their governments. By far the greatest range of comments occurs in the Laos matter and relates to the validity of the Security Council's action in regarding its decision to set up the Sub-Committee on Laos as a procedural, rather than a substantive, matter. Significantly enough, the Secretary-General has not commented on the Council's action.

## General

UN (Secretary-General) March 3, 1959

We have had successes and we have had failures, but the failures are more remembered than the successes. . . .

—Speech to Pakistan U.N. Association in Karachi. Press Release SG/789.

UN (Secretary-General) May 2, 1959

We are in the midst of a period of intense international negotiations. Every day, the press brings news about conferences among leading statesmen, correspondence between governments, and meetings of various political organs such as the NATO council of ministers. It may appear as though the significant developments we are witnessing were taking place entirely outside or independently of the United Nations. One may well ask where the Organization is in this puzzle. Since it is not visible, one may wonder what role it plays in world politics. Has it been side-tracked by other organs? Have difficulties and failures broken its ability to make contributions of value? In attempting to answer these questions, it may be natural to tie the answers in with the present international discussion and some of the problems it poses. Let me begin by making some distinction which may help clarify the problem. The United Nations is, on the one hand, an *organ of negotiation*, and, on the other, an *executive organ* with practical functions. These functions can be of various kinds: military functions, police functions, diplomatic-political or administrative functions. In appraising the need for the United Nations in the present situation, it is necessary to keep apart the tasks of the Organization in connection with negotiations and its possible executive functions along the lines I have just mentioned.

It is true . . . that so far the United Nations has not entered the picture as a forum for those international negotiations concerning Germany and the European security problem which have dominated events during the past months. But this means neither that the Organization has been without importance in the current negotiations, nor that those forms of negotiations which it offers may not play a crucial part later on.

In the United Nations, representatives meet face to face, not only from countries with a direct interest in the German question and the European security problem, but also from the many states for whom the outcome of the international deliberations may indirectly have a vital importance. Of course, something similar takes place, although in varying degrees, wherever the majority of states have diplomatic representation. There is, however, a qualitative difference between

New York and these capitals. Over the years, the diplomatic representatives accredited to the United Nations have developed a cooperation and built mutual contacts in dealing with problems they have in common, which in reality make them members of a kind of continuous diplomatic conference, in which they are informally following and able to discuss, on a personal basis, all political questions which are important for the work of the Organization. These continuous informal deliberations do not lend themselves to publicity, and they receive none. But it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that they are unimportant. On the contrary, the flexible and confidential forms in which these discussions can be pursued have given them a particular value as a complement to other diplomatic contacts and to all the various conferences and public exchanges about which we are being informed through the press and which constitute the normal operating procedures in a more traditional diplomacy.

In these circumstances, it is natural that contacts concerning the security problem and European questions have developed of late at United Nations Headquarters, too. My own experience is that, in this informal way, the Organization has become the framework for important exchanges between member states about the questions simultaneously dealt with at foreign ministers' meetings, in the NATO council, etc. It is all the more natural that such has been the case, since it is within the realm of the possible that the United Nations will be given certain functional tasks later on or will be used as a central negotiating organ concerning some special facet of the European problems.

While the negotiations on the official level have so far predominantly been conducted among the Powers on one side or the other in the international conflict, the unofficial contacts within the United Nations have naturally not been similarly restricted. Public debate in the United Nations is dominated by the same differences among the parties as international political life as a whole. But behind closed doors these differences are diluted. The human factor carries more weight there, and confidential exchanges are possible even across frontiers which otherwise appear impassable.

One illustration of the position of the Organization is that it serves as host to the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva about a week from now. This, of course, does not mean that the meeting takes place under the auspices of the United Nations, or that the Organization is in any way a party to the deliberations. But it does mean that it has been found that the United Nations can offer a framework within which it is natural that such discussions between the two sides take place. This is more than a purely formal relationship. It reflects the

fact that, should the parties find themselves in need of the kind of assistance the Organization can render in any other respects, they can ask for such assistance and will get it. To begin with, this means only various practical arrangements, but the assistance can go further without changing the basic situation, which is that the foreign ministers' conference as such is independent of the Organization, and that the United Nations at the present stage neither has nor can have any policy position as a party to the conference.

It is easy to minimize the importance of the manner in which the United Nations enters the negotiating picture in these respects. For my part, I do not want to exaggerate, but I know that the Organization facilitates or can facilitate impending diplomatic operations of such a degree of difficulty that even the relatively modest support they can gain from the United Nations as an external framework for negotiation or as a kind of unofficial sounding board must be highly valued. There is no reason for me to prophesy about the future, but in this context it is worth recalling that when a meeting at the level of heads of government was discussed last year, the intention was to have it take place on the basis of, within, or in intimate connection with the Security Council. Should present plans also develop in the same direction, it would mean that the functions of the Organization which I have already mentioned would reach their full development. The Organization, in that case, would become not only the framework of an unofficial exchange or the unofficial support for formal deliberations between the governments, but the forum of the ultimate negotiations which are the aim of all the extensive diplomatic preparation. The reasons which last year led to preliminary agreement that the meeting of heads of government should take place within the framework of the Security Council, illustrate the possible role of the Organization in such negotiations. Not only would the Security Council have provided a firm procedural foundation for the planned discussion between the heads of government; more important, it would have provided them with a clearly defined legal frame and would have eliminated elements of uncertainty concerning purposes and principles which easily might complicate deliberations in other forms, unless far more extensive preparations had been made than are required for a meeting of the Security Council.

When a meeting is formally held within the framework of the Organization—even if this occurs in circumstances which lend it a relatively independent character—it means that the United Nations Charter as a whole emerges as the background of the deliberations. It means that the negotiating parties, without its having to be openly stated, accept as guiding them those basic rules of international coexistence of which

the Charter is an expression. Before this body, I need hardly recall the most important of these principles: the obligation to find a peaceful solution of emerging conflicts, the respect for the integrity and independence of each member state, the right of collective self-defense in case of armed aggression, etc.

In characterizing the three different respects in which the Organization enters into the present picture as an organ of negotiation—or, rather, the three degrees in which it is possible to visualize the utilization of the possibilities of the Organization as an organ of negotiation—I have left aside the role in possible negotiations which would devolve upon it rather automatically, in case the conclusion should be that the cooperation of the United Nations as an executive organ is needed in some respect or other. A decision providing such cooperation can only be made by the General Assembly or the Security Council. Should there be agreement about requesting the assistance of the Organization for certain practical tasks in the field, this question would thus have to be referred to those main organs for a decision. In this situation, the United Nations would obviously become a party to the negotiation.

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes, in certain circumstances the Security Council to use military force to maintain peace. It is important to realize what this means. This is not collective security of a kind which a defensive alliance can provide. The Charter expressly permits the formation of such alliances, but the United Nations itself is something else again. The possibilities of the Organization to use military force are limited to acts of coercion in the name of the world community against a nation which violates the peace. Such an action requires unanimity of the Great Powers. This unanimity has a twofold significance. Without it a military police action lacks the foundation necessary to be fully effective. And without it the United Nations would also, in contrast to the fundamental idea on which it is built, be capable of transformation into an instrument of military force in a conflict between the Great Powers—with all that this might mean for the other member states. The rule of unanimity in combination with the right to form defensive alliances defines the position of the Organization. It has never been meant as an organ of collective security of the alliance type, but it is aimed at a universal system for the maintenance of peace which may have, as a natural complement, defensive alliances.

The circumstances in which the Organization has functioned during its first thirteen years have made so far a dead letter of the provisions in Chapter VII about recourse to military force. Instead, the executive functions of the Organization for the peaceful solution of conflicts,



under Chapter VI of the Charter, have developed along a much broader front. Under this chapter, the General Assembly has even created a quasi-military organ of the United Nations when it found this necessary for that very purpose—peaceful solution—in a situation where the unanimity rule had rendered the Security Council incapable of action. As you know, this measure was taken under the so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution which has established procedures for the exercise by the General Assembly of certain functions when the Security Council fails. The resolution has not changed the Charter. If the General Assembly decides to create a quasi-military organ of the United Nations, it has therefore been found that such an organ, irrespective of the form of the decision, can have only tasks which are in substance compatible with the provisions of the Charter on the peaceful solution of conflicts under which the General Assembly has acted. Experience has shown that such a military organ of the United Nations, even if, like UNEF, it has no military tasks in the conventional sense, can be a decisive factor in preventing hostilities and restoring calm in a troubled area.

For the General Assembly or the Security Council to create such an organ as UNEF to represent the United Nations in helping to maintain peace is an extreme case. It turned out to be necessary and useful in the case of Gaza, but it would have been too extreme a measure for Lebanon, and it would have been out of the question in Jordan—to name two other current instances of executive operations. In Lebanon, an observation group was formed, which at its peak numbered about 500. It was recruited from the officer corps in a score of countries, but no matter how useful their military training was, the group did not even have those military functions accorded to UNEF and, of its three leaders, two were civilians. In Jordan, where many expected the United Nations to form a military organization, it was decided to station a purely civilian organization of very limited size, which has turned out to fill the need extremely well.

The instances I have recalled—I might of course have named others—are interesting because they show how the United Nations may fill vital needs in maintaining peace by executive measures. In these respects there is at present no substitute and no alternative for the Organization. The tasks of this kind which it has assumed could not have been fulfilled outside the United Nations framework by any single country or group of countries. These are security needs in the widest sense, which can be met only on the basis of universality and neutrality in the sense of freedom from partisan interests. Whatever role may be accorded to defensive alliances and similar arrangements, experience shows that there are essential tasks in the maintenance of

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peace which fall, and must fall, entirely outside the province of such groupings.

In various public statements and in what has been published about deliberations on Germany and related problems, there have been hints that, without any commitments about what should be done, the possibility of using the United Nations for functional tasks has also received attention. What has emerged has naturally been quite vague, since more concrete proposals require a far clearer picture of the political solutions which may be reached than it has been possible to obtain until the principal parties have met in common deliberations. The ideas seem to have been exclusively focused on some form of what has come to be called, in international parlance, a "United Nations presence," a common term used to designate all the various forms of functional representation which have been tried or may come up under Chapter VI. The possibilities existing under Chapter VII have, of course, had no place in the debate.

In this connection, let me say that in my view practical considerations alone prevent even the kind of quasi-military arrangements which are possible under Chapter VI and which fall within the competence of the General Assembly, from being used except to a very limited extent, if at all. Nor do I find it reasonable to envisage civilian tasks for the United Nations that would assume an ultimate constitutional responsibility for any one of the main organs of the Organization exceeding what they are equipped or ready for. This excludes the imposition in this case of executive authority on the United Nations for administrative tasks which require political decisions. The possibilities I have thus written off still leave a wide area within which the United Nations could lend assistance, should such assistance be requested by the negotiating parties.

It is interesting to discuss the role and the capabilities of the United Nations in the relatively narrow perspective you get when applying them, as we have now done, to an actual international complex of problems. But there is good reason to consider the matter in broader terms too. It is one thing to try to form an opinion about the importance of the United Nations in bringing a critical situation under control. It is another to examine the preventive capabilities of the Organization, how it may be used to forestall the emergence of conflicts requiring specific actions.

Only to a limited extent does the United Nations have an existence and possibilities of action independent of the will of the member governments and the policy of the member states themselves. In comparing the General Assembly to, for instance, a parliament, it must be recalled that the authorized representatives of governments in the

various United Nations organs do not have a position comparable to that of an individual legislator, and that only to a small extent can they contribute to the making of a policy which goes beyond the fundamental national reactions. It may be said of a parliament that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Although the same can be said about the United Nations in certain respects, to which I shall come presently, it applies far less to the Organization than to a parliament or related national organs.

It is therefore hardly reasonable to reproach the Organization as such for not having been able to cope with, let us say, the so-called cold war, or for not having taken action in the Hungarian question, confining itself to an expression of principle. In the first case, it is obvious that the Organization can advance no further than the intentions of the parties permit. In the latter case, it is worth remembering that, with the exception of one or two of the smaller countries, no government in the United Nations urged measures going further than those which were actually taken.

But no matter how realistic it may be to view the relations between the Organization and the member states in the way I have done here, and to evaluate the capacity for action of the Organization as I have now done, something essential is missing from the picture. There are other elements which require attention and point ahead to a situation with other possibilities.

I have described the United Nations as an organ which offers the framework and the foundation for negotiations. But a negotiation as such may affect the parties and their representatives. Granted that states are far less inclined than individuals and groups to be affected by the fact that negotiations are taking place and by the way they are going; still, they are affected. Therefore, it means something essential that membership in the United Nations forces all states to subject themselves to such an influence. One may agree or fail to agree to a foreign ministers' meeting on a certain question, for instance. But only with difficulty is it possible to avoid entering a reply if the same question is brought before the United Nations in the prescribed form.

The importance of this is increased by the fact that not the parties alone, but practically all the states in the world, are represented at the negotiating table in the United Nations. The parties thus have to meet both the arguments coming from the other side, and the judgments and reactions expressed by states which, even if not directly engaged, are interested. It is dangerous, and in my view highly presumptuous, to describe this situation as one in which the parties are confronted with "world opinion" and its "moral judgment" at the

peace which fall, and must fall, entirely outside the province of such groupings.

In various public statements and in what has been published about deliberations on Germany and related problems, there have been hints that, without any commitments about what should be done, the possibility of using the United Nations for functional tasks has also received attention. What has emerged has naturally been quite vague, since more concrete proposals require a far clearer picture of the political solutions which may be reached than it has been possible to obtain until the principal parties have met in common deliberations. The ideas seem to have been exclusively focused on some form of what has come to be called, in international parlance, a "United Nations presence," a common term used to designate all the various forms of functional representation which have been tried or may come up under Chapter VI. The possibilities existing under Chapter VII have, of course, had no place in the debate.

In this connection, let me say that in my view practical considerations alone prevent even the kind of quasi-military arrangements which are possible under Chapter VI and which fall within the competence of the General Assembly, from being used except to a very limited extent, if at all. Nor do I find it reasonable to envisage civilian tasks for the United Nations that would assume an ultimate constitutional responsibility for any one of the main organs of the Organization exceeding what they are equipped or ready for. This excludes the imposition in this case of executive authority on the United Nations for administrative tasks which require political decisions. The possibilities I have thus written off still leave a wide area within which the United Nations could lend assistance, should such assistance be requested by the negotiating parties.

It is interesting to discuss the role and the capabilities of the United Nations in the relatively narrow perspective you get when applying them, as we have now done, to an actual international complex of problems. But there is good reason to consider the matter in broader terms too. It is one thing to try to form an opinion about the importance of the United Nations in bringing a critical situation under control. It is another to examine the preventive capabilities of the Organization, how it may be used to forestall the emergence of conflicts requiring specific actions.

Only to a limited extent does the United Nations have an existence and possibilities of action independent of the will of the member governments and the policy of the member states themselves. In comparing the General Assembly to, for instance, a parliament, it must be recalled that the authorized representatives of governments in the

various United Nations organs do not have a position comparable to that of an individual legislator, and that only to a small extent can they contribute to the making of a policy which goes beyond the fundamental national reactions. It may be said of a parliament that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Although the same can be said about the United Nations in certain respects, to which I shall come presently, it applies far less to the Organization than to a parliament or related national organs.

It is therefore hardly reasonable to reproach the Organization as such for not having been able to cope with, let us say, the so-called cold war, or for not having taken action in the Hungarian question, confining itself to an expression of principle. In the first case, it is obvious that the Organization can advance no further than the intentions of the parties permit. In the latter case, it is worth remembering that, with the exception of one or two of the smaller countries, no government in the United Nations urged measures going further than those which were actually taken.

But no matter how realistic it may be to view the relations between the Organization and the member states in the way I have done here, and to evaluate the capacity for action of the Organization as I have now done, something essential is missing from the picture. There are other elements which require attention and point ahead to a situation with other possibilities.

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his intentions in order to give its members an opportunity to raise objections if they so desired.

This action, which may lead to the development of a new pattern—other governments have made two or three proposals of a similar nature—is an example of what I should like to call active preventive diplomacy, which may be conducted by the United Nations, through the Secretary-General or in other forms, in many situations where no government or group of governments and no regional organization would be able to act in the same way. That such interventions are possible for the United Nations is explained by the fact that in the manner I have indicated, the Organization has begun to gain a certain independent position, and that this tendency has led to the acceptance of an independent political and diplomatic activity on the part of the Secretary-General as the “neutral” representative of the Organization. It may have struck some of you that the possibilities I have touched upon in connection with the present international debate, and the evolution I have just dealt with as well, have little explicit support in the United Nations Charter. This is true if you apply a restrictive literal interpretation to the Charter. But it is not true if the Charter is regarded as an international treaty, establishing certain common goals for international cooperation and creating organs which the member states may use in their cooperation towards these goals, but without aiming at limiting the development of its procedures. The statement of objectives in the Charter is binding, and so are the rules concerning the various organs and their competence, but it is not necessary to regard the procedures indicated in the Charter as limitative in purpose. They may be supplemented by others under the pressure of circumstances and in the light of experience. This freer interpretation permits an evolution departing from what has been explicitly stated, to the extent that new procedures, perhaps combined with a modified balance in the use of various organs, prove productive in practice for the efforts to attain the objectives of the Charter. Seen in this perspective, the developments I have dwelt on appear entirely compatible with the Charter and well fitted into its framework. What we are seeing is an evolution on the basis of a fundamental charter of sufficient flexibility to permit a continuous adaptation of constitutional life to the needs.

At the outset, I asked the question whether the United Nations is needed. The reasons for my affirmative answer are clear from what I have said, and yet I have not touched on the role of the Organization in the economic and social fields or in the transition of peoples from colonial status to independent nationhood.

We need the Organization in the present situation for the negotiating



negotiating table in the United Nations. But it is true that within the Organization they are being forced to confront their stand with that taken by states for whom the principles of the Charter may weigh more heavily than direct or indirect partisan interests. I spoke before of what I called a continuous diplomatic conference without publicity, for which the Organization is a framework, side by side with the public debates. This is the respect in which that continuous contact assumes its greatest importance. The independent opinion which gives the negotiations in the United Nations their special character is formed as much outside the conference halls as inside them.

It is possible, however, to go further and say that increasingly, although in a way difficult to define, something like an independent position for the Organization as such has found expression both in words and deeds. The roots of this development are, of course, the existence of an opinion independent of partisan interests and dominated by the objectives indicated in the United Nations Charter. This opinion may be more or less articulate and more or less clear-cut, but the fact that it exists forms the basis for the evolution of a stand by the Organization itself, which is relatively independent of that of the parties.

Here the office I represent enters the picture. The Secretary-General is elected by the General Assembly, but on the recommendation of the Security Council, and this recommendation requires unanimity among the five permanent Council members. The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that the Secretary-General shall, as far as possible, be placed outside or lifted above conflicts which may split the Assembly or the Council. From another point of view, the rules of election aim at ensuring that the Secretary-General, as one of the main organs of the United Nations, shall have the opportunity of functioning as the spokesman of the Organization in its capacity as an independent opinion factor. This desire is natural and not particularly difficult to satisfy concerning administrative questions, which of course should be insulated as far as possible from all political conflicts. The problem is pointed up when the political and diplomatic responsibilities of the Secretary-General come into play.

There are two possible lines of action for the Secretary-General in the political questions falling within the competence of the Organization, two lines which have both had their advocates in the debate about the office. The Secretary-General may interpret his constitutionally objective position in such a way as to refuse to indicate a stand in emerging conflicts in order thus to preserve the neutrality of the office. He may, however, also accord himself the right to take a stand in these conflicts to the extent that such stands can be firmly

based on the Charter and its principles and thus express what may be called the independent judgment of the Organization.

It goes without saying that, to the extent that the Secretary-General follows this latter course, his office assumes an importance quite different from what happens if he chooses what one might call negative neutrality as his leading principle. If the Secretary-General represents an independent but positive evaluation, free of partisan influences and determined by the purposes of the Charter, this means not only that he reinforces the weight that independent opinion may come to carry in the negotiations. Step by step, he thereby also builds up a practice which may open the door to a more generally recognized independent influence for the Organization as such in the political evolution.

The difficulty of a policy along these latter lines is obvious. A positive influence, politically, for the Secretary-General can be imagined in practice only on two conditions. First, he must have the full confidence of the member states, at least as to his independence and his freedom from personal motives. Second, he must accept the limitation of acting mainly on inner lines without publicity. In nine cases out of ten, a Secretary-General would destroy his chances of exerting an independent influence on developments by publicly appealing to opinion over the heads of the governments. Only in rare exceptions—in the tenth case, one might say—this is what the situation requires, and then he must of course be prepared to see his future value as a negotiator endangered or even lost. In the latter case, he ought, naturally, to resign from his post.

Sometimes, it has proved difficult to gain understanding of the fact that the independent influence of the Secretary-General largely is directly proportionate to his degree of discretion. Cases such as the Suez and Hungary crises, when on the basis of the Charter he took a direct political stand in public, have been considered instances of what he ought to do more often. Everybody is free to judge for himself. What I have just said reflects my own experience and the conclusions I have reached.

To the extent that events have led the governments to accord an independent position as spokesman of the United Nations to the Secretary-General even politically, this has also given him wider opportunities for independent diplomatic activity. One instance during this year may be mentioned. On the basis of an invitation from two member states, the Secretary-General recently sent a personal representative on a good offices mission to these countries. This was a measure of a kind that used to be taken exclusively by the Security Council. In this case it was taken without a decision by the Security Council, after the Secretary-General had informed the Council of

possibilities it opens up. We need it as an executive organ. We need it for the constructive additions it offers in international attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. And we need it as a foundation and a framework for arduous and time-consuming attempts to find forms in which an extra-national—or perhaps even supra-national—influence may be brought to bear in the prevention of future conflicts.

In none of these respects do any of the other forms of international organization which have been tested offer a viable alternative. Therefore, the work must go on. To write it off because of difficulties or failures would mean, among many other things, to write off our hope of developing methods for international coexistence which offer a better chance than the traditional ones for truth, justice, and good sense to prevail.

—Speech in Copenhagen to Students Association. Press Release, SG/812.

#### AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 30, 1959

61. . . . In the world as a whole there is a movement towards some accommodation between the great Powers. But in particular areas of the world there are—and, unfortunately, it may be expected that there will continue to be—tensions and potential sources of conflict, many of which are not susceptible to early or quick solution. In some of these places the United Nations has by its very presence had a beneficial influence; for instance, in ending open conflict or in calming the atmosphere. I have in mind such examples as the United Nations Observers in Kashmir and elsewhere; the UNEF in the Middle East; the Secretary-General's representative in Jordan, and the Secretary-General's own quiet diplomacy in the course of his many overseas visits. The United Nations "presence" in a trouble spot can be a great influence for peace.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 263)

### *Hungary*

#### UNITED KINGDOM (Lloyd) September 17, 1959

38. . . . I much regret that the Hungarian Government has refused to co-operate with the work of Sir Leslie Munro, the United Nations representative. The flagrant disregard of the recommendations of the General Assembly is a matter of deep concern to us.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 24)

#### UNITED STATES (Department of State Press Release)

July 17, 1958

. . . The U.S. Government believes that the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary has once again rendered a signal service to the United Nations and to the world. The Committee's report on the

recent developments in Hungary is clear and conclusive despite the willful refusal of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to accede to the Committee's request for full information about these events....

*DSB, XXXIX* (August 18, 1958), 295

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1958

On June 16, 1958, Moscow and Budapest announced simultaneously the secret trials and executions of former Premier Imre Nagy, former Defense Minister Pal Maleter, and two other leaders of the 1956 national uprising. As a result of this brutal action in defiance of world opinion and in violation of the pledged word of the Hungarian authorities, the Special Committee made a further investigation. On July 14, 1958, in a special report, the Committee asserted that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces from Hungary and indicated that repression continues in that unhappy country.

The tragedy of Hungary has not been forgotten. In fact, the Hungarian question has been inscribed on the provisional agenda of the 13th Assembly. Thus, all member states will have an opportunity to consider the latest report of the Special Committee and determine what further steps can be taken to alleviate the plight of the Hungarian people.

—Address before the American Association for the United Nations, *DSB, XXXIX* (September 29, 1958), 508-509.

#### UNITED STATES (Hetter) September 17, 1959

47. Hungary is another area where the effects of the threat and use of violence are manifest. The tyrannical rule which was imposed on that unhappy country by the ruthless use of outside force still obtains. Every effort of Sir Leslie Munro, the United Nations Special Representative on the Question of Hungary, to investigate the situation at first hand has been rebuffed by the puppet Hungarian régime, which Soviet troops imposed and now maintain. The continued, deliberate defiance of this Organization by Hungary augurs ill for our continuing efforts to secure international peace and security.

(UN. GA. 14th. *OR.*, p. 11)

### Kashmir

#### PAKISTAN (Prince Aly Khan) October 3, 1958

99. The question of Kashmir has been before the United Nations for ten years. There have been numerous attempts by the Security Council to resolve the dispute by prolonged negotiations as well as by the appointment of commissions and mediators. More than a dozen directives and recommendations have been made from time to time by the Security Council. All have been accepted by Pakistan. All have been

rejected by India. Progress has been barred by a veto of the USSR, a veto which, I would point out, has been exercised entirely contrary to the spirit of the Charter, and the main effect of which has been to frustrate a peaceful settlement of this very serious dispute.

. . . . .

101. If a just solution of this problem is not found promptly, the people of Pakistan and of Kashmir—and indeed, people throughout the world—will not only lose faith in the effectiveness of the United Nations, but a situation might well arise which would threaten the peace of the whole sub-continent and perhaps that of the world.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 769 mtg.)

PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 25, 1959

29. The Kashmir dispute brings out in sharp focus the urgent need to strengthen the United Nations procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes in order to avert danger to international peace and security. The threat of veto which hangs over any action that the Security Council might propose to take in this direction renders the Council impotent to fulfill its commitments.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 179)

### *Laos*

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

In the course of the year, most recently in August, difficulties have developed at the north-eastern border of Laos. Although the United Nations has not been formally seized of this situation, communications on the matter have been addressed to the Organization. The development has been found to call for informal studies and consultations regarding the possibilities open to the Organization to be of assistance, obviously without impairing the Geneva agreements or interfering with the arrangements which are based on them.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs. *Suppl. 1A*, p. 4)

ARGENTINA (Amadeo) September 7, 1959

It is no secret to anyone that the confidence of the people of the world in the United Nations as an effective instrument for safeguarding peace and security has been seriously weakened because some of the main bodies of this Organization have proved rather ineffectual. My colleagues will be fully aware of the fact that this weakening of prestige stems primarily from the difficulties we have encountered in bringing before the United Nations forum some of the major problems that today endanger peace and international security.

If our silence constitutes a tacit agreement that we are powerless to act when confronted with a concrete appeal, then the peoples of the

world might well ask whether this highest international body is truly fulfilling the purpose for which it was originally established.

(Doc. S/PV. 847; pp. 67-70)

**ARGENTINA (Taboada) September 17, 1959**

116. We regard the recent action taken by the Security Council in the question of Laos as a sound step in the direction we have just indicated. No one can claim that the action of the Security Council is an unlawful intervention. Faced with a request for assistance by a Member State which considered itself a victim of aggression, the Council did the least it could do in such circumstances; it set up a sub-committee to investigate the charge and provide the information necessary on which to base a decision on the matter.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 16)

**BULGARIA (Lukanov) September 25, 1959**

159. In this connexion it must be noted with regret that traces of the cold war are still to be seen in the activities of certain delegations to the United Nations. How else but as a cold war manifestation can we characterize the decision, recently imposed on the Security Council, to send a group to Laos to investigate the false accusations made by the Royal Government against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam? It is already clear, from reports published in the Press and received from the United Nations group itself, that this group is chasing ghosts—in other words, that the reactionaries of Laos and their protectors have dared to make a sport of the United Nations. (Same, p. 204)

**BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. (Kiselev) September 28, 1959**

51. The Sub-Committee on Laos set up by the Security Council is illegal and its activities cannot contribute to a settlement of the Lao-tian problem. Is it appropriate that the United Nations should be led on a leash by the groups that are attempting, in violation of the Geneva agreements, to turn Laos into a spring-board for provocative acts against the independent States of South-East Asia behind a barrier of noisy accusations about "communist aggression"? (Same, p. 217)

**CANADA (Green) September 24, 1959**

94. . . . we have in Laos at present a sub-committee set up by the Security Council, and we must await its report upon the facts of the situation there. . . . the very presence of this United Nations body seems already to be having a pacifying effect.

(Same, p. 168)

**PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 25, 1959**

43. The action taken by the Security Council earlier this month on the request of the Royal Government of Laos for an emergency force was both timely and appropriate. In appointing a Sub-Committee to

ascertain and report the facts of the situation in the north-eastern provinces of Laos, the Security Council did not do more than set up a fact-finding body. It could have done no less. It could not have turned a deaf ear to the plea of Laos without seriously undermining the faith of small Member States in this Organization.

(Same, p. 180)

**THAILAND (Khoman) September 24, 1959**

137. . . . As the Sub-Committee appointed by the Security Council is now conducting its investigation and collecting evidence of that intervention, my delegation will only say that the above measure has already produced some tangible results for the restoration of peace and tranquillity. It is our hope that the Sub-Committee will be allowed to function in Laos for some time, and if it should be withdrawn the United Nations must take other adequate measures to safeguard peace in the area.

(Same, p. 158)

**U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) September 7, 1959**

The resolution has been adopted following an illegal procedure that was approved by the majority of the Council. This illegal procedure was adopted in violation of the San Francisco Declaration, even though the President stated that this Declaration, as far as he is concerned, perhaps as far as other members of the Council are concerned, was not binding in itself. Nevertheless, this Declaration exists; it was recognized in San Francisco by all States who signed the Charter; it becomes thereby an inalienable part of the procedure under which this Council and the Organization as a whole operate. The San Francisco Declaration constitutes an interpretation of the Charter, and you cannot regard it as being something apart from the Charter, or you cannot oppose this document to the Charter. These two documents must be taken together. They constitute a single whole. That is why this Declaration has as much importance as the Charter in so far as it affects the important parts of the Charter.

What was done today in the Security Council points first to the fact that it was done according to a plan agreed to ahead of time. The Security Council has, as we pointed out at the very beginning, embarked upon a violation of its own rules of procedure. It then went on to break up the San Francisco Declaration. And finally, it infringed upon one of the fundamental provisions of the Charter, that which deals with the procedure of voting in the Council.

All those who are genuinely interested in seeing the United Nations operate in accordance with the San Francisco Declaration and the San Francisco Charter, would be well advised to ponder what the effects of such a policy can bring. I think that it is a secret to nobody, or nobody can doubt that the decision taken here sets a very dangerous

precedent indeed which may have very far-reaching effects upon the future and the future activities of the United Nations. We have just witnessed the beginning of the factual revision, if not the verbal revision of the Charter. I think that many delegations will take note of this. If you can start to break up one of the basic documents that governs the work of the Security Council, namely the San Francisco Declaration, then we may have also to look to the future and see what may be the future fate of the Charter taken as a whole.

The Soviet delegation wishes once again to state that it regards this resolution which has just been adopted as non-existent, as illegal and therefore as not binding upon anyone to whom it may be addressed.

. . . . .

There have never been any instances—and Mr. Lodge has not been able to cite any—where a committee or sub-committee appointed under Article 29 for the maintenance of international peace and security was established by a vote which ignored the unanimity rule. There have never been any cases of this kind, because in the past the Council has adhered strictly to the practice laid down by the Charter or, where the Charter is not sufficiently explicit, by the San Francisco Declaration. The purpose of the Declaration, which was subscribed to by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Soviet Union and China, was to assist the Security Council in interpreting that part of the Charter. I am bound to say that the authors of this Declaration bear the responsibility for the situation that has now arisen in the Council. It is they who are responsible for the fact that this Declaration is being flouted. The United States, the United Kingdom and France have violated the obligations which they solemnly assumed under the San Francisco Declaration. . . . There is no way out of this dilemma. What the Council did . . . was to violate its past practice and trample underfoot the San Francisco Declaration. The responsibility for this, of course, is borne by its authors, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. The Council, furthermore, has violated the Charter, and for this the responsibility is borne by the majority of the members of the Council who regard this resolution as valid, even though it is invalid and was obviously adopted in violation of the Charter and therefore has no legal or binding force.

(Doc. S/PV. 848, pp. 78-80, 96-100)

#### UNITED STATES (Lodge) September 7, 1959

This resolution which we have just adopted establishes a Sub-Committee of the Council to receive statements and documents and to conduct such inquiries as it may determine necessary. We regard such action as a normal and accepted procedure by which the Council can make its work more orderly and efficient. . . . It is both illogical and



contrary to the fundamental intention of the Charter that the Security Council should be prevented by a double veto from obtaining assistance from subsidiary organs which it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. But beyond that, in the resolution which we have adopted, the Council stands on a precedent of long standing in reaffirming that establishment of such a sub-committee is a matter under Article 29.

(Same, pp. 83-84, 86)

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 12, 1959

The decision of the Security Council to establish a factfinding sub-committee on Laos is a further striking illustration of the flexibility of the United Nations and of its capacity to take constructive action in a crisis.

When confronted with an appeal for assistance from Laos, one of its smallest members, the United Nations could not sit idly by.

. . . . .

We hope that, in addition to the value of its factfinding function, the presence of United Nations representatives in Laos will have a quieting effect in the area and serve as a deterrent to further aggression. No doubt you have read the Soviet complaints that this action by the Security Council was "illegal." I want to assure you that this action by the Security Council is fully consonant with the procedures laid down in the United Nations Charter. Moreover, it is of great importance as a demonstration that the Security Council can move quickly in response to an urgent need of a United Nations member even when the five permanent members are not in agreement. In fact, the resolution adopted by the Security Council was virtually identical with language which had been used in previous Security Council action under Article 29 of the Charter. As you may know, Article 29 is found in the section of Chapter V of the Charter clearly headed "Procedure." That Article authorizes the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary.

—Address before the American Association for the U.N., New York, *DSB*, XLI (September 28, 1959), 441.

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) October 18, 1959

The Soviets vigorously opposed the United Nations' taking any action with respect to Laos. Their solution was the reconvening of an international control commission whose mission the Lao Government regarded as having been fulfilled. The Soviets have also sought to divert effective United Nations action by calling for a conference. The Lao Government rejected this idea, preferring instead to appeal to the United Nations, where justice could be assured.

Laos, like every free nation, seeks to control its own destiny. Since

the United Nations has already taken appropriate action, there is no need for a conference which would be disruptive and which would ignore the authority of the United Nations.

The presence of the Security Council subcommittee has been a short-range measure. Now we await the report of that group with considerable interest. Once the report is available, the United Nations will want to consider what further measures it should take to assure a continuation of its tranquilizing influence in Laos.

—Address at Miami Beach, Florida, *DSB*, *XLI* (November 9, 1959), 667-68.

### *Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan*

UN (Secretary-General) July 15, 1958

... the Security Council passed, on 11 June, a resolution in which it decided to "despatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon," and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for implementation of the resolution. In the resolution the Security Council stated that the aim of the step it was taking was "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese border."

I have in my actions regarding the Lebanese case acted solely with that purpose in view. I have used the tool created for this purpose in the resolution. I have also relied on the authority that the Secretary-General is recognized as having under the Charter.

My actions have had no relation to developments which must be considered as the internal affairs of Lebanon. Nor have I, in my implementation of the resolution, or acting under the Charter, concerned myself with wider international aspects of the problem than those referred to in the resolution. The Secretary-General in this situation obviously is neither an arbiter nor a mediator. However, even with these important restrictions, there has been wide scope for action for the purposes of the resolution, strictly in keeping with United Nations principles and rules.

The Security Council, in deciding to despatch to Lebanon an "observation group," defined not only the character of the operation but also its scope. It did so by linking the observation to illegal traffic in arms and infiltration, requesting the Group to keep the Council currently informed of its findings. In taking this stand, the Council defined the limits for authority delegated to the Secretary-General in this case.

I have, in the light of the decision, considered myself free to take all steps necessary for an operation, covering illegal traffic in arms and infiltration, as effective as it could be made as a tool towards ensuring

against such traffic or infiltration with its basic character of observation maintained. I have had a free hand as to the structure and organization of the operation but have considered myself as barred from an interpretation of the authority granted which would have implied that I changed the policy, laid down by the Council, by my decisions on the scope of the operation and the authority of the observers.

In fact, had I, by going beyond the reasonable limits of a "group" charged with "observation," or by deciding on terms of reference exceeding observation, changed the observation operation into some kind of police operation, not only would I have overstepped the resolution but I would also have faced a conflict with principles laid down in the Charter. In a police operation, the participants would in this case need the right, if necessary, to take the initiative in the use of force. Such use of force would, however, have belonged to the sphere of Chapter VII of the Charter and could have been granted only by the Security Council itself, directly or by explicit delegation, under conditions spelled out in that Chapter.

As to the structure and organization of the Observation Group and its activities, I have at the initial stage acted in close consultation with members of the Security Council and the Representative of Lebanon. My interpretation of the resolution, as presented to them before any action was taken, met with their full approval, including that of the representative of Lebanon. At later stages I have naturally, to a decisive extent, depended upon the judgement of the highly qualified military, political and diplomatic experts of the United Nations who are in the field. The present arrangements are in accordance with their suggestions and meet with their full approval.

I have said before that I have acted solely for the purpose mentioned in the resolution of the Security Council, using the instrument created by the resolution, but using also my authority under the Charter. This means that the efforts I have made of a diplomatic nature have been guided by the desire to get necessary support for the observation operation, so as to make it possible for it to succeed as a measure against any infiltration or smuggling of arms. It would be premature to give here an account of the activities to which I refer. Their value for the purpose mentioned can be judged only in the light of practical experience in the observation operation and of other developments, as registered by our observers or by other reliable means.

What I have to stress here is that, whatever weight might finally, in the light of the tests to which I have referred, be given to the special efforts in which I have had to engage, it has been a matter of course that I have striven to give to the observation operation the highest possible efficiency. The diplomatic efforts in support of the observation

operation, or their outcome, have been in no way permitted to influence my judgement as to the size, scope or mandate of the Observation Group.

My stand on these last-mentioned questions has been determined exclusively by the attitude taken by the Group itself. As I have already said in public, the Observation Group has and will have as many observers as it has asked or *might* ask for. On the other hand, I have found it very difficult to provide them with observers before they consider themselves ready to absorb them in useful current work. If there would be any impression that restraint has been shown in the build-up of the Observation Group, the explanation of this impression is, therefore, the stand taken by the Group itself regarding its needs and possibilities, and obviously in no way any political considerations, least of all any considerations caused by anticipations of the outcome of any diplomatic efforts in support of the observation operation.

It has already been reported to the Council how the observers have managed to operate within areas which are now outside of Government control. From previous published accounts it has appeared that the Group has been meeting with difficulties north of Tripoli and in the north of the Bekaa region. I can now report to the Council that throughout the northern border areas north of Tripoli arrangements have been made for full freedom of movement and access and that agreement has been reached on the establishment of out-stations in that area. In the region north of Bekaa the Group has this very morning, in a meeting between General Bull and a leader of the opposition forces in that region, formalized its previous requests for full freedom of access.

(Doc. S/PV. 827, pp. 32-35)

UN (Secretary-General) July 22, 1958

The Security Council has just failed to take additional action in the grave emergency facing us. However, the responsibility of the United Nations to make all efforts to live up to the purposes and principles of the Charter remains.

I am sure that I will be acting in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Council if I, therefore, use all opportunities offered to the Secretary-General, within the limits set by the Charter and towards developing the United Nations effort, so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find ourselves.

First of all—the continued operation of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon being acceptable to all members of the Council

—this will mean the further development of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon so as to give it all the significance it can have, consistent with its basic character as determined by the Security Council in its resolution [S/4023] of 11 June 1958 and the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The Council will excuse me for not being able to spell out at this moment what it may mean beyond that. However, I am certain that what I may find it possible to do, acting under the provisions of the Charter and solely for the purposes of the Charter, and guided by the views expressed around this table to the extent that they have a direct bearing on the activities of the Secretary-General, will be recognized by you as being in the best interests of our Organization and, therefore, of the cause of peace. (Doc. S/PV. 837, pp. 11-12)

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

... the questions of Lebanon and Jordan, which last year at this time were at the centre of the attention of the Members, have been wholly or partly resolved. As a consequence, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was withdrawn at the end of 1958. The office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, stationed in Amman under the terms of the Assembly's resolution of 21 August 1958, is still maintained. The supporting communication offices in Beirut and Damascus, which were suggested in my report to the General Assembly in September of last year and on which agreements were reached through exchanges of letters in the spring, have been found unnecessary and have, therefore, not been established. A further improvement of relations between Arab countries, in the spirit of the resolution, which is warmly to be hoped for, would call for a reconsideration of the arrangements regarding the Special Representative in Amman. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs. Suppl. 1A, p. 4)

CANADA (Ritchie) June 11, 1958

22. It has been the consistent view of the Canadian Government that States Members of the United Nations should have the right, and indeed should exercise that right, of bringing to the appropriate body of the United Nations their anxieties about their relations with neighbouring countries, particularly, of course, when they consider that there is a threat from without or some form of external interference in their domestic affairs. We agree wholeheartedly with those who say that the United Nations should be prepared to hear these appeals for help, and we consider it axiomatic that its response should be particularly sympathetic towards appeals from the smaller countries, which must, indeed, rely largely on the United Nations for their continued existence in independence and peace.

(UN. SC. ORs. 825 mtg., p. 4)

**CANADA (Smith) September 25, 1958**

104. We must not, of course, be too optimistic in our assessment of the achievement of the third emergency special session. No one will draw the conclusion from the events of that session that the mere entrusting of responsibility for negotiation to a United Nations organism or official is in itself any assurance of abiding success. . . .

105. Nevertheless, the third emergency special session did produce a détente, a marked relaxation of tension. It also laid down or reaffirmed certain principles to guide the countries of the area in maintaining this détente. We must hope that the countries concerned will continue scrupulously to abide by these principles; other Members of the United Nations can also encourage them to do so by persuasion, by reassurance, by exercising restraint and by adhering themselves to the general principles outlined in the resolution, both in this and other areas of the world.

106. . . . It seems to my delegation that the noteworthy fact of this United Nations endeavour to serve the cause of peace in the Middle East is this. We have seen the parties to a dispute willingly and spontaneously joining together, with the unanimous assent of the international community, to entrust to a third party, the representative of the United Nations, a task which they had been unable, in their normal relations with one another, to accomplish. We may indeed find this a valuable precedent for future action.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR. 759 mtg.)

**CEYLON (Cores) September 30, 1958**

31. It was only last month that we met in an emergency special session to discuss ways and means by which this Organization could settle the immediate problems of the Middle East, heightened by the landing of United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively. It was indeed a happy sign that, in a spirit of compromise and understanding, a resolution jointly sponsored by all Arab States [resolution 1237 (ES-III)] was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly as a preliminary step towards a solution of these problems. Tension in that part of the world has been greatly reduced by the action taken by the United Nations on that occasion, and we are pleased that Member States directly concerned with this question have agreed to work together. We have watched with interest the customary skill and zeal with which the Secretary-General has pursued the mission entrusted to him by the General Assembly. . . .

32. I must point out that the third emergency special session which made this result possible will go down in the history of our Organization as an example of the steadfast adherence of Member States to . . . peaceful coexistence or good neighbour relations. . . .

(Same, 764 mtg.)

**CHINA (Tsiang) July 17, 1958**

. . . I have great respect for the men in the Group, and I know that the Secretary-General has laboured hard to make the work of the Group a success. Nevertheless, it seems to be obvious that the Observation Group of the United Nations in Lebanon did not and, of course, could not make any observation of developments in Lebanon before its arrival in Lebanon. It is also obvious that since its arrival, the work of the Group has been severely limited both in time and in space. The Group has not been able to go into the areas controlled by the rebels. For our purposes, these areas are the critical areas.

Furthermore, the Group has been able up to the present to visit less than one-tenth of the frontier between Lebanon and Syria. It is only natural, therefore, that the reports of the Group should, up to the present moment, be rather meagre in substance. These reports prove nothing one way or another.

. . . the Security Council would be irresponsible and unrealistic if it continued to view the crisis in Lebanon in isolation as if nothing had happened in Iraq or as if the tragic events in Iraq had no connexion with developments in Lebanon.

. . . . .

We have no right to gamble with the independence and the integrity of a country, even though it is a small country. Neither do we have the right to stake the prestige and the future of the United Nations on mere observation. If we did this, I am afraid that we would be making the Security Council the laughing stock of the world.

The representative of Sweden argued yesterday that Article 51 of the Charter could not be applied in Lebanon at this moment because... of the absence of armed attack. In other words, he would limit the application of Article 51 to cases of direct aggression. My delegation does not share in that interpretation. We have always held the view that in the present period of world history indirect aggression is as dangerous as direct aggression. I should know the representative, as I am, of a country which has suffered so much from indirect aggression by the Soviet Union. The organs of the United Nations in dealing with matters of this kind must keep in mind the Peace through Deeds resolution of 17 November 1950. (Doc. S/PV. 831, pp. 51, 52, 53)

**COLOMBIA (Araujo) July 18, 1958**

The delegation of Colombia believes that no matter what decision the Council may adopt on the proposals put before it for a vote, none of these proposals will basically solve the substantive problem that has acutely and deeply convulsed that important part of the world. Neither the action of the observers to see that infiltration of arms and other materials into Lebanon from across its frontiers has not taken place

nor the presence of American armies with all those elements of modern warfare will seal off the frontier and stop any type of violation. Neither troops nor any other additional measures which may eventually be taken by the United Nations can possibly operate satisfactorily in that zone. Eventually the Organization may adopt measures leading to this same end. But I believe that none of these draft resolutions will give the permanent, humane and just solution which will avoid any further convulsions from which these people are suffering, these people that are seeking by all the means at their disposal, within an atmosphere of peace, to carry out the historic concept of racial association, religious co-existence and common economic interests.

Once any of the draft resolutions is adopted, the Council must realize that it has merely alleviated one of the alarming symptoms of this very sick patient. The Council will not have given the final dose that once and for all will cure the patient of his sickness.

(Doc. S/PV. 834, p. 26)

FRANCE (de Vaulcelles) July 15, 1958

... I am happy on this occasion to express to [the observers] ... as well as to the Secretary-General our appreciation for the fine work which they have done.

However, from the report submitted by the Mission, we see that the Mission could not completely do its job because of the difficulties it met with, especially because of the fact that it could not control or check on more than one-tenth of the frontier between Lebanon and Syria.

... the French Government wishes the efficiency of this Group to be increased and, in order to do so, the means and supplies at the Group's disposal also to be increased. The Observation Group itself recognizes the need for such measures since it requests in its latest report that the number of observers be brought to 200, that it also be given unarmed observers and that a larger number of aircraft and pilots be placed at their disposal.

The French Government believes that there is no reason to suspend the activities of the Observation Group since the United States intervention is not in any way supposed to replace the action of the United Nations and it is to come to an end as soon as the United Nations is able to make the necessary arrangements to assure the closing of the Lebanese frontier to all infiltration.

(Doc. S/PV. 832, pp. 5-6, 7-10)

IRAQ (Jamali) June 10, 1958

234. As to the charge that Lebanon brought the issue to both the



Security Council and the Arab League at the same time, and that Lebanon was not serious about its complaint to the Arab League, I reveal no secret if I give you my impression: Had Lebanon not come to the Security Council, the Arab League might have never met. Egypt would have never gone to Benghazi had Lebanon not gone to the Security Council. . . . It was the presentation of Lebanon's case to the Security Council that caused the United Arab Republic to accept the meeting of the Arab League and send representatives to Benghazi. (UN. SC. OR. 824 mtg., p. 43)

**JAPAN (Matsudaira) July 17, 1958**

. . . it is inappropriate and regrettable indeed that the United States has taken measures to intervene in the dispute in Lebanon by sending its own armed forces to Lebanon while the Security Council is still examining Lebanon's complaint. It is true that the said dispatch of forces was made in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon. However, it cannot be denied that intervention by a State in the disputes of another State could have unfavourable repercussions directly or indirectly, and the Government and the people of my country sincerely hope that the stationing of United States troops in Lebanon will come to an end as soon as possible.

(Doc. S/PV. 832, p. 11)

**JAPAN (Matsudaira) July 18, 1958**

We note with appreciation . . . that the Observation Group has been carrying out its mission promptly and efficiently and that the situation in Lebanon seems to have improved recently. The continuance and strengthening of the activities of the Observation Group, I believe, will contribute to the creation of conditions that will enable the United States forces to be withdrawn from Lebanon.

(Doc. S/PV. 834, p. 56)

**LAOS (Panya) September 30, 1959**

As far as my Government is concerned, we are gratified to note the positive record of this year, and this finding bolsters our confidence in the United Nations role of conciliation and mediation and also in its work in the economic and humanitarian fields as represented in assistance to under-developed countries and aid to destitute peoples.

Among the achievements which were put on record last year by this Organization, we should single out first its fortunate intervention in the Middle East which made it possible not only to avert irreparable steps but made it possible also to establish a climate favouring relaxation, peace and order in a region whose extreme sensitivity to political developments is well known. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 815 p. 51)

**LEBANON (Azkoul) July 15, 1958**

The Government of Lebanon wished to draw the attention of the

members of the United Nations, and especially those of the Council, to the four following truths: firstly, that the failure of the Observation Group to make a final judgement on the dispatch of men and weapons to Lebanon was not due to the absence of such infiltration but to the following fact: the Observation Group was not able to reach the frontiers that were held by the rebels. It did not have at its disposal air observation means. It was not equipped to carry out observation at night. Finally, it had not yet started to function with the personnel that had been envisaged.

The second thesis was that the observations that were contained in the report confirmed in themselves the charges of Lebanon regarding infiltration of armed men and the dispatch of weapons to Lebanon in the following points: a. The group of observers had admitted indirectly that at least a certain number of armed men whom it had observed were not Lebanese; b. infiltration of armed men had occurred or was probable in areas where there were ethnical groups on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border; c. the supplying of rebels in the border areas was due to the proximity of Syria from where they could receive support in men, weapons, and money; d. the obstructive tactics used by the rebels in order to prevent the observers from going into the border areas were due to the fact that the rebels wished to conceal the infiltration movements that were occurring.

The third thesis was that despite the presence of the United Nations observers, the sending of armed men and weapons was continuing, and, therefore, the purpose which the Security Council was seeking in sending observers to Lebanon and which would have prevented the dispatch of men and weapons had not yet been achieved.

The fourth thesis was that the interpretation of the action of the Council in its resolution of 11 June which limited the activities of the observers to mere observation showed itself in the light of experience to be inadequate from the point of view of the purposes of the Council and inadequate to face the realities of the situation.

In making these comments, I do not wish to minimize the importance of the presence in Lebanon of the Observation Group and the usefulness of its activities. On the contrary, I would stress here that the Government of Lebanon appreciated the efforts that were made by the Secretary-General in order to mount in so short a period of time the machinery of observation that is at this time operating in Lebanon and also the efforts made by the Observation Group in order to carry out its observation assignments.

The Government of Lebanon sees with satisfaction the expansion of this mechanism and the expansion of its activities, and it will do all

it can in order to continue to co-operate fully with it and in order to extend all possible assistance to it. (Doc. S/PV. 827, pp. 41-42)

**LEBANON (Azkoul) July 18, 1958**

I should like briefly to inform the Council of the preliminary remarks I have just received from my Government regarding the second interim report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon [S/4052] which came to the Council yesterday.

First, the report does not indicate clearly that observation posts have been set up on the border.

Secondly, access by the observers to the frontier does not mean that observation has in fact become effective.

Thirdly, limited observation which the observers are at present able to carry out continues in the daytime as in the past. According to all our official information, infiltration of armed men and the shipment of weapons on a large scale are carried out at night.

Fourthly, the entry of the observers into rebel territory often takes place in the company of the rebels themselves at certain definite times; that is to say, when the rebels have nothing to hide from the observers. Fifthly, we have quite recent and reliable information that observers were repulsed in the Baalbeck region, that they were sometimes even fired upon to intimidate them and that, always taking into account the dangers to which they can expose themselves, they avoid carrying out their observation during the night and conduct their inquiry only during the day when they are sure of being sheltered from all danger.

. . . . .

We should also bear in mind the following three considerations: Firstly, the nature of observation as understood by the Observation Group, namely, the fact that it can report to the Council only the incidents which it alone has personally and directly observed; and, secondly, the nature of the report which the Lebanese Government submits to the Observation Group. These reports contain mostly facts which were observed by agents of the Lebanese authorities and which often reach the Observation Group only when these facts will have already taken place and are no longer observable. For example, a report reaches the Beirut authorities from one of the agents of Army Intelligence regarding the fact that a mule convoy loaded with ammunition and weapons will have crossed the Lebanese frontier at such-and-such a point and on such-and-such a date. When this report, which as far as the Lebanese authorities are concerned represents proof of continuing infiltration, reaches the Observation Group, it becomes obsolete because the Observation Group can no longer check the facts which are mentioned, and, therefore, they cannot take this incident into account.

The third point which we have to bear in mind is the manner in which the Observation Group observes in accordance with the instructions of the Council. The Council did not send to Lebanon an investigation group whose principal or sole task would be to report back to the Council the results of its investigation. It has sent to Lebanon an Observation Group whose mission is to see to it that there is no infiltration of men or material in Lebanon. This means that the duty of the Group is not to tell the Council whether there is or is not infiltration. Its duty is to put an end to this infiltration and to report on the results of this effort to the Council. In other words, what must be expected from the Observation Group is not a report indicating whether there is or there is not infiltration or listing the different cases of infiltration, but merely whether it was able or was not able to exercise the function which was assigned to it, which was to put an end to such infiltration, and, thus, whether the infiltration has ended or whether it is nevertheless continuing.

. . . . .

For according to the interpretation given to the resolution of the Council, it is only through observation that it was hoped the Observation Group might put an end to the infiltration of armed men and the shipment of material. Now the Group has just told us in its first report that it was not yet in a position to observe, and therefore it could not judge whether it was able or not to put an end to infiltration. It is this conclusion of the Observation Group that we should bear in mind and which is of interest to us, not the fact that they were not able to arrive at any conclusions regarding the existence or non-existence of infiltration. I conclude that the preliminary conclusions arrived at by the observers in their first report do not justify the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union to the effect that there is no infiltration of men and material into Lebanon. He cannot say that he bases himself on the report of the Observation Group and then say that there is no infiltration. . . . The Group describes its various needs in men, material, aircraft and helicopters that are needed to carry out the task which the Council assigned to it. The question that follows from this request of the Group: if the Observation Group was convinced, as the representative of the Soviet Union claims, that there was no infiltration, why then does the Observation Group ask for all these measures which are needed in order for it to bring to a successful conclusion its observation task on the Lebanese border?

(Doc. S/PV. 833, pp. 2-3, 8-10, 11-12)

POLAND (Rapacki) August 19, 1958

86. . . . the armed intervention of United States and United Kingdom troops in the domestic affairs of these countries took place without the

approval of the United Nations, was contrary to the Charter, and has dealt a blow to the authority of the United Nations. This is all the more true, since the action took place after decisions had been taken by United Nations bodies concerning Lebanon and under the very eyes of the United Nations observers.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs., 740 mtg.)

**SWEDEN (Jarring) July 16, 1958**

The situation in Lebanon seems to have improved during the last weeks and in the opinion of my Government the presence of the observers and the activities in the area have contributed towards this development.

The Government of Lebanon has now asked the United States Government for military assistance to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. The United States has decided to provide such assistance. The new element to which reference is made to justify these actions is events in another country. The implication would seem to be that something similar could happen in Lebanon.

The United States has now informed the Council of its action and proposed that the United Nations itself take steps to insure the independence of Lebanon, whereupon the United States troops could be withdrawn. The United States Government is of the opinion that the United Nations contribution should take other forms and be greater in scope than the present Observer Group.

When the Council now proceeds to consider the question in this new situation, two aspects must be kept apart. First, to the extent that we are confronted with a decision of a State to request assistance from another State in order to stabilize the internal situation in the State, this is not a question falling directly within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. In this connexion I wish to refer to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Secondly, on the other hand, it has been stated that the United States acted in accordance with the principle expressed in the Charter on collective self-defence. It is apparently considered that measures have been taken in accordance with Article 51, or at least in the spirit of this Article. According to the Charter, measures of this kind come under the examination of the Council.

One of the conditions for Article 51 to be applicable is that an armed attack has occurred against a Member State. The Swedish Government does not consider that this condition has been fulfilled in the present case, nor does my Government consider that there is an international conflict in the terms of Article 51. The action now taken by the United States Government has substantially altered the conditions of the activities of the observers in Lebanon, and the question is whether in practice they are able to fulfil their task as set forth in the Council resolution of 11 June.

In the opinion of the Swedish Government the proper course to take might be to suspend until further notice the activities carried on by the observers in Lebanon. (Doc. S/PV. 830, pp. 21-25)

**SWEDEN (Jarring) July 21, 1958**

A situation in which the United Nations Observers continued their activities after the arrival in Lebanon of a considerable number of American soldiers seemed, in the opinion of the Swedish Government, to blur the distinction between the United Nations Observers and the United States soldiers. The continued activities of the Observers could in this new situation become a political handicap to the United Nations. Thus, considering that in the Swedish view the Observers could at present not fulfil their task as set out in the Security Council resolution of 11 June, the Swedish delegation proposed that these activities be suspended until further notice. This did not in any way mean that the Council should cease to pay attention to the situation in Lebanon, nor did it imply that efforts to reach agreement on appropriate measures for the purpose of serving the interests of peace and security in the area should be discontinued. . . .

When it comes to the continued effort which should be made within the framework of the Security Council in dealing with the situation, it is the opinion of my Government that the first paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution of Japan, submitted in document S/4055/Rev. 1, provides us with a suitable starting point. It is the understanding of the Swedish delegation that the plans which the Secretary-General is requested to work out according to this paragraph should, on the one hand, involve concrete measures on the United Nations to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, and, on the other, anticipate the successive withdrawal of the foreign troops.

It does not seem possible at present to have any definite idea as to the precise nature of the steps which should be taken. The Swedish delegation does not exclude the possibility of continued and expanded activities of the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon as well as the dispatch of military United Nations contingents, or both.

(Doc. S/PV. 835, pp. 36-40)

**U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) June 10, 1958**

155. It is, on the contrary, the duty of the Security Council to rebuff any attempts at external interference in the domestic affairs of the Arab States. This point must be emphasized, since numerous facts show that certain Western Powers are attempting to use the events in Lebanon for the purpose of intervening in its domestic affairs and of exerting further pressure on the Arab States.

. . . . .

181. It is quite clear that the settlement of the internal conflict in Lebanon should be sought not in the Security Council, but in Lebanon itself. The Lebanese Government's appeal to the Security Council can only be regarded as an attempt to gain support in its struggle against its own people from certain Western Powers represented in the Council.  
(UN. SC. *ORs.*, 824 mtg., pp. 29, 33)

**U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) July 9, 1958**

You, Mr. President, often make public statements in support of the United Nations, but by their actions in Lebanon and Jordan the governments of the United States and Great Britain are dealing a body blow at this international organization. At such a momentous hour in the life of the peoples, the United Nations has actually been pushed out of the way with the bayonets of the American and British forces.

. . . . .

This is why the Government of the Soviet Union proposes to call immediately a conference of the heads of government of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Britain, France and India, with the participation of the United Nations Secretary General, to take urgent measures to stem the beginning military conflict.

. . . . .

We deem it necessary that this summit conference should work out concrete recommendations to end the military conflict in the Middle East and submit them to the Security Council so that this United Nations body would study them with the participation of representatives from the Arab states.

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 11, 1958), 232-33.

**U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) July 15, 1958**

... a short while ago the Security Council had already considered the Lebanese complaint which contained accusations against the United Arab Republic regarding its alleged interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Observation Group which was sent to Lebanon in accordance with the instructions of the Security Council did not, as we know, confirm these charges that were leveled against the United Arab Republic. The Chairman of the Observation Group, the former representative of Ecuador, Mr. Galo Plaza, said that they had found no proof of mass infiltration on the part of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon. At a Press conference held in Beirut, Mr. Plaza confirmed that the Group had no proof at all of the infiltration or support of the rebels by the United Arab Republic. He added that he regarded the events in Lebanon as a civil war. It is fitting to add that the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

who through a special decision of the Security Council was instructed to follow the operations and activities of the Observation Group, has in numerous statements stressed that the events which took place in Lebanon were the domestic concern of the Lebanese people.

The Observation Group took an objective stand. It objectively assessed the situation in Lebanon as the domestic affair of the Lebanese people.

... the dispatch of United States troops to Lebanon constitutes an act of aggression against the peoples of the Arab world and is a gross intervention in the domestic affairs of the States of this area. This action is a gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations which prohibits the use of force as a means of foreign policy. . . .

(Doc. S/PV. 827, pp. 47-50, 52, 56)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) July 15, 1958

... These are the conclusions of the Observation Group:

"1. It has not been possible to establish from where these arms [namely, the arms seen by the Observation Group] were acquired . . .

"2. Nor, was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside."

"Any"—not "massive," but "any." I understand it may be even single, "if any."

And, lastly, which is much more important to me and I think for everybody:

"3. There is little doubt, however," concluded the Observation Group, "that the vast majority was in any case composed of Lebanese."

(Doc. S/PV. 828, p. 31)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) July 16, 1958

I was struck by the fact that the policy of the United States towards the Observation Group is a twofold policy.

On the other hand, we have the policy which has been stated here, which has been voiced by Ambassador Lodge in his official statements before the Council, in which he welcomes the Observation Group and in which he congratulates the Observation Group and heaps praise upon it.

Then you have that other aspect of the United States policy towards the Observation Group and its work, and that other aspect of the policy is that the results of the Observation Group are completely ignored, rejected, or doubted. In other words, the crux of the work of the Observation Group is not accepted or acceptable to the United States.



. . . the Charter says specifically that this right of self-defence is enjoyed when there is a direct attack, when a State is threatened from outside. Now neither the Security Council nor any other organ of the United Nations had noted that such a situation prevailed in the Lebanon and it did not do so because this situation does not exist. We have observers in Lebanon. That is why they were sent there. They were sent there in order to alert the United Nations if ever there was to be such a threat to the Lebanon. But we have never received such a report from them. We have not received it because such a situation did not exist in Lebanon.

. . . . .

Now what must the Security Council do under the circumstances? The course has been mapped out in the Soviet draft resolution which invites the Security Council to take such steps as would lead to an end to the intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Arab States, an end to intervention in the domestic affairs in Lebanon, and the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon.

. . . Mr. Lodge, in support of what he said in his general statement yesterday, adduced certain facts which allegedly testified to the intervention of the United Arab Republic in Lebanese affairs and also to infiltration from the United Arab Republic into Lebanon. These facts, as far as Mr. Lodge was concerned, consisted of the repetition of certain mysterious sources which, as he said, were very reliable. But if the United States indeed has such proof, why on earth does it not submit that evidence to the United Nations Observation Group which is there precisely in order to collate such information. It is there to elucidate these misgivings. It is there in order to confirm or refute these facts. (Doc. S/PV. 829, pp. 16, 27, 31, 41)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) July 18, 1958

The delegation of the Soviet Union voted against the American draft resolution in so far as it included an endorsement of the armed incursion of United States forces in Lebanon. Such an endorsement by the Security Council constitutes a mockery of the fundamental principles upon which our Organization rests. . . .

We voted against the American draft resolution also because it envisaged the establishment of United Nations armed forces to be sent to Lebanon, the functions and purposes of which would have been contrary to the basic provisions of our Charter.

. . . . .

Today's vote will rest as a dark stain on the reputation of the Security Council, and today will be a dark day in the annals of the United Nations Organization.

In the face of armed intervention in the affairs of the Arab States by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Security Council took no step whatsoever in order to put an end to these aggressive actions which represent a threat to peace and security not only in the Near and Middle East, but throughout the world. Thereby, the Security Council has failed to carry out the duties that devolve upon it under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

As a result of the outcome of the vote that was taken in this Council, the Soviet Union . . . demands the immediate calling of an emergency session of the General Assembly. . . . (Doc. S/PV. 834, pp. 61-65)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) July 21, 1958

The Observer Group is there at the decision of the United Nations. It is there as the result of a decision of the Security Council. The Group represents the United Nations in Lebanon. What will it do? Will it help the forces of the United States in their dirty work, dirty work which runs counter to the interests of the Lebanese people? . . . The new draft resolution proposed by Japan proposes to broaden the tasks placed before this group of observers. If the original resolution, the first decision, said only that this Observation Group is to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration and it was to report to the Security Council, the new draft resolution will include in the functions of the Group the function to ensure the territorial integrity and the political independence of Lebanon.

. . . the Security Council has not made a determination that the United Arab Republic through its activities is threatening the territorial integrity and the political independence of Lebanon. There is no decision of the Security Council to that effect, and there is no basis for such a decision of the Council. If there is no threat, that means that there is no need for the United Nations and for the Observers to have this task of ensuring the territorial integrity and the political independence of Lebanon from such a non-existing threat.

To sum up, first, this resolution actually amounts to a tacit moral sanction by the United Nations of the presence of United States troops in Lebanon and of the presence of British forces in Jordan, although the two forces of these two countries are there illegally and in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Secondly, the draft resolution proceeds to instruct the Observation Group to continue and develop its work despite the utter change in the conditions of the presence of the Observation Group, a point which is open to

serious question. Thirdly, the draft resolution asks that measures be taken in addition to those envisaged by the resolution of 11 June, measures which would expand the Observation Group and give it new functions in addition to those originally provided—in fact if not in name.

The resolution would sanction . . . a United Nations international army in Lebanon. But the Security Council rejected the resolution for the establishment of a United Nations international army last week.  
(Doc. S/PV. 835, pp. 51-56)

U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) July 23, 1958

We also are in agreement with that approach to the work at this special session of the Security Council which Mr. Macmillan proposes. We agree that at this special session of the Security Council no resolutions whatever should be introduced unless they will flow from a previous agreement and that the goal will consist in the achievement of an agreement and not in the fixing of disagreement by the method of voting.

In this regard the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that the chiefs of governments in the aim of achieving the quickest concrete decisions in the interests of the preservation and strengthening of peace will have the opportunity for joint consultation not only in an official procedure.

Inasmuch as in the given instance the question revolves around the consideration in the Security Council not of the usual current questions but of questions of particular importance from the viewpoint of the preservation of peace and the guarantee of security, we consider that in this case it would be useful to enlist for participation in the work of the Security Council India—the largest Asiatic country which has received universal recognition as a state out for the strengthening of peace. Its participation would be really useful in contrast to the participation of one of the so-called permanent members who factually represents no one. We consider it necessary that in the work of the Security Council there should take part the representative of India in the person of its Premier J. Nehru who has agreed to participate in a meeting of the chiefs of state.

In your message, Mr. President, you say that if a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the chiefs of governments is desired by all, then the USA will join in this orderly procedure.

As regards the Soviet Union . . . the Soviet Union will be represented at this session by the chairman of the Council of Minister of the USSR.

It goes without saying that representatives of the interested Arab states must be brought into a discussion of the question in the Security

Council with the participation of the chiefs of government of the above mentioned five powers.

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 11, 1958), 234-35.

U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) July 28, 1958

Your current reply represents a step backwards from the achieved agreement and, naturally, cannot but evoke serious anxiety among the peoples. The Government of the USA proposes that instead of the examination by the Heads of Government of the five powers of the situation dangerous for peace in the Near and Middle East, this question should again be transferred to a regular session of the Security Council of the UN. This proposal is now also supported by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan. But what can this bring? You, of course, know well that the Security Council, as the experience of its last sessions showed, is not capable in its regular meetings to adopt an urgent and effective solution for this question. In this region an unceasing accumulation of armed forces is taking place and it more and more is becoming a powder-magazine which can explode from the smallest spark and evoke a world catastrophe.

In these circumstances it is necessary in the quickest manner for the Heads of Government of the five powers—the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India—to meet, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, who being invested with high authority could reach an agreement about the quick termination of the military conflict in the region of the Near and Middle East and about measures for preserving and strengthening universal peace.

It is entirely evident that if we with complete sincerity desire to find a way for reducing tension then we must agree that in the present instance these five powers must first reach agreement on the necessary measures for preserving and strengthening peace. Can anyone doubt that, if these powers succeed in reaching agreement about the immediate termination of the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East, any other state which is actually interested in strengthening peace would welcome and support such a solution (sic).

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 18, 1958), 275-76.

U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) August 5, 1958

... Inasmuch as the Governments of the USA and Great Britain evaded the convocation of a conference of the Heads of Government of the five powers, and the Security Council, as we have already noted, has shown itself incapable of assuring a solution of the question of the situation in the Near and Middle East in the interests of peace, the Government of the Soviet Union with the aim of speediest adoption

of the necessary measures for stopping the aggression instructed its representative at the UN to demand the convocation of a Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN for the discussion of the question of the withdrawal of the troops of the USA from Lebanon and troops of Great Britain from Jordan. The Soviet Government hopes that the consideration of that question in the General Assembly, in which there are represented large as well as small states, will permit finding of a way to liquidate the war danger created in the Near and Middle East by the actions of the USA and England and bring tranquillity to that area.

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXIX (September 1, 1958), 345, 346.

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (Loufi) July 15, 1958

All the official documents which we have before us, such as the report of the Observer and the statements of most of the world press, have clearly shown that the question of Lebanon was an internal problem, which was in fact of concern only to the Lebanese, and it was up to the Lebanese to find a solution to it. The armed intervention of the Government of the United States, at the request of President Chamoun, unfortunately can merely aggravate the situation and make it more critical in that part of the world.

. . . . .

I thought that the resolution of the Security Council of 11 June last was apt to improve the situation in Lebanon and to enable the Lebanese to settle their differences themselves. It is in this spirit that my delegation did not object to the resolution of the Council. It was therefore with considerable regret that we take note of this new attitude of the Government of the United States.

. . . there is a decision of the Council which should be carried out and which is being carried out by the Observation Group.

From the very first day it became clear that this resolution of the Security Council of 11 June last did not satisfy the present Government of Lebanon. We noted therefore that the Observation Group and the observers themselves were the target of much criticism of the part of the President of the Lebanese Republic.

(Doc. S/PV. 828, pp. 16, 17)

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (Loufi) July 16, 1958

. . . I stated that my delegation found that this intervention was not justified because the situation in Lebanon was continuously improving and the observers were able to fulfil their task, and this follows clearly from the statement of the Secretary-General yesterday, his statement today, and is confirmed by the statements of the Observation Group

in the press release of 16 July which was circulated this morning under code S/4051.

. . . . .

What is important also is that Article 51 of the Charter which was invoked by Mr. Azkoul does not apply in this case. On the one hand, nobody can see here that there was armed aggression against Lebanon. The observers did not speak of aggression.

(Doc. S/PV. 830, pp. 2-3)

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (Loufi) July 17, 1958

The Security Council, in its resolution of 11 June, clearly stated that it was far from being convinced by the statements of Mr. Malik and that it was not impressed by information which stemmed from such intelligence sources.

. . . The report of the Observation Group, which has just been circulated, will merely confirm the thesis which I advanced here, namely that there was no motive for the United States to land troops in Lebanon. It is quite obvious that the observers now have access to all areas in Lebanon.

(Doc. S/PV. 831, pp. 55-56)

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (Loufi) July 18, 1958

We can understand that the Government of the United States is not prepared to have its troops attacked by the regular forces of the United Arab Republic, but what is important and serious is that the United States wishes to be the judge as to which are the elements under our control or accepting our directives. In making that decision, the United States will base itself on the unilateral reports which it receives from its own information services. It has already done that in the case of its intervention in Lebanon, contrary to the report of the Observation Group.

(Doc. S/PV. 833, pp. 16-17)

#### UNITED KINGDOM (Sir Pierson Dixon) July 15, 1958

This response [by the United States] to a request from . . . Lebanon for such assistance is certainly fully consistent with the provisions and purposes of the United Nations Charter and the established rules of international law.

. . . . .

It has been the consistent view of Her Majesty's Government that there has been interference from the United Arab Republic in the affairs of Lebanon, and our information is that this interference is continuing despite the efforts of the Observation Group which this Council dispatched to Lebanon so as to ensure that no illegal infiltration took place.

. . . We recognize and deeply appreciate the contribution which the Secretary-General has made and is making.

(Doc. S/PV. 827, p. 46)

**UNITED KINGDOM (Sir Pierson Dixon) July 18, 1958**

The Soviet draft resolution itself ignored and was irrelevant to the problem under consideration by the Council. . . . [It] asked the Council to decide that this assistance should be withdrawn without anything being put in its place. . . .

My Government . . . considers that the United Nations owes a debt of gratitude to the Secretary-General, to the members of the Observer Group, and to all the personnel employed in Lebanon, for their tenacious and devoted pursuit of the task assigned to them. It would have been a serious setback to their work if the Security Council had now decided on its suspension, as was proposed in the Swedish resolution.

(Doc. S/PV. 834, pp. 51-52)

**UNITED KINGDOM (Sir Pierson Dixon) July 21, 1958**

. . . my Government proposes to . . . withdraw British forces from the territory of Jordan if and when effective arrangements could be made by the United Nations for the protection of Jordan against external threat. My Government concluded from the course of the present debate in the Council on the Lebanese item that there is no immediate prospect of agreement being reached here on the necessary measures in Jordan. It therefore proposes, as a first step, to explore urgently with the Secretary-General the possibility of devising some form of effective action by the United Nations. This will be done in consultation with the Government of Jordan and with other Governments concerned. The object of these consultations will be to work out proposals under which assistance can be given by the United Nations to the Government of Jordan to ensure the preservation of its territorial integrity and political independence.

(Doc. S/PV. 835, p. 16)

**UNITED STATES (Lodge) June 10, 1958**

113. The most constructive thing the Security Council can do is to get United Nations observers to the borders of Lebanon to assure that no activities of the nature complained about by the representative of Lebanon are carried on.

(UN. SC. ORr. 824, p. 22)

**UNITED STATES (Dulles) July 1, 1958**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chamoun of Lebanon is quoted this morning as saying that, if the United Nations action fails, he would appeal to friends of Lebanon and the West for direct military assistance under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Could you define for us under what circumstances the United States would be willing to render direct military assistance to Lebanon?*

A. I will make a reply to your question, although I am not going to attempt to define in detail all the circumstances under which we might respond. I would say this: The normal way to deal with these problems is through the process of the United Nations, and the Government of Lebanon initiated such a process when it took its case to the Security Council and obtained the resolution for observation under which the Secretary-General is now acting and under which, I believe, some results at least are being obtained.

Now we have never believed that you could only act under such processes; indeed, article 51 was put into the charter to meet the contingency that it might be impractical, because of the veto power or otherwise, to obtain appropriate action from the United Nations. Article 51, as you will recall, talks about collective defense if an armed attack occurs. Now we do not think that the words "armed attack" preclude treating as such an armed revolution which is fomented abroad, aided and assisted from abroad. Indeed you will recall perhaps in the report on the North Atlantic Treaty that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that that kind of a civil disturbance could be treated as an armed attack. In our Japanese security treaty that is expressly spelled out. However, we believe that the best way to deal with these things is through the processes of the United Nations. We do not think it is proper yet to conclude that those processes have failed or will fail. If and when we had to reach that conclusion, then there would be a new situation which we would have to deal with in the light of the new circumstances at the time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind the role we played in discouraging, at least, the invasion of Suez, is it realistic to think that we would participate in any kind of military intervention in Lebanon except under the most extreme circumstances?*

A. I don't think that there is any analogy whatsoever between the situation in Lebanon, where the lawful Government is calling for assistance, and the Suez case, where the armed intervention was against the will of the Government concerned. There is no parallel whatever between the two cases. We do believe that the presence in Lebanon of foreign troops, however justifiable—and it is thoroughly justifiable from a legal and international-law standpoint—is not as good a solution as for the Lebanese to find a solution themselves. It would be, as you put it, a sort of measure of last resort.

—Press Conference, *DSB*, XXXIX (July 21, 1958), 105-106.

UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower), July 15, 1958

The United States, this morning, will report its action [in sending troops to Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun] to an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. As the United



Nations charter recognizes, there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit of the charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are occurring nearby, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers now in Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support in the United Nations measures which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will enable the United States forces promptly to be withdrawn. Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has traditionally had the most friendly relations. There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles of the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals itself for evidence of our concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to defend itself against indirect aggression.

—Statement to the Press, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 4, 1958), 181

#### UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) July 15, 1958

It is our belief that the efforts of the Secretary General and of the United Nations observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personnel and military equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for hope that the situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with the continuing integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from without was being brought under control.

The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14, when there was a violent outbreak in Baghdad, in nearby Iraq. Elements in Iraq strongly sympathetic to the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office individuals comprising the lawful Government of that country. . . .

We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without further evidence of support from other friendly nations.

After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. . . . Pending the taking of adequate measures

by the United Nations, the United States will be acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right—the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence.

It is clear that events which have been occurring in Lebanon represent indirect aggression from without, and that such aggression endangers the independence and integrity of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. I have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risks involved this action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

—Message to Congress, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 4, 1958), 182-83

#### UNITED STATES (Lodge) July 15, 1958

The United Nations must be particularly alert in protecting the security of small States from interference by those whose resources and power are larger. This is a principle which has been supported here in this very hall in the past and which should be supported today regardless of who the offender may be.

The overthrow of another State by subversion and the fomenting of internal strife is more difficult for the world to combat than is direct military aggression, because the fomenting of internal strife is harder to see with your eyes. But this is not the first time that the United Nations has faced such a problem. The United Nations faced such a problem successfully in Greece in 1946, when Soviet-sponsored insurrection threatened to overwhelm the Greek Government. The United Nations did so unsuccessfully in 1948 when the Communist coup was perpetrated in Czechoslovakia.

The United Nations sought to provide means for dealing with such aggressive developments in the future when in 1949 and in 1950 it adopted the Essentials of Peace and the Peace through deeds resolutions of the General Assembly. (Doc. S/PV. 827, pp. 27, 28-30)

#### UNITED STATES (Lodge) July 17, 1958

To us there is an unanswerable argument in the unanimous view of the United Nations Observer Group which has just reached the Council today in document S/4052, which says that further stations and permanent observation posts should be established close to the frontier, and that the size of the group should be increased to a total

of some 200, which is about double its present strength. Evidently, the United Nations Observer Group does not think it should suspend its activities.

I am afraid that some misconceptions have crept into the debate with respect to the actual situation in Lebanon. I have heard it implied here that because the Observation Group has not reported the occurrence of a certain event, the event . . . has not happened. The fallacy of this contention becomes plain when you consider that the Observation Group has not made a final report; that the Observation Group undoubtedly possesses a great deal of information which it has not yet reported or had time to evaluate; that all that we have had from the Observation Group so far have been interim reports and reports on the progress of their organizational work; and that it has not been able to penetrate thoroughly many of the most sensitive border areas, nor to engage in any extensive night patrols.

. . . It was only yesterday that we were told that the Observation Group had finally reached agreement to enable it to get to the frontiers of Lebanon all the way around. That agreement was only received on the day, may I point out, that our forces landed, and with great respect I submit that our efforts may have already been helpful to the work of the United Nations. The fact that the day before yesterday the Observation Group got permission to reach the frontiers of Lebanon is a cause for gratification. But, obviously, it does not mean that the work of the Observation Group is finished. On the contrary, it means that they are now in a much better position than they have ever been to go ahead. It marks the end of the beginning—the end of the beginning—as far as the Observation Group is concerned, and the beginning of a phase which can be of even greater usefulness. So I think we ought to be clear about that.

(Doc. S/PV. 831, pp. 22-25)

**UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) July 22, 1958**

When last week the Soviet Union introduced in the United Nations Security Council a Resolution condemning our action in Lebanon, that Resolution received only one vote—that of the Soviet Union itself. I also note that efforts were made within the Security Council to provide Lebanon with increased protection from the United Nations so as to preserve its integrity and independence, thus permitting United States forces promptly to be withdrawn. There were two such proposals, each defeated by the one vetoing vote of the Soviet Union.

How does the Soviet Union reconcile its allegation that United States forces in Lebanon endanger world peace with the veto of these two proposals?

The Soviet Union, by its constant abuse of its veto power in the

Security Council—its veto of today was the 85th—would tear down, and not strengthen, the orderly processes which the nations have established for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Your present proposal seems further calculated to derogate from the authority and prestige of the United Nations. What you propose amounts in effect to five nations, without sanction of the United Nations and without conformity with its Charter, reaching what you call "recommendations" regarding the Near and Middle East which would then be submitted to the United Nations Security Council. But in reality such so-called "recommendations" would be decisions and the process would in effect make the United Nations into a "rubber stamp" for a few great powers.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, when procedures are sought to be improved to meet what is alleged to be a situation of great urgency, this can scarcely be expected to save time. . . .

It, indeed, the Soviet Union seriously believes that there is an imminent threat to world peace, it is bound by the United Nations Charter to take the matter to the Security Council. . . .

The Security Council is already dealing with certain phases of the problem alluded to by your note. If you or we believe that other aspects of this problem or other problems should be urgently dealt with in the interests of peace, then it lies open to any of us to enlarge the scope of the Security Council consideration. Furthermore, under the Charter, members of government, including Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, may represent a member nation at the Security Council. If such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure.

I do not, of course, exclude the discussion, outside the United Nations, of world or regional problems, not posing alleged imminent threats to the peace. I cannot but deplore the persistent refusal of your Government for so many months to agree to the adequate preparation of a "summit" meeting at which we could exchange considered views on the great problems which confront the world. . . .

—Letter to Premier Khrushchev, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 11, 1958), 230-31.

#### UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) July 25, 1958

I am glad that you now recognize the responsibility of the United Nations and have withdrawn your original proposal which would have gravely undermined the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

You now make specific suggestions dealing with the composition of the Security Council and the conditions under which nations other than members of the Council may participate in discussions of the Council.

My letter to you of July 22 urged that one of the advantages of proceedings in the Security Council is that there are established rules on these matters and it is accordingly not necessary to rely on improvising. I pointed out that when rules of this kind are sought to be improvised, there is raised a whole series of new problems, notably as to the participation and non-participation of various states. The United States will adhere, in these respects, to the Charter, which lays down the conditions under which nations which are not members of the Council may participate in the discussions of the Council.

As to the agenda, we agree that it should be limited to a discussion of the problems of the Middle East, including the causes of those problems. I would, however, be lacking in candor if I did not make clear that to put peace and security on a more stable basis in the Middle East requires far more than merely a consideration of Lebanon and Jordan. These situations are but isolated manifestations of far broader problems. In my opinion the instability of peace and security is in large measure due to the jeopardy in which small nations are placed. It would be the purpose of the United States to deal with the specific incidents you raise within that broad context. To do otherwise would be to be blind to the teaching of history.

. . . . .

It is my earnest hope that through the United Nations Security Council steps can be taken in regard to the Middle East which, by making peace more secure there, will help promote it elsewhere.

(Same, pp. 233-34)

**UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) August 5, 1958**

I welcome Mr. Khrushchev's agreement that the problems we have had under discussion in our recent exchange of letters should be placed again before the United Nations. I regret that he did not accept the Security Council with the Heads of Government present as the appropriate forum in view of his alleged concern over the threats to the peace. However, the General Assembly is completely acceptable, particularly since the United States previously proposed on July 18th such a procedure to the Security Council.

—Public Statement, *DSB*, XXXIX (September 1, 1958), 342.

**UNITED STATES (Lodge) September 2, 1958**

The final result of the United Nations consideration of the Near East question came . . . when, instead of denouncing the United States or calling upon us to withdraw, or doing any of the things which the Soviet Union wanted, the United Nations adopted a resolution which embodies the kind of thing which we think should be done in the Near East. It contained a pledge of noninterference, and it in effect

put the United Nations in Lebanon and Jordan. Both of these provisions, therefore, if lived up to, would make possible our withdrawal. Finally, and of great importance for the future, the resolution approved a long-range scheme for regional economic development along the lines proposed by President Eisenhower.

To be sure, resolutions are but words and, if they are to be considered successful, they must be carried out in practice. But the resolution just adopted in New York was a constructive document, and it represented not only a defeat for the efforts of the Soviet Union to condemn the United States but was also gratifying evidence of the way in which the nations in a troubled part of the world can go ahead on their own to reduce tensions.

If I may utter a personal view, it is that we accomplished more at this special session of the General Assembly than would have been accomplished at the type of unprepared and hastily convened summit meeting which Mr. Khrushchev favored—and then hastily dropped after his visit to Peking. Our correspondence with the Soviet Union on this matter showed that the Soviets had no sincere concern for the desires of the small countries of the Near East but were only looking for a chance to make trouble.

—Address before the 40th Convention of the American Legion, *DSB*, XXXIX (September 22, 1958), 449-50.

#### UNITED STATES (Herter) September 5, 1958

Now, it may be asked, in such a situation as that in Lebanon and Jordan why should the United States work through the United Nations? Why not choose the direct, simple way, unfettered by the complexities of multilateral diplomacy? The answer is simple. The day is gone when any great power, or even a group of great powers, for that matter, can take matters in its own hands to "solve" an international situation affecting others.

Prime Minister Nehru, in his recently published analysis of the world today, put it this way:

"We have arrived at a stage in the modern world when an attempt at forcible imposition of ideas on any large section of people is bound ultimately to fail. In present circumstances this will lead to war and tremendous destruction. There will be no victory—only defeat for everyone."

The world is a growing community of sovereign nations, and each has a responsibility for the peaceful solution of international problems wherever they may occur. The Near East problem is as much, perhaps more, a matter of concern to the small states as it is to the large powers. Small countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, will remain free and independent only through collective action. As was shown

during the recent session of the General Assembly, statesmanship and leadership are by no means the monopoly of the few; they are, fortunately, shared by many.

—Address before the American Political Science Association, DSB, XXXIX (September 29, 1958), 495.

#### UNITED STATES (Lloyd) September 25, 1958

50. . . . We have to admit that to date the Security Council, except in one or two instances, has not been a success as an authority for enforcing international agreements or for dealing speedily with threats to the peace. The reason for this is not a fault in the United Nations, but the fact that the great Powers have failed to agree and that the veto has been repeatedly misused by one great Power.

51. The result has been not only a failure to get agreed solutions, but also it has proved impossible for speedy action to be taken in critical situations. That is why in the situation in Lebanon and Jordan in the week beginning 14 July 1958 it was necessary for the United States and the United Kingdom, in response to requests from legitimate Governments, to take speedy action to preserve the independence of two small countries and so to win time for other action.

52. Our Organization is more successful when it is given time to reconcile different points of view in order to show the way to acceptable solutions. When there has been time for this process of reconciliation to work, the United Nations has proved well qualified and often very successful in producing acceptable solutions within the framework of the Charter.

53. Again in this context let us look at what has happened over Lebanon and Jordan. On 21 August 1958, at the third emergency special session of the General Assembly, something happened which none of us, I think, suspected would happen: a resolution [1237 (ES-III)] was unanimously passed. That resolution seemed to recognize exactly the principle which I am seeking to advocate—the principle of the interdependence of the Arab countries of the Middle East, indeed of all the countries of the Middle East. That resolution propounded in admirable words the doctrine of "live and let live."

54. Following upon the resolution, the Secretary-General visited some of the countries concerned in the Middle East. I pay warm tribute to his disinterested and strenuous endeavours to promote a settlement as well as to his other work in this Organization. . . .

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 758 mtg.)

#### *Palestine*

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

. . . little or no progress can be reported from [Palestine]. . . . The

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the United Nations Emergency Force, therefore, remain essential elements in the efforts of the Organization to assist the Member Governments to maintain stable and peaceful conditions.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs. Suppl. 1A*, p. 4)

#### ISRAEL (Eban) January 30, 1959

The Mixed Armistice Commission has carried out its function in investigating the complaint and determining the facts. The fact that it has done so through the present report rather than by endorsing a severely worded *ex parte* resolution by one of the complainants is not material. The competence extends up to the important duty of attesting the facts. There have been long periods of intranquillity during the past years when the procedural position of the Armistice has been precisely as it is today. . . . after ten years of duration the Armistice has not been developed into permanent peace. When a provisional structure endures beyond the time for which it was erected, many anomalies and strains set in. These are matters which can be discussed and negotiated. Indeed article 8 of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement lays down the procedure for such discussion, but only if it is clearly understood that members of the Security Council insist on the unconditional and reciprocal validity of the cease-fire. . . . The fact that peaceful shepherds cannot graze their flocks in the Galilee are unarmed is a vivid index of the lack of security, peace and tranquillity in this region. The Security Council and the United Nations as a whole will surely not have achieved its function in this area until people can go about these peaceful pursuits without the necessity of carrying weapons of defence. (Doc. S/PV. 845, pp. 32-35, 91)

#### JAPAN (Matsudaira) January 30, 1959

. . . if the injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force is not respected or is paralysed by some other circumstances and if the peace machinery of the area does not work properly, our endeavour must be extended towards securing ways and means to ensure the smooth functioning of the said peace machinery. We might find ways to strengthen, revise or review the whole structure of the peace machinery. We are more and more inclined to weight the wisdom of such a course. (Same, pp. 57-60)

#### NEW ZEALAND (Davies) August 15, 1958

19. Among these conflicts the Palestine issue is central. It is now six years since this Assembly carried out an examination of the full range of the problem. . . . the Assembly should make a serious effort to formulate recommendations which might serve as the basis for



lasting reconciliation . . . [and] decide what obligations it was prepared to assume in order to give its recommendations meaning. . . . unless steps are taken to make the situation better, it is bound to get worse.

20. We have, I believe, not been alone in voicing our disappointment that there should have been a reluctance at earlier sessions of this Assembly to extend our work from the study of effects to the study of causes and to accept the responsibility from which we have retreated in recent years.  
(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs. 737 mtg.)

SAUDI ARABIA (Shukairy) October 1, 1958

123. In 1947 Palestine became the problem of the United Nations. . . .

126. Thus, it becomes obvious that the assumptions which you took as a basis in the creation of Israel have been vitiated, not by one or two events but by a lengthy series of condemnations of Israel by the Security Council, a long history of tension, insecurity and instability through a whole decade. . . .

127. . . . Now, after ten years of United Nations efforts, there is still a great deal of talk about a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. Well, that goes to prove that the 1947 "settlement" did not lead to a settlement.  
(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 766 mtg.)

U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) December 15, 1958

What should the Security Council do in these circumstances? It would seem to me that it would be appropriate for the Council to advise both parties that it behooves them to observe scrupulously the Armistice Agreement and that, if there are any points in dispute, they should turn to the machinery established for such purpose under the Armistice Agreement. Here, as in numerous previous cases, this machinery was not utilized.  
(Doc. S/PV. 844, pp. 46-50)

UNITED KINGDOM (Sir Pierson Dixon) January 22, 1958

41. In the absence of a permanent settlement, the Council has always sought to obviate further outbreaks of violence and to remove potential sources of tension by strengthening the authority of the United Nations and, where appropriate, of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in particular. I am sure my colleagues will agree that this is what we should do in this case.

(UN. SC. ORs., 809 mtg., p. 8)

UNITED STATES (Lodge) January 22, 1958

. . . the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan has not adequately provided for a regulation of controversial activities in that area. The parties to the Armistice Agreement do not agree what civilian activities, if any, are permissible there. These circumstances have produced a need for Council action. . . .

**UN (Secretary-General) August 25, 1958**

Arrangements have also been completed and reported to the Members for the repayment of advances made by certain Member States to the United Nations to meet the cost of clearing the Suez Canal. Collection of the 3 per cent surcharge on Canal tolls, as previously approved in principle by the General Assembly, will start on 15 September, and it is hoped that the expenditure on clearance of the Canal will be recovered by this means within about three years.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.*, *Suppl. 1A*, p. 2)

**UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959**

In the course of 1959, attention has again repeatedly been drawn to questions raised by present policies regarding the Suez Canal. . . . While never losing sight of its ultimate objectives in this region, as repeatedly stated, the United Nations, in these circumstances, may make its main contribution also to a solution of the Suez question by continuing to work for a reduction of tensions, for the avoidance of incidents and for such, at least, temporary solutions to limited problems as may be attainable and as may lead to further opportunities for continued progress toward these ultimate objectives.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.* *Suppl. 1A*, p. 5)

**UNITED STATES (Lodge) January 17, 1958**

It is certain that what has been accomplished could not have been done by the United States acting alone in accordance with what, at first glance, might appear to be the sole dictates of our own self-interest. The truth is that our self-interest is not always best served by working alone. This turn away from war thus could only have been accomplished by mobilizing our influence, and that of others, in accordance with the only existing moral code of world behavior, the United Nations Charter.

This is further proof, perhaps the most important proof we have ever had, of the value of the United Nations to the American people.

—Address prepared for delivery at the University of Louisville, *DSB*, XXXVII (March 3, 1958), 347.

**UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) June 26, 1958**

In 1957 the United Nations took an important step forward to maintain peaceful conditions in another troubled area of the Middle East. In an unprecedented action its members agreed to share the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force on the same basis as their contributions to the United Nations budget. In this way the Assembly insured the existence of UNEF for another year as the chief deterrent to threats to peace in the Gaza Strip and the Sharm-el-Sheikh area. This truly international police force can boast an inspiring record since

its creation more than a year ago. It has helped to reduce to a minimum tension-breeding incidents between Egypt and Israel. Its international character has provided living proof that men of different nations, backgrounds and religions can work together harmoniously to create peaceful conditions in an area where tensions might otherwise run high.

—Letter transmitting to the Congress the 12th Annual Report on U.S. participation in the United Nations, *DSB*, XXXIX (August 4, 1958), 220.

## Chapter 4. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

### *Introduction*

Delegates show a greater willingness to comment freely on organizational matters than on other aspects of the United Nations. None of the inhibitions that affect their discussions of political problems operate when they turn to evaluate the organization's ability to achieve its purposes. Many representatives actually relate their analyses of substantive issues to organizational problems, implying that failures to agree stem often from inadequate procedures.

Their comments do not fall into any pattern, but several discernible themes occur. On the question of Chinese representation, the Communist Members were naturally vociferous and the United States adamant, but few spoke enthusiastically of the practice of excluding the Peking Government, a diffidence that is potentially significant. There were a good many remarks on the growing practice of groups of states to consult together informally before meetings of the organization. Most of the Members who commented on these caucuses believed that the groups should not become hard and solid blocs, and they deplored the evidence that the blocs were growing into cohesive political factions.

Most states praised the General Assembly sessions for the opportunity they provided, especially during the General Debate, for everyone to review the world situation. The delegates all valued the chances which the United Nations offered them to present their own views and hear the policy positions of other governments. In previous years delegates have argued in favor of enlarging the several United Nations Councils to give states adequate political representation, but many statements during this period stressed the need to represent adequately the diverse economic interests of states.

By far the most interesting assessments in 1958 and 1959 concern the role of the Secretary-General. Most members praised his perceptive comments in introducing his *Annual Report* and lauded his diplomatic skill, but the Soviet bloc Members were entirely silent on these two matters. They were by no means silent, however, in their demands for unanimous great-power agreement in the Security Council, nor was the West shy about objecting to what they construed as the misuses of the veto. The selections to follow also contain significant comments on voting in the General Assembly, particularly Premier Khrushchev's remarks (which India echoed) that majority decisions are not important in international relations and that passing resolutions against the will of a small but significant minority was not necessarily in the Assembly's interest.

## *Blocs and Groups*

### **ALBANIA (Shmylla) October 1, 1959**

One of the principles lying at the very basis of our Organization is that of equitable geographical distribution in the membership of United Nations organs. For many years, the seat of one non-permanent member of the Security Council, which should properly have been conferred upon a representative of Eastern Europe, has arbitrarily been occupied by representatives of other geographic groups. We believe it necessary to respect the rights of all groups, including those in the socialist camp. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 816 mtg., p. 61)

### **CAMBODIA (Son Sann) September 17, 1959**

118. But unfortunately, as the Chairman of the Cambodian delegation, His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, pointed out last year, although the United Nations is playing an ever greater part in the life of all nations, its activities, which should have a universal character, are still seriously hampered by the existence within the Organization of hostile and conflicting blocs, so that the United Nations is prevented from playing its full role of supervision and censure, and is slowly being transformed into a forum for propaganda and the clash of opposing beliefs, while the Charter and the real aims of the United Nations are forgotten. Certain problems are inevitably raised year after year, and the result is inevitably a deadlock for which a purely illusory solution is found by the adoption of a large number of resolutions which are theoretical rather than practical.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 29)

### **ICELAND (Thors) October 5, 1959**

There is one omen that forebodes danger and disruption in the fruitful, fair and realistic work of our Organization. It is the division and encirclement of delegations into blocs which vote together, act together, and jointly claim benefits, privileges and positions for their members. This has become an ever-increasing characteristic of our daily affairs and activities. These blocs, which in more polite but superficial language, are called groups, are known to us under various names such as the British Commonwealth Group, the Latin American Group, the Afro-Asian Group, the NATO Group, the Communistic Group and even the European Group, which seems to be the vaguest one since Europe is strictly divided. The strengthening of these blocs bears a certain danger in itself. We must avoid letting them develop to the extent that all decisions here in our Organization are reached inside the blocs, but not by the nations individually. According to our Charter, we are here, each delegation to represent the Government of our sovereign nation and act in that capacity guided by the ideals and principles of our Charter.

If this tendency should further develop, we might come to the conclusion that it would be sufficient to have one representative for each bloc attending the meetings here and the rest of us could pack up and go home. My delegation is not a member of any bloc and is not supported by any of them. Naturally, however, being one of the Western democracies, our course most frequently runs parallel with other democratic countries by reason of common ideals, common heritage and similar ways of thinking, similar desires and aspirations of our peoples, similar outlook on life and the same love for freedom. This is particularly the case in our relations with the other Nordic countries. It is to be avoided that the wrangling for positions and influence tie the delegations into tight blocs. The freedom of thought and action of each nation must be reserved. Then we may have the hope that also the small nations can have some mission inside the United Nations. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 820, pp. 36-37)

**INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 6, 1959**

In that connexion, we welcomed the statement of the representative of Iceland the other day, not about fishing rights in the North Pole—in that we do not want to participate—but in regard to the formation of blocs, not the blocs of the cold war, but the blocs inside the Assembly. We ourselves belong to various groups, and I think that groups, in so far as they seek to offer to the Assembly the collective wisdom, are a constructive force. But if, on the other hand, blocs surround themselves with walls of isolation, then we shall divide the unity of this Assembly. A degree of neighbourliness, a degree of the coming together of people who have common problems and common backgrounds, is to be expected.

But my delegation shares, with the representatives of Iceland, the concern that our attempts to co-operate with each other should not result in our isolating ourselves from the whole of the United Nations. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, pp. 58-60)

**PAKISTAN (Prince Aly Khan) October 3, 1958**

120. It is well known that the smaller States meet together occasionally in various groups, reflecting to some extent the geographical division of the world or common cultural and historical backgrounds. But the allegiance of the smaller countries to the Charter must override and transcend their regional solidarity if the United Nations is not to become a house divided against itself.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 769 mtg.)

**UNITED STATES (Lodge) January 17, 1958**

Many new members are countries which were once colonies and whose experience in self-government is recent. Ten such countries have become

members since 1955. Some persons predicted that these countries would be erratic and vengeful. On the contrary, many of them have exercised a constructive and moderating influence on many difficult questions, notably Algeria and Cyprus. And when it became necessary to pass a climactic resolution of condemnation against the Soviet Union for its brutality in Hungary, 60 countries voted "yes"—nearly three-quarters of the whole membership in the General Assembly—and only 10 voted "no." This would not have been possible without the votes of such countries as Libya, Nepal, Tunisia, Burma, and Laos. These facts give grounds for confidence in the future. They also refute the notion of a so-called "neutralist bloc" in the United Nations which always votes together on every issue.

—Address prepared for delivery at the University of Louisville, *DSB*, XXXVIII (March 3, 1958), 345

#### UNITED STATES (Herter) September 17, 1959

77. The United States believes that major committees of the United Nations should continue to reflect the principle of fair geographical representation. This principle derogates in no way from the relative contribution which those States with superior technical capacity can make.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 13)

### *Chinese Representation*

#### ALBANIA (Shyti) September 21, 1959

167. This problem has been outstanding for many years now and the postponement of a solution from session to session, primarily as a result of the negative and hostile attitude of the United States, has done grave harm to the efficiency and prestige of the United Nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 69)

#### ALBANIA (Shyti) October 1, 1959

We note with regret, however, that certain representatives would have this Assembly become, alas, the bastion of the cold war. Thus, thanks to the negative stand and egoistic interest of a single Power which flouts common sense, justice and the pressing interests of the United Nations, we find that the question of restoring the rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations is a matter which has been deferred once again.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, A/PV. 816, p. 300)

#### BULGARIA (Lukanov) September 22, 1959

31. For ten years a systematic attempt has been made to trample underfoot the basic principle of the universality of the United Nations. For ten years, openly abusing its influence and manifesting ill will, the United States has deprived the largest nation in the world, the great

Chinese nation, of its right to legitimate representation in the United Nations. It has thus robbed every fourteenth person on our planet of his right to be represented here.

. . . . .

34. It is time we recognized that the United States attitude to the representation of China in the United Nations is damaging, first and foremost, to the Organization itself, and hence, to all States Members. By continuing to act in this way, the United States is attempting to restrict the influence and authority of the United Nations, and to obstruct its efforts to solve major international problems.

(Same, p. 76)

**BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. (Kiselev) September 22, 1959**

87. It is a fact adversely affecting the prestige of our Organization that the United Nations, despite the proposals repeatedly submitted by the Indian, Soviet and other delegations, has as yet been unable to adopt a favourable decision of the question of the United Nations representation for the People's Republic of China—the only correct decision and that which is expected by all the peace-loving nations.

(Same, pp. 81-82)

**CAMBODIA (Prince Norodom Sihanouk) September 24, 1958**

3. We cannot hide the fact that many of us were deeply disappointed to see the crucial problem of the representation of China held up once again. Even if our lack of realism in this matter does not throw the world into an immediate tragic conflict, we shall be unable to prevent the debate which was evaded from being resumed one day in this Assembly in an atmosphere of increased bitterness.

. . . . .

29. We also feel that the cause of the present crisis must be attributed to the fact that the People's Republic of China is still excluded from the United Nations.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 756 mtg.)

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA (David) September 23, 1959**

119. If the United Nations is to be a real instrument of international co-operation it is vital first and foremost that the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be restored and that the Chiang Kai-shek puppets, who represent nobody, should be driven out of our Organization.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 120)

**HAITI (Dorsinville) August 6, 1959**

94. [He] pointed out [in reply to Soviet comments about the Chinese representatives] that the representatives seated in the Council were the representatives of Governments recognized by the United Nations.

(UN. TC. 24th. ORs., p. 496)



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(UN. TC. 24th. ORs., p. 496)

**HUNGARY (Sik) September 23, 1958**

4. By now there is no one who does not realize that sooner or later the representative of the Chinese People's Republic will occupy his rightful place in the United Nations. The desperate manoeuvres introduced in an attempt to obstruct and prevent this recall to mind an absurd historical parallel. Let no one be taken aback by so momentous an example; the significance of the subject warrants a parallel of such importance. When Copernicus startled his contemporaries with his staggering discovery that it was not the sun which revolved about the earth but the earth which revolved about the sun, an edict was proclaimed in Rome, the mediaeval intellectual metropolis, that this was not so, but that the sun did revolve about the earth. However impressive the prestige of mediaeval Rome, that solemn decree was binding neither on the sun nor on the earth.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., 755 mtg.)

**HUNGARY (Sik) September 22, 1959**

21. . . . It is mere illusion for an international Organization to deal with the problems of international peace and security, with the universal problems of disarmament and, among other things, with the fate of the peoples of Asia, while excluding from the discussions one of the powerful factors of international life, the Chinese People's Republic, which is ever growing in power. This procedure progressively diminishes the seriousness and importance of the position taken by the General Assembly and, at the same time, it endangers the existence of this Organization.

22. The longer forced resolutions keep up the present mendacious situation, the more they will conjure up the danger that beset the League of Nations; and the longer the Assembly's resolutions fail to come to terms with truth and reality, the more will those delaying the solution of this question have cause to be ashamed.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 75)

**INDIA (Krishna Menon) September 22, 1959**

5. . . . Mr. President, once again an unhealthy precedent has unfortunately been followed. An item is proposed on the provisional agenda. The General Committee is strictly enjoined by the rules of procedure not to enter into political considerations. The only function the General Committee has in this context is either to accept or to reject an item. It may be argued that the first part of the draft resolution of the General Committee before us probably does it. The only thing that might be said against it is that it is unnecessary; that a contrary vote is sufficient, instead of having a draft resolution. But that is a matter of choice, with which we do not quarrel. However, the second part is not covered by the item at all, because the item simply says "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations."

On that there is a draft resolution of a political character, which is strictly barred by rule 41 of the rules of procedure, which states:

"[The General Committee] shall assist the President in the general conduct of the work of the General Assembly which falls within the competence of the President. It shall not, however, decide any political question."

6. It may be said that this is not "deciding" a political question but is solely making a "recommendation," that it is merely a decision to recommend rather than making a political decision. Therefore, I submit—though I know it is not going to carry me any further—that the whole posture adopted by the General Committee in regard to this matter is ultra vires as regards the rules and the competence of the General Committee. This Committee, which is also called a Steering Committee, is a business committee to deal with some of the problems of the Assembly before-hand in order that our work may be facilitated. Instead of that, like many other organs of the Assembly—and I shall not specify any—it tries to usurp the sovereign functions of this body, and I submit that no such committee, least of all a Steering Committee, is qualified to pronounce politically.

{UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 89}

IRAQ (Jawad) September 21, 1959

130. . . . The recommendation of the General Committee to the Assembly is twofold. The first part of the draft resolution recommends the rejection of India's request for the inclusion in the agenda of the fourteenth session of the question of the representation of China, and the second part recommends that the Assembly should not consider any proposals relating thereto during this session.

131. We believe that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly have not been adhered to. It is for the General Committee to recommend the inclusion or non-inclusion of an item that has been proposed, but it is not within its power to make a recommendation such as the one it has made in the latter part of its draft resolution. A reading of rule 40 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which discusses the functions of the General Committee, supports this view.

. . . . .

139. The intransigent attitude of avoiding a debate on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations has weakened the prestige of this Organization, since the feeling is growing that that attitude is based on purely political considerations. It might be said that the concept of the rule of law in this Organization is again being subordinated to political expediency. This has resulted in increasing world tension and substantially reducing the effectiveness of the United Nations and its decisions.

{Same, pp. 66-67}

the unrealistic position of the United States, which sets the tone for the representatives of many Western countries, is in fact the only reason for the abnormal situation which has been created in the United Nations.

31. . . . This sad farce, played each year within the walls of our Organization, disgraces its great name.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, pp. 55, 58)

U.S.S.R. (Oberetnko) June 16, 1959

28. The 1959 Visiting Mission to Nauru could not be considered successful. It had confined itself to registering some of the memoranda submitted to it and it had in fact agreed to the Administering Authority's plan that the Nauruans should be resettled. It had even started to discuss methods of resettlement. Clearly, nothing else could have been expected from the Visiting Mission in view of its composition. The representative of Burma was the only representative of a non-administering country on the Visiting Mission. He could hardly have had a decisive say about the Mission's findings, since he was alone in the face of two representatives of Administering Authorities and the Chairman of the Mission—a Chiang Kai-shek person who had been illegally appointed to the Mission and who did not represent any one. More attention should be paid in the future to the composition of visiting missions, to ensure that they were more representative and that the Trusteeship Council was not burdened with reports of such poor quality.

(UN. TC. 24th. *ORs.*, p. 86)

U.S.S.R. (Oberetnko) June 23, 1959

1. . . . [He] pointed out that the legitimate representatives of the People's Republic of China were not listed in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General on credentials (T/1468), although China was a member of the Trusteeship Council. The USSR delegation wished to remind the Council that China could only be legitimately represented on the Trusteeship Council and other United Nations organs by representatives appointed by the Government of the People's Republic of China. It was absurd that one of the most important Powers in the world, which had participated in the founding of the United Nations and which contained more than one-quarter of the world's population should not be represented on the Trusteeship Council, nor was it admissible that persons who had not received their credentials from the Government of the People's Republic of China should be seated in the Council.

. . . his delegation had abstained in the vote on the [credentials] report as a whole because, under the heading "China," the report enumerated the names of private persons who did not possess credentials

issued by the People's Republic of China and who did not therefore have the right to represent China. (Same, p. 125, 133)

U.S.S.R. (Zhukov) July 28, 1959 :

3. . . . in future the Trusteeship Council would have to give serious consideration to the composition of visiting missions, to ensure that they did not include persons who represented nobody but themselves. The composition of the mission was bound to affect the quality of the report.

(Same, p. 431)

U.S.S.R. (Oberemko) August 6, 1959

93. . . . his delegation would have warmly welcomed China as a member of the [Standing] Committee [on petitions] if representatives of the People's Republic of China had been seated in the Council.

(Same, p. 496)

UNITED STATES (Department of State Memorandum)

August 11, 1958

Still another factor which must be considered in the case of China is the effect which recognition of the Communist regime would have on the United Nations. Recognition of Peiping by the United States would inevitably lead to the seating of Peiping in that body. In the view of the United States this would vitiate, if not destroy, the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace. The Korean war was the first and most important effort to halt aggression through collective action in the United Nations. For Communist China, one of the parties against which the effort of the United Nations was directed, to be seated in the United Nations while still unpurged of its aggression and defying the will of the United Nations in Korea would amount to a confession of failure on the part of the United Nations and would greatly reduce the prospects for future successful action by the United Nations against aggression.

*DSB*, XXXIX (September 8, 1958), 387

UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1959

The Chinese Communists are aggressors condemned as such by the United Nations. They have shown only disrespect for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations itself would suffer if it permitted the Chinese Communists to aggress their way into the Organization whose charter provides that it is to be made up of peace-loving states.

—Address before the American Association for the U.N., New York, *DSB*, XLI (September 28, 1959), 442

## *Delegations*

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

A development of special significance is the establishment of permanent delegations at United Nations Headquarters with standing senior representation there for all Members of the Organization. While in one sense reducing the practical importance of the public sessions of the various organs, this development has, basically, tended to give these organs greater real weight in present-day diplomacy. The public debate, and the decisions reached, gain added significance when the attitudes presented in public result from practically uninterrupted informal contacts and negotiations. Thus, it does not belittle the importance of the formal proceedings in the General Assembly, the Councils and other United Nations organs if it is understood that, to an increasing extent, their role has come to provide for a public confrontation of views which have developed in negotiations under other forms, and for the registration of a resulting consensus, or, when this has not been achieved, of a difference of opinion with the relative support apparent from the votes.

The importance this evolution has given to the experienced work of the permanent delegations is obvious. They are today to a decisive extent pioneers in the development of international co-operation within the United Nations, giving to the work of the major organs a perspective which is not less valuable for being less publicized. The permanent representation at Headquarters of all Member nations, and the growing diplomatic contribution of the permanent delegations outside the public meetings—often in close contact also with the Secretariat—may well come to be regarded as the most important "common law" development which has taken place so far within the constitutional framework of the Charter. It is to be hoped that it will continue and increase in strength.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs. Suppl. 1A, p. 2)

## *Economic and Social Council*

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

For several practical reasons it is difficult at regular meetings of the Economic and Social Council, without special arrangements, to organize the work in such a way as to render possible a searching examination and discussion of key issues of decisive general importance at a policy-making level. At the summer session of the Economic and Social Council this year, I suggested that the Council consider a development of its procedures to meet this need. I believe that short special meetings at the ministerial level, within or under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council, might make an invaluable contribution to the formulation of international economic policies adequate to vital requirements

for concerted action. Were the suggestion to meet with the sympathy of Member Governments and appeal to the Council, the Secretariat would, in consultation with Member Governments, devote further study to the question and in due time present concrete proposals to the Council. It is my opinion that, in this or in such other ways as might be considered preferable, efforts should now be made to add to the usefulness of the Economic and Social Council and to give to the United Nations, through this Council, better possibilities of playing a role of the same significance in the economic field as the one which is entrusted to it in the political sphere.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs. Suppl. 1A*, p. 3)

**AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 30, 1959**

50. The Economic and Social Council is the principal organ of the United Nations in the economic field, not simply because it is described as such in the Charter, but because it is the only body of the United Nations which is small enough to permit fairly detailed discussion and yet large enough to represent the principal regions of the world and the varied types of economy. The Second Committee of the General Assembly is too large for this work. Yet I believe that the Second Committee might sometimes be able to do more if the Economic and Social Council could give more guidance to its discussions—if, for example, the Council were to propose each year an important topic of discussion, not so wide that discussion can be only general, but a topic of defined scope and practical importance, with some supporting paper that would serve as a basis for discussion. An item with too broad a heading does not allow Governments to brief their representatives closely, nor does it allow discussion to be narrowed sufficiently to produce an impact on international thought. This year several important subjects are referred to in the report of the Economic and Social Council itself—which is item 12 on our agenda—but it is difficult to anticipate much prepared discussion on any one of these when delegates' attention has not been specifically called in advance to the likelihood of discussion on that subject. This is something to which the Council itself might perhaps give some thought, as a way of increasing its own effectiveness and usefulness.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 262)

**BRAZIL (Penteado) July 31, 1958**

... without consulting the members of the [International Commodity Trade] Commission not represented at Geneva, a proposal had been made to reconstitute it entirely. The Brazilian Government regarded that proposal as a most dangerous precedent, since it disregarded the rights of members countries and violated earlier decisions. On what authority could the Council inform the present duly elected countries members of the Commission, the term of office of some of



which was not due to expire for more than two years, that, unless re-elected, they would cease to be members? He recalled that a draft resolution on agenda item 2(b) (E/L. 797) sponsored by Brazil and five other delegations had been withdrawn at the 240th meeting of the Economic Committee in the light of advice given by the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs that no change in the terms of reference of a regional economic commission should be made without prior consultation. However, in the present case, a functional commission was being entirely reconstituted without any such consultation.

(UN. ECOSOC. 26th. OR., p. 141)

#### NEW ZEALAND (Shanahan) October 2, 1959

This year my country has rejoined the Economic and Social Council after an interval of ten years. Once again we have found how useful it is to be brought into closer touch with this large and important segment of the work of this Organization. No Member State is unaffected by the activities within the Council's purview. It is, I am sure, very much in the United Nations own interest that all Member States should, from time to time, have the opportunity to serve on the Council. Unfortunately, the present size of the Council restricts these opportunities unduly; nor does it provide a membership which is fully representative of the various geographical areas of the world. Discussions which took place in the Assembly and in the Council itself have more than once drawn attention to the benefits which would flow from increased membership.

It is our impression that some changes in the role of the Council are also demanded if it is to keep pace with the extension of United Nations interests and activities. It is, however, equally pertinent to recall that the Council and its subsidiary bodies already have substantial achievements to their credit. Among the most notable is the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, which the Secretary-General has justly described as "an example of international economic co-operation on an unprecedented scale." This statement is all the more impressive when it is remembered that the Expanded Programme is only one facet of a larger undertaking—the economic and social development of the less-developed countries.

(UN. GA. 14th. A/PV. 819, p. 32)

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (Ghorbal) July 31, 1958

24. In the past, his government had deplored the absence from the Commission of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and he looked forward to their participation in its work, which could not fail to yield valuable results. On the other hand, the procedure proposed for reconstituting CICT [Commission on International Com-

modity Trade] justly aroused the suspicion that rights duly established by the Council were being tempered with.

25. One of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter was that of equitable geographical distribution in the establishment of the membership of United Nations bodies. At present, Africa and the Middle East were represented on the Commission by the United Arab Republic alone. He hoped that the Council would bear that principle in mind, among other things, when it came to elect the Commission's new members. (UN. ECOSOC. 26th. OR., p. 142)

### *General Assembly*

**ARGENTINA (Florit) September 19, 1958**

14. . . . Since international politics are, to a great extent, the visible expression of the internal conditions and circumstances prevailing in a given country, the success of the Assembly's work will largely depend on the frankness with which those circumstances are stated before it.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., 751 mtg.)

**BURMA (Tun Aung) September 29, 1959**

142. Once again, at this fourteenth session, the General Assembly opens in an atmosphere of tension. Unfortunately there is nothing new or novel about this, because it seems to have become the rule rather than the exception for the General Assembly to meet in such an atmosphere. It merely reflects the unfortunate fact that the world has not known genuine peace during the past two decades, ever since the outbreak of the Second World War. We have all been compelled to adjust ourselves to this atmosphere, and we are all fortunate that we have the United Nations to turn to whenever a given situation seems to be getting out of control. (UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 248)

**CAMBODIA (Prince Norodom Sihanouk) September 24, 1958**

. . . At present, our Organization is obviously becoming a forum for propaganda where discourtesy prevails a little too often for our taste.

31. An objection of form has been brought forward which nevertheless is worthy of consideration. Certain very influential Members have said that the General Assembly should not be considered as a sort of universal super-parliament or one tending towards universality, but as a club of peace-loving countries to which only nations applying certain ethical principles and fulfilling certain conditions can be admitted.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., p. 117)

**CANADA (Smith) September 25, 1958**

100. The prime purpose of the United Nations in its present phase of development is the pursuit of peaceful settlement and peaceful change

not by force but by reconciliation. In this process the general debate with which we open our proceedings each year has an important function. It provides an invaluable opportunity for a broad exchange of views on the international situation and on the specific tasks with which our Organization is faced. In the world of today it is not surprising that these declarations of policy by nations great and small demonstrate a wide divergence of views as to the methods by which our problems might be resolved in achieving the noble aims of the Charter. This clash of policies—this urging of certain courses of action as good and the denunciation, sometimes in heated terms, of other courses of action as bad—which takes place in this forum does, I believe, serve a purpose which is far greater than the mere publication to the world of national policies of Member States. This debate, this exchange of views, is a part of the process of negotiation and conciliation, a part of our efforts to ensure international security.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 759 mtg.)

**COLOMBIA (Ayala) September 21, 1959**

20. The debate which annually takes place in the General Assembly is a living and eloquent example of the juridical equality of nations. Regardless of the intrinsic importance of the countries taking part in it, this debate enables all nations to place their views on the scales of world destiny.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 40)

**ECUADOR (Correa) August 20, 1958**

72. During the past few years, the progress of the United Nations has been marked by two trends that stand out above all others: the increasingly representative character which the General Assembly, owing partly to its growing universality, is assuming as the principal authentic exponent of world public opinion; and the increasingly vigorous role which the Secretary-General, as the chief executive officer of the Organization, is assuming in political matters.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs. 744 mtg.)

**ETHIOPIA (Alemayehou) October 1, 1959**

The debate in the General Assembly faithfully performed every year affords to Member States the opportunity to review, if not all, certainly the major events and happenings in the world. It is, I believe, a healthy practice, particularly for the smaller States, which stand to gain considerably by stable political, economic and social conditions in the world and, concomitantly, to lose much by an adverse situation in these matters. The privilege is the reflection of our duties as Members of the United Nations, and I am happy to observe that Member States have discharged it—each according to its own conviction—in earnestness and sincerity.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, p. 2)

**FEDERATION OF MALAYA (Ismail) September 26, 1958**

9. The continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly on the part of the Soviet Union and the present authorities in Hungary and their refusal to co-operate with bodies set up, and persons appointed, by the General Assembly greatly impair the efficacy of the United Nations for the purposes which we are solemnly pledged to further.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., p. 192)

**FRANCE (Couve de Murville) September 25, 1958**

96. . . . During the twelve years since the United Nations was founded it has become an established tradition to hold a general debate at the opening of each session of the General Assembly to enable each delegation to review the international situation, discuss the problems of special interest to it, make any suggestions it may wish to offer and in general make its contribution to the task of objective analysis which must be undertaken by an organization responsible for promoting peace and establishing friendly relations among peoples. It is natural that such a debate should be marked by concern with the national interests of the individual countries concerned and that passions should sometimes run high, with the result that on occasion things are said that would normally be left unsaid. Nevertheless as a rule a general pattern emerges and some conclusions can be drawn by a sufficiently impartial observer. Therein lies the main value of the debate, and also its disadvantage, for in the world in revolution in which we all of us live, subjects of concern and points of friction inevitably tend to push into the background the factors that might make for optimism.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., 758 mtg.)

**GHANA (Ako-Adjei) September 22, 1958**

33. . . . It is the view of my delegation that any Member of the United Nations has a right to place on the agenda of this session any item that it wishes to propose for discussion. This is a principle which we consider to be crucial to the whole concept of the United Nations. . . .

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 752 mtg.)

**HUNGARY (Sik) October 5, 1959**

It is easier now for the General Assembly to deal with the principal task of maintaining peace and security because the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR presented right here the proposal of the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament. Lately discussions of problems of peace and security have begun to slip through the fingers of the United Nations to be discussed at the conference tables of other agencies. Here in the Assembly discussion of

the most exciting problems of international peace was made difficult by the lack of a genuine spirit of negotiation, by conducting business through mechanized voting. Very serious reasons prompted the Soviet Premier to warn the United Nations of the fate of the League of Nations. Indeed, if the United Nations allows itself to be used for the selfish political purposes of a group of Member States, if instead of the proper questions of peace and security it deals with factitious problems, and if instead of striving for relaxation of tension some endeavour to turn this Organization into an arena of the "cold war," then it will inevitably share the fate of the League of Nations. In the present more favourable international atmosphere, the United Nations General Assembly can also find it easier to deal with its proper task. In fact we have here a whole series of questions related to disarmament, including that of averting the danger of nuclear explosions in the Sahara. Here are the problems of the countries now rising from colonial status. We have here the problem concerning assistance to economically under-developed countries. In the less strained atmosphere it seems possible to adopt on these matters more favourable resolutions this year than a year ago.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 820, p. 72)

#### INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 6, 1959

My delegation participates in this debate at a rather late stage. Some seventy-nine speakers, not including those who exercised the right of reply, have spoken nearly sixty hours on the various problems that concern the world. This is not a large number of speakers, nor is it a considerable amount of time, and my delegation feels that the opportunity of the general debate—where we not only hear the discussion of world problems as such, but also get some glimpse of each other's countries—is one of the main contributions at the open session of the Assembly which makes for international understanding.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, p. 56)

#### IRAQ (Jawad) September 21, 1959

136. The value of the debating and discussion of international problems in this Assembly is that it may shed new light on these problems and may indeed help toward their constructive and satisfactory resolution instead of allowing them to fester and assume explosive dimensions. Even if, for various reasons, it is assumed that the majority in this Assembly may be disinclined to accede to a particular course of action, the minority should, in equity, be conceded the right and the opportunity to present its case in full debate.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 67)

#### IRELAND (Aiken) September 19, 1958

73. The annual general debate of this Assembly is the nearest approach

we have to humanity's appraisal of its own situation and of the outlook for human civilization in the context of a given year. The item on the agenda, though not formally inscribed, is always essentially the same. It is: What can this Assembly do or advise which will best serve at the present time the purposes of peace? What can we do to divert the skills and resources of humanity away from the preparation of war and towards economic and social improvement? How can the course of history be turned away from death and toward life?

(UN. GA. 13th. ORr. 751 mtg.)

#### MEXICO (Padilla Nervo) October 6, 1958

62. Over the years every nation's voice has been heard from this great forum, every cultural value and all men's highest aspirations have been made known. For thirteen years, the United Nations General Assembly has been the scene of dreams and disappointments, of acts of good faith and expressions of intransigence, of magnificent human achievement and small but decisive steps towards peace and harmony.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORr. 771 mtg.)

#### MOROCCO (Benhima) October 6, 1959

For many years now and up until its last session, the General Assembly of the United Nations has begun its work in an international atmosphere of distrust, concern and threats. The periodic outburst of regional conflicts and crises in international relations tested our Organization severely and very often increased the feeling of skepticism about its value and its authority. We must recognize, however, that whenever the Assembly has come together, it has examined in a calm atmosphere the problems submitted to it and it has repeatedly prevented specific and imminent threats to peace and international security.

Thus it condemned and stopped the aggression against Egypt in October 1956 and it prevented the outbreak of a general conflict in the Middle East at the time of the revolution in Iraq and the events in Lebanon. It also found, or helped to find, solutions of delicate questions which were discussed within its walls or which involved the Organization in some way. Last year peace returned to Cyprus, and we hope that it will be strengthened and consolidated there in freedom and in justice.

Nevertheless, the agenda of our current session still includes very important questions and the wishes and hopes of all are once again directed towards our Assembly. Among these questions there is one which relates to colonial domination and the future of the non-self-governing territories. Other questions relate to human dignity and the fundamental rights of man, for which this Organization is responsible, such as the existence of more than 1 million refugees in Palestine and the persistence of racial segregation. Lastly, there are questions that

relate to international tensions, the problem of disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests.

In connexion with this last problem, there is a clear difference between this session and previous sessions. As a matter of fact, our work this year has started under the hallmark of a relaxation of tension. The meeting between the President of the United States and the Head of Government of the Soviet Union can be included among the efforts made by the United Nations to decrease differences, to reduce sterile antagonisms and to open the way to an intelligent understanding of international realities, and, it is to be hoped, to useful co-operation among the nations of the world as a whole.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, p. 21-22)

#### NEW ZEALAND (Nash) October 3, 1958

7. The agenda is a mirror of men, of nations, of time and space, a mirror of mankind with its restless genius and dreams, and immeasurable capacity for good or evil. (UN. GA. 14th. OR. 770 mtg.)

#### PANAMA (Moreno) September 23, 1959

2. This general debate must of necessity be, as it were, a balance-sheet of the action taken and the work done on behalf of international peace and security in the period between the regular sessions of the General Assembly and, to widen the scope somewhat, over the years in which our Organization has existed. It must be a kind of examination of conscience: a dispassionate and forthright analysis of the situations now threatening world peace, and at the same time an impartial and sincere assessment of our own behaviour in regard to those problems which have remained unsolved despite many years of study and to those which are of more recent origin.

3. Only after this process has been duly carried out can we arrive at a rational and exact understanding of the items on this General Assembly's agenda. Many of them are familiar, a legacy from past sessions, although their importance is no less today, despite the time that has gone by, and our obligation to study them and to find the speediest and most equitable solution possible remains the same. One might almost say that, as time goes by, our obligations and our responsibility to those items which have figured constantly on the agenda of the various sessions of the General Assembly increase, for many of them involve matters of vital importance to the peoples of the world and we cannot afford to postpone them indefinitely.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 111)

#### PHILIPPINES (Serrano) September 23, 1958

111. Two profoundly encouraging signs have, of late, been widely noted in this Assembly, namely, the remarkable self-possession which has been exhibited in the midst of tempestuous discord and the increas-

ing tendency to approximate unanimity in the decisions taken. The first affords a sure indication of the growth and emerging maturity of the Assembly; the second augurs well for the weight and force of its influence wherever its "presence" has been invoked.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 755 mtg.)

**PORTUGAL (Garin) September 26, 1958**

74. Once again, we are meeting in this yearly event, the regular session of the General Assembly. None of us would underrate the importance or doubt the extreme usefulness of such an event. Faced as mankind is today with numerous and most intricate problems, including the supreme problem of its own survival, problems whose complexities and difficulties seem inexorably to increase only to challenge man's ingenuity, it is proper and logical and most necessary that the nations of the world, large and small, should meet together regularly in this forum.

75. By doing so, we learn more about one another, about one another's history, aspirations, economic possibilities, social structure and institutions. That, by itself, is a tremendous advantage, considering that nations are complex realities and that we all need to know each other well in order to work in common, in the fields in which we are able to work, if we want to solve the problems of our epoch. . . .

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 761 mtg.)

**SPAIN (de Lequerica) October 3, 1958**

52. Here, the clash of ideas, the expression of authoritative opinions—which in former times were buried in the silence of diplomatic discretion and reduced to a few controlling voices—marks a great step forward, both moral and political, in the history of man. From every corner of the earth ideas, questions and answers to the problems of the moment are brought to this forum.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 770 mtg.)

**SUDAN (Kheir) October 1, 1959**

The Members of the United Nations and their representatives meet in these regular sessions to renew a pledge and thereby to perpetuate a dearly cherished hope of peace through right and justice. It is this common craving for peace, it is the international pursuit of happiness and the necessity of co-operation amongst ourselves to achieve the noble ends consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations, that bring them together every year in this international forum. They meet here annually to discuss certain questions in the world situation, the satisfactory settlement of which we believe to be conducive to promoting the purposes for which this Organization has been created.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, p. 22)



**U.S.S.R. (Gromyko) September 18, 1958**

Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly are events that always compel us to undertake a comprehensive review of the international situation and to see how our Organization is fulfilling the primary task defined in its Charter, which is to ensure the maintenance of international peace. (UN. GA. 13th. ORs., p. 21)

**VENEZUELA (Sosa-Rodriguez) August 20, 1958**

Until this session of the Assembly was convened, a good many countries had not been able to play any role other than that of mere spectators in the face of a serious crisis of world-wide repercussions in which they found themselves involved, and which would determine their future destiny. The convening of this Assembly where all of us, large nations and small nations, have the right to raise their voices and be heard, now gives us the opportunity to make our views known and to add our contribution to the work of finding a solution.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. Doc. A/PV. 743, p. 26)

### *Membership*

**UN (Secretary-General) February 4, 1958**

The United Nations is a sensitive barometer of the impact of change. Not long ago from Asia, more recently from Africa, new States became members of the United Nations. These States are lending their thought and suasion to the understanding of the large issues that affect the peace and stability of the world community. The United Nations is stronger for their presence. But they have also come onto the international scene with expectations of their own. A newly independent state knows that in an international forum it has the opportunity to discuss the problems which impede or retard the development of its individual life, and that it will be heard; it likewise believes that in the United Nations lies its best hope of finding the assistance which will enable it to achieve progress and well-being in terms acceptable to its sense of nationhood and its search for the realities of freedom.

—Speech in Cleveland, Ohio. Press Release SG/657, p. 6.

**UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1958**

In the United Nations we see reflected the political rebirth of Asia and the awakening of Africa. But the United Nations, of course, is in no sense a cause of these great changes. Indeed, the conscious policy of the United Kingdom has played a very large part indeed in the appearance upon the world scene of so many newly independent states. And I believe that the role of the United Nations, like the policy of your Government, in the evolution that has occurred over the past

twelve years, has tended, on balance, to ameliorate rather than to exacerbate conflicts that would have occurred in any case.

—Speech to Parliament, London. *To-day's World and the U.N. Four Addresses . . .*, U.N. Office of Public Information, p. 5.

**CHINA (Tsiang) September 30, 1958**

120. In the brief span of thirteen years the United Nations has grown enormously both in membership and in scope of service. The multitude of activities which the United Nations and its specialized and affiliated agencies undertake is simply astounding.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 764 mtg.)

**COLOMBIA (Turbay Ayala) September 29, 1958**

15. We are gratified to note that the United Nations is making great progress towards universality. A comparison of the number of countries represented at San Francisco with the list of States which are now Members of the Organization justifies the assertion that the United Nations has followed, as far as possible, an open-door policy.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 762 mtg.)

**ECUADOR (Correa) October 1, 1959**

In San Francisco the small countries looked ahead and tried to set a balance between the principal bodies which would not prejudice or undermine the powers of the Assembly as the true representative of the totality of the Organization. In the pertinent Articles of the Charter we left the doors open so that in the General Assembly we might deal with all and any matters which were not before the Security Council for consideration. By virtue of this, and when the Council was precariously impotent to act, the General Assembly has exercised functions in the field of collective security, as was seen during the latest emergency session.

Furthermore, the General Assembly, because of the admission of new Members to it, took a significant step toward universality and widened its representative character. Considerable fears were expressed regarding the danger that, due to the increase in and expansion of the General Assembly, we were not adequately revising the methods, procedures and working of the body. It is obvious that the more numerous the Assembly becomes, the smaller is its capacity to act as a concrete unit. But it will give rise to a very much more complete understanding between the Members of the Assembly; the strengthening of the functions of the Secretary-General has also in practice added to the activities and possibility of action of the Assembly.

On another level, through participation in such a body as the General Assembly every Member State is constantly able to increase its discipline in the difficult practice of co-operation, and each and every

Member can daily learn lessons of international law, lessons which can be summed up to read: Give and receive.

As a Member of a group of the States which fourteen years ago amounted to almost half the Assembly, and yet today is only about a quarter of the number of Members, I can assure the Assembly that we feel much safer today now that our role in the Assembly is based upon the extent of our contact with other groups, and also the permanent process of negotiation and conciliation, than we did when it was based upon the easier, but at times fictitious, advantage of numerical majority. May I be permitted to reiterate our determination to work in the Assembly in close contact with the delegations of other groups in the search for common denominators, and if such are not found, in the search to find ways of reducing friction and reducing the field of disagreement. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817 mtg., pp. 51-52)

**ETHIOPIA (Deressa) September 24, 1958**

79. The gratifying enhancement of strength and prestige of the Organization, in the opinion of my delegation, has been largely due to the growth in membership of the United Nations in recent years.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs.* 756 mtg.)

**ICELAND (Thors) October 5, 1959**

One of the most striking features of our Organization during the last few years has been the steadily increasing number of new Members, many of which are nations that have emerged as sovereign States from the rule of colonialism, often under the auspices of governments seated in faraway lands and not always understanding of the problems of the people in the colonies, nor of their fight for independence.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 829 mtg., p. 36)

**LIBYA (Fekini) October 1, 1959**

10. My delegation believes that the authority and survival of the United Nations depend primarily on the development of the universal aspect of the Organization and that any revision of the Charter would be justified if it tended to make the organization more democratic and all its Members equal within the principal organs.

(UN. GA. 14th. *ORs.*, p. 290)

**MOROCCO (Benhima) October 6, 1959**

On many occasions in the course of our work speakers have cited the necessity for this Organization to be universal. It is true that almost every year one country or several countries become Members of the United Nations, but this universality has not yet reached the desirable dimensions. The prolonged absence of so many nations, large or small, limits the value and the scope of our Organization. The expression of

our regrets, even our most sincere regrets, which are repeated each year, does not lighten our responsibility for maintaining outside this Organization those countries which for many years have been expressing the desire to become Members, and thus to subscribe to all of the Organization's principles and obligations. Other countries are not represented here because of the antagonism of blocs, which this Organization has not been able to by-pass at certain times. This has kept them on a national level in an unfortunate state of division and, on an international level, outside the community of nations and outside the world of collaboration. Others, lastly, under colonial domination, are heroically conducting a difficult struggle, supported in their sacrifices by the rightness of their cause, supported by the free peoples and the confidence which they have in the United Nations, which has inscribed in its Charter the right of all peoples to self-determination.

Our Organization, whose responsibility in view of this situation is still considerable, should concern itself more actively with removing the obstacles still confronting these peoples, whose courage and sacrifices in reconquering their own freedom are solid guarantees of their respect for the freedom of others and the safeguarding of peace.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, pp. 23-25, 26)

**NEPAL (Upadhyaya) October 5, 1959**

Coming to the question of United Nations membership, we believe that, if the United Nations is to be made into an effective instrument of peace, it is necessary to ensure universality of membership. It is for this reason that we have felt happy at the addition of each new Member, and the expansion of the United Nations membership from fifty-one to eighty-two has been a matter of deep satisfaction for us. We have, however, been disappointed when the question of the representation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is postponed year after year, because this postponement has not only deprived the United Nations of universality, but also made it a less efficacious instrument of peace. If, unfortunately, it becomes established that all important international conferences having a vital bearing on world peace have to take place outside the United Nations, as has been the increasing tendency so far, the United Nations may go the same way which the League of Nations did. We believe that all will agree when we say we must prevent this from happening. Political attitude, in our opinion, requires acceptance of such a great reality as China, not escape from or evasion of such a reality.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 820, p. 5)

**U.S.S.R. (Sobolev) December 9, 1958**

The experience of many years of discussion of the question of the admission of Viet-Nam and Korea into the United Nations has definitely

shown two opposing trends, two mutually exclusive approaches to the resolution of this problem. On the one hand, a significant number of Members of the United Nations, basing themselves upon the real situation resulting from the existing division of both Viet-Nam and Korea and also taking into account the urgent need for their unification, insists upon the adoption of measures which would promote the peaceful unification of these countries. This trend was most definitely outlined in the decisions adopted at the tenth session of the General Assembly, when the majority of the Members of the United Nations clearly indicated that, in respect of nations which are divided, the first thing that must be done is to solve the problem of their peaceful unification, and that the admission to the United Nations of countries so united would be the most appropriate way of solving the problem. On the other hand, the United States and the Western Powers supporting the United States have directed their efforts for a number of years now in the opposite direction, and have had as their purpose the confirmation and consolidation of the division of these countries through encouragement of South Viet-Nam and South Korea in their policy of sabotaging all measures aimed at the peaceful unification of these countries. (Doc. S/PV. 842 mtg., p. 46)

#### UNITED KINGDOM (Lloyd) September 17, 1959

28. In the last fifteen years there have been great changes, above all in Asia and Africa. The membership of the General Assembly is the best proof of our record in this matter.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 23)

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) March 24, 1958

The society of nations . . . is still characterized by the existence of sovereign, independent states, the principal new factor being that there are more of them. More than 20 new nations have achieved their sovereignty since the end of World War II. The United Nations, as you know, was established in 1945 with 51 member states. Its roster had risen to 60 by 1955 and by last year to a total of 82 members. The recent merger of Egypt and Syria has, of course, reduced this number by one, that is, to 81 members at present. Accordingly, the political problems arising from the conflicts of national interests of these new sovereign states have increased proportionately. The United Nations has played a fundamental role in dealing with these new issues. —Address before the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs, DSB, XXXVIII (April 21, 1958), 669

### *Non-Governmental Organizations*

#### FRANCE (Marandet) April 30, 1958

[He] did not agree that in refusing to grant consultative status to the

Women's International Democratic Federation, the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations had acted in an arbitrary fashion. It had merely followed the rules which should govern any decision of that kind and which were set forth in Council resolution 288 B (X). It had rightly considered that in view of the political activities in which the Federation continued to engage, contrary to those rules, the consultative status that had been withdrawn from it in 1954 [Council resolution 529 B (XVII)] should not be restored.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. OR., p. 97)

**POLAND (Machowski) April 30, 1958**

[He] thought it illogical to grant category B consultative status to the Associated Country Women of the World, with a membership of only 5.5 million in eighteen countries and a limited sphere of activity, and to deny it to the Women's International Democratic Federation, with a membership of 200 million in seventy-nine countries and a much vaster sphere of activity. There was nothing, moreover, in the Charter or in any United Nations document forbidding a non-governmental organization to carry on political activity. Discrimination against the Women's International Democratic Federation was prejudicial not only to that organization but to the interests of the United Nations as well. . . .

(Same)

**U.S.S.R. (Arkadev) April 30, 1958**

[He] pointed out that it was not the first time he had been obliged to defend the legitimate rights of the Women's International Democratic Federation. That great women's organization numbered 200 million members in eighty countries; yet, its category B consultative status, granted in 1947, had been arbitrarily withdrawn in 1954. The Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations had just refused once again to repair that injustice; it had discussed the matter at closed meetings to which the Federation had not been admitted in order to set forth its point of view and to reply to the tendentious charges made against it. Such an anti-democratic procedure was hardly likely to enhance the prestige of the United Nations and was all the more astonishing in that the Council was publicly considering the question although the organizations concerned could not take part in its deliberations.

. . . . .

13. The Council did not have the right to exclude from its activities a large international organization which sincerely wished to co-operate with the United Nations. It should reverse the decision of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, which, from all indications, had been dictated by purely political motives.

14. There existed a dangerous tendency to discriminate against organizations found objectionable by certain Council members, which did not hesitate to distort the facts in order to discredit those organizations. In doing so, they were actually discrediting the United Nations in the eyes of the world.  
(Same, pp. 96-97)

UNITED KINGDOM (Scott Fox) April 30, 1958

18. . . . The Women's International Democratic Federation had failed to fulfill the conditions required for enjoyment of category B consultative status. It was still concerning itself predominantly with political questions, which did not fall within the Council's province, and on certain of those questions it had taken a stand diametrically opposed to that of the United Nations. It had persisted in a propaganda campaign against the United Nations forces in Korea, and had even seen fit to inform the United Nations of its activities.

19. It was to be regretted that an organization with so many members did not have consultative status with the Council. Nevertheless, the very fact that it had such a wide membership made it all the more imperative to ensure that it adhered to the principles of the Charter and that there was no danger of its using the privilege it might be granted for purposes of political propaganda. Contrary to what the representative of the USSR had said, it was not for the Council but for the Federation to change its attitude.  
(Same, p. 97)

UNITED STATES (Phillips) April 30, 1958

[He] regretted that the USSR representative had called upon the Council to reject the recommendation adopted by the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, with only one negative vote, concerning the Women's International Democratic Federation. The Committee members had acted not from political motives but on the basis of purely objective considerations. The Federation had shown itself clearly unworthy of retaining the consultative status accorded it in 1947. . . .  
(Same)

### *Secretary-General's Role*

UN (Secretary-General) January 2, 1958

On all the occasions when Governments have, so to say, appealed to the United Nations Secretariat or the Secretary-General for what may be called diplomatic services, I think I have responded and I think that there are other cases in which I have, so to say, taken the initiative myself in that very same direction because I saw a possibility which should be fully explored. I will [continue to] respond to all the extent that there is an appeal. I may myself take this or that initiative, provided that I feel that it does make sense, with the naturally

limited and modest means which the Secretary-General has, because he represents in a certain sense only an abstraction, the international community; he does not represent any centre of power.

—Notes for Correspondents, No. 1706, p. 13.

UN (Secretary-General) February 20, 1958

I cannot tell you anything about the role of the Secretary-General in those days [of the Franco-Tunisian crisis] . . . beyond what has been published. That is to say that I took up this matter, which seemed to be rather explosive, of supplies to the troops. I want to pay tribute to the wisdom which led to a quick solution. That is typical of what the Secretary-General can do and it remains his duty to intervene whenever he sees a possibility to ease tension in the same sense. That kind of duty, so to say, does not lapse because of the fact that fortunately a good offices operation is getting started. On the other hand it is a matter of course that the field for such initiatives and such efforts is limited to the extent that those very matters are covered by the general good office operation.

I may perhaps add that it seems to me that a useful interpretation of the role of the Secretary-General, apart from what follows obviously and directly from the Charter, is that when there is a risk of a vacuum which he can usefully fill it should always be his obligation to do his best in the situation. It is for the Governments concerned to accept or not to accept. That is to say, he cannot and he should not force himself on them. But on the other hand he should not be non-existent and absent if he can serve either as a catalyst or as a little bit of oil in the machinery.

(Same, No. 1737, pp. 1, 4)

UN (Secretary-General) March 6, 1958

I do not in my free activities, so to speak, consider myself bound by the United Nations General Assembly agenda. I am bound only by the Charter, and the Charter spells out quite clearly that the Secretary-General is expected to take an active interest in everything which may be considered as a cause of tension or a threat to peace and security.

. . . my activities are and should be oriented to those of the Governments. I am, as you know, in the service of all these various Governments. For that reason, when I read into your question a kind of idea that the Secretary-General might come into the picture, so to speak, exerting his influence as an independent factor, as the situation now stands and as the matter is now being handled, I think that goes beyond what I would consider sound diplomacy and sound policy.

(Same, No. 1752, pp. 2, 3, 4)



UN (Secretary-General) May 1, 1958

[Was there a difference between my support of a Soviet Union proposal for a ban on nuclear tests and a United States proposal for an Arctic Inspection Zone?] As to the first part of your question—my relation to this or that Government, in this case in particular one of the big Powers—I am personally firmly convinced that that depends on the maintenance of their trust in let me say, my independence, my sincerity, my impartiality, and my sense of responsibility. I do not for a second believe that the Secretary-General, with due reserve and due tact, going on record with his general views on one of the key United Nations problems, will shake such trust.

An entirely different matter is that any delegation, of course, has its right to have a different view, to criticize in substance the stand taken by the Secretary-General, and to disapprove or approve of the ways he uses to express those views. But I think that it would be rather helpful, generally speaking, in your understanding of what I tried to do and how I try to operate, if you would make this distinction between, so to say, a disagreement as to a question of substance or a disagreement as to a question of procedure, and a demonstration of lack of trust. After all, between people who trust each other it is not at all uncommon to agree to disagree. This I think should make it clear—not in this specific case but generally speaking—where I think that the Secretary-General would go beyond the danger line. (Well, nowadays the popular term is "fail-safe line.") He would indeed do so if he gave any reason to any Government—the one directly interested or other Governments, it is just as true of them—for doubts about those various qualities to which I referred. On that point I trust that nobody will find reason in my recent intervention to lose their trust; and that is the reason why I felt that your expression of concern—although sympathetic—was unnecessary. (Same, No. 1794, p. 6)

UN (Secretary-General) May 15, 1958

[Can the Secretary-General act as a "third-man" in connection with Austrian Chancellor Raab's suggestions for German unification?] First of all, I would leave it to Chancellor Raab himself to decide what he wants to bring up when he comes here. Needless to say, I am very happy to have this opportunity to meet him. If he would feel that he would like to inform me about his ideas I would certainly welcome it. But that would then, from my point of view, be just part of what so many Governments kindly do: keeping me *au courant* with their thinking on main issues. You should not, from that, draw any conclusions either as to their wish to engage the Secretary-General in any specific role or regarding the role the Secretary-General might play. Regard it, if such an exchange comes about, simply as part of the

current information which I am happy to receive from Governments on their thinking. However, I repeat what I said at the beginning: the initiative belongs to Chancellor Raab. (Same, No. 1804, pp. 4-6)

**UN (Secretary-General) June 3, 1958**

Finally, and as a fourth new technique added to the arsenal of classical diplomacy, I should like to mention the utilization of the diplomatic functions of the Secretariat. Over the years, the weight of the work of the Secretary-General has increasingly moved from what are conventionally regarded as political and administrative tasks to the diplomatic ones. This has not stemmed from any directed or planned development; it has happened under the pressure of practical needs which have increasingly made themselves felt. The diplomatic activity of the Secretary-General and his assistants is exercised in forms and for purposes which in many ways resemble those typical of the activity of an ambassador on behalf of his government, whether he is exercising "good offices" or operates as a negotiating party in relation to some other country.

—Speech in Oslo. *To-day's World and the U.N. Four Addresses . . .*  
U.N. Office of Public Information, pp. 25-26.

**AFGHANISTAN (Pazhwak) September 25, 1959**

111. The recent trips of the Secretary-General to many countries in various continents constituted one of the most useful undertaking of the United Nations, leading toward a correct understanding of real situations, particularly in the less developed countries.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 200)

**AUSTRALIA (Casey) September 30, 1959**

38. One feature of the general debate so far has been a number of references by representatives to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization [A/4132]. This reflects the amount of thought-provoking material which Mr. Hammarskjöld has included in his report, and is one more example of the way in which he has been developing his high office so that it will help Member nations co-ordinate their own policies as part of the world community.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 260)

**AUSTRIA (Figl) September 23, 1958**

. . . The Austrian delegation places the highest confidence in the diplomatic skill of the Secretary-General through whose initiative a previous dangerous conflict in the Middle East area was settled in 1956.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs., p. 107)

**BELGIUM (Wigny) September 25, 1959**

38. We should also like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for his unwearying efforts since the last session to increase the

efficiency of our Organization and help it to achieve at least part of its essential purpose of settling disputes and maintaining world peace.  
(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 194)

BURMA (Tun Aung) September 29, 1959

160. . . . It seems to my delegation this world Organization can certainly exert its pacifying influence by making its presence felt in the turbulent areas of the globe. On behalf of my delegation I want to pay a very warm tribute to our Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, for his untiring efforts in discharging his very delicate duties towards the achievement of United Nations objectives. But we feel that, in the context of increasing flare-ups in some parts of the globe, the remedy lies in our ability to make the United Nations presence felt in all potentially explosive areas. Peace is indivisible. Any disturbance of the peace in any one part of the globe cannot fail to have repercussions on the other parts.  
(Same, p. 250)

CAMBODIA (Son Sann) September 17, 1959

113. . . . I . . . call the Assembly's attention to the recent intervention by the United Nations, at the instigation of our wise and energetic Secretary-General, in the dispute which arose between Cambodia and Thailand. . . . After a period of rather alarming tension between the two countries, the Secretary-General was kind enough to send his personal representative, Ambassador Johan Beck-Friis, to Thailand and Cambodia. Full credit for the happy outcome of this intervention is due to the weighty influence of Mr. Hammarskjöld and the skill of his representative, which made possible the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the creation of a better atmosphere.

115. But it is important to stress the entirely novel character of the procedure adopted by the Secretary-General. His representative was neither an observer responsible for reporting the facts, nor an arbiter whose task was to induce the parties to accept a given solution. Ambassador Johan Beck-Friis was simply an intermediary who placed himself at the disposal of the two Governments in order to facilitate the restoration of diplomatic relations between them and pave the way for improved relations between the two countries.

116. We believe that this new course followed by the Secretary-General is a most promising one. It made prompt intervention possible without involving the prestige of the Organization in case of failure. This is a tactful and ingenious procedure which provides a most useful method of solving problems for those nations which have a genuine respect for the United Nations Charter.  
(Same, p. 29)

**CANADA (Smith) August 19, 1958**

39. The fact that this Assembly is going about its tasks in a purposeful way, can, I think, be attributed in large measure to the Secretary-General's timely intervention on 8 August, at the opening meeting of the emergency special session, when he outlined in such broad but comprehensive terms the course which this Assembly could most usefully steer. In identifying what he described on that day as "basic needs for action in the region," the Secretary-General focused attention on the constructive purposes of the Assembly. . . . The nature of the Secretary-General's statement illustrated the ever-increasing burden of responsibilities which he has been called upon to assume in recent weeks, acting always within the broad powers which the Charter confers upon him.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs. 741 mtg.)

**CEYLON (Corea) September 30, 1958**

. . . We would like also to express our appreciation of the efforts made by the Secretary-General in this direction. Unfortunately, he is unable to act on his own. He can put forward suggestions but is is for Member States to act on such proposals, and it is our unfortunate experience that his initiative has been dampened and even thwarted by lack of enthusiasm and even opposition from those countries which alone can supply the essential financial aid necessary.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 764 mtg.)

**CEYLON (Corea) October 5, 1959**

I should like here to express our great appreciation of the most valuable constructive work done in his usual quiet but effective manner by our Secretary-General in reducing tensions, creating better understanding and in attempting to attain the basic objectives of the Charter. His task has not been easy, but we admire the patience, determination and confidence he has shown in carrying out his difficult and delicate task, and we wish him continued success in the role he has to play.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 821, p. 62)

**ECUADOR (Correa) August 20, 1958**

89. . . . The Suez incident, the establishment and operation of the United Nations Emergency Force and the position of Israel in regard to its neighbours have shown that the Secretary-General can be the most effective instrument of United Nations action in situations that call for an able interpretation of the political realities reflected in the General Assembly and for a combination of talents comprising capacity for conciliation, diplomatic ability and administrative efficiency.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs. 744 mtg.)

**ECUADOR (Correa) October 1, 1959**

The ever-increasing functions being carried out by the Secretary-

General, and particularly by the exercise of diplomatic activities besides those traditionally considered political and administrative, has been a factor which has given great life and vigour to our Organization in the last years. His presence at different diplomatic stages outside the United Nations constituted a symbol of the interest shown by our Organization in vital questions. His pacifying action in many countries has reduced the fear of conflict. His policy of encouraging the causes of the under-developed countries is so authentically representative of the spirit of the Charter. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, p. 52)

INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 7, 1958

46. Before leaving this aspect of matters, we should like to express our appreciation of the fact that in dealing with the problems in the Middle East, the Secretary-General and his staff have played a part which is historic. However, I should like to say—and I hope that the observations I am going to make, which arise more or less from the developments of the last two or three years, will be accepted in a more or less philosophic sense—that it is all very well in an emergency to produce some sort of machinery and say "deliver the goods," but I think we must think hard and see that we do not get a situation where the United Nations, as at present composed, becomes a kind of superior authority, a kind of super-state with its representatives directing governments, which is not provided for in the Charter, and where the Secretary-General will be pushed away from his Charter functions into other matters. . . .

(UN. GA. 13th. ORt. 774 mtg.)

INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 6, 1959

We have before us the report of the Secretary-General, which is of unusual character. It deals with questions of political philosophy and theory; it deals with problems that have to do with the development of this Organization in the future. And I say, in all humility, that I do not think that our Organization has given proper attention either to these problems or to the report itself. The Secretary-General's report is received as a matter of course, and we are inclined to think that our responsibilities are over when we pay him his meed of thanks. We are grateful not only to the Secretary-General for this report. In his person, he embodies the whole of the Secretariat. At the end of this general debate, we should like to offer the thanks of our delegation and, if I may say so, the thanks of all of us, to all those persons who make up the Secretariat, who make the functioning of the Assembly possible, and who prepare the large amount of material and the considerable number of documents which we receive, and some of which we do not receive. For all these things, we are grateful to the Secretariat—to the administrative staff, to the interpreters, and to everybody concerned. Most of them are people whose names do not

appear in the newspapers and do not even appear in official records. If not for their diligence and their devotion to duty and the hard work they have to put in, often after office hours, it would not be possible for us to function here. May I therefore take the liberty of asking the Secretary-General to convey to the Secretariat, in an appropriate way, the appreciation of my delegation.

. . . . .

There are certain constitutional procedures where, again, there are certain aspects which one would welcome and other aspects which one would want to study. We will all admit that as the work of the United Nations grows, becomes intensive, becomes more a day-to-day affair, the functioning of the representatives of Governments at Headquarters who are accredited to the United Nations would become more important. But my Government has always taken the view that, whether it be in groups, the Asian-African group or the European group or whatever it is, policies are to be made by chancelleries, and therefore no group of representatives, either at a particular time at an Assembly or otherwise, could, in the present circumstances of the world, in the absence of a world constitution and world law, become *de facto* a world government. Therefore, while we are fully aware of the importance of day-to-day consultation, this Organization will carry weight with public opinion in various countries, will have the conscious and enthusiastic support of Governments, only to the extent that, in activities from day to day, the Secretary-General's personality itself is more and more in touch with Governments and chancelleries. Mr. Hammarskjöld is fully conscious of this matter and, during the considerable time that he has between sessions of the Assembly, he takes care to visit capitals. Unfortunately, he has to do a certain amount of sightseeing, but included in these sights are the statesmen of those countries.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, pp. 61-63, 65)

IRAN (Aram) September 17, 1959

68. I should also like to pay a tribute to the wise statesmanship and outstanding ability of the Secretary-General, whose wholehearted devotion to the cause of constructive international co-operation is a great asset to this Organizations.

80. . . . We have seen that, in the pattern of the development of the United Nations, the concept of the "United Nations presence" has successfully evolved in recent years and that this concept has rendered most striking service in removing sources of friction among nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., pp. 26-27)

**ITALY (Pella) September 23, 1959**

134. . . . We are indebted to Mr. Hammarskjöld for his clear introduction to the annual report on the work of the Organization [A/4132/Add.1]. He has shown us how the influence of our Organization can be strengthened by developing the activities and initiatives of the statutory organs.

(Same, p. 121)

**JAPAN (Fujiyama) September 17, 1959**

135. This Organization is playing a signal role to relieve international tensions by its efforts to promote mutual understanding through "open diplomacy." Through "quiet diplomacy"—the personal contacts between the permanent missions and the good offices rendered by the Secretary-General—the United Nations is also playing an equally notable role in the maintenance of peace. . . .

(Same, p. 18)

**LAOS (Panya) September 29, 1958**

48. . . . I should like to point out here that the Government of Laos has followed closely all the missions which the Secretary-General has undertaken in the best interests of peace; although his great modesty is known to me, yet I should like to congratulate him publicly on the energy and ability he has displayed wherever international tension required his presence. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, he has carried on the work of conciliation and pacification and we are justified in saying that he has served the cause of peace well.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR., p. 223)

**PAKISTAN (Qadir) September 23, 1959**

3. . . . His initiative in the direction of evolving procedures of a diplomatic, operational and good offices character without altering the constitutional balance among the various organs of the United Nations, and his efforts to build up an independent influence for our Organization by expressing an independent judgement on questions of international concern must be welcomed by all Member States. In particular, the not-so-powerful nations have especial reason to endorse Mr. Hammarskjöld's independent role on matters which, though of primary concern to the great Powers, also affect the interests of the rest of the world.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 177)

**PARAGUAY (de Vargas) October 6, 1959**

As a result of his work, our international Organization is daily gaining in prestige and renown through the formation of a greater consciousness among peoples throughout the world, a greater confidence and hope for the objectives of the United Nations Charter. The personal prestige and renown of Mr. Hammarskjöld as a tireless worker seeking to keep alive this world consciousness on behalf of the United Nations is indeed a most valuable contribution to the maintenance of

international peace and security. The policy which Mr. Hammarskjöld has pursued along these lines, particularly in his visits to many different countries, with a view to fostering closer understanding of world problems within the province of the United Nations, has enabled peoples to see more clearly the role that is being played in our world by this international body. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 822, p. 41)

PERU (Belaunde) August 19, 1958

80. The United Nations Charter has given the Secretary-General a great many powers; but the life and the needs of the Organization have increased these powers within the Charter itself.

(UN. GA. 3rd. ESS. ORs. 741 mtg.)

PERU (Belaunde) September 15, 1959

26. . . . The Secretary-General, I most solemnly affirm, has played a decisive part in recent years in strengthening the United Nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 3)

THAILAND (Khoman) September 24, 1959

143. . . . Both the United Nations and its Secretary-General have presently and potentially a truly significant role to play in preventing conflicts from becoming aggravated as well as in resolving them peaceably. In support of what the Foreign Minister of Cambodia said [798th meeting], my country also can speak from direct experience and state that when diplomatic relations were at one time suspended, the United Nations, through the personal representative of its Secretary-General, was instrumental in helping the two countries re-establish normal relations. Since then, and thanks to the will of both Cambodia and Thailand to live as good neighbours, the clouds of misunderstanding are gradually being dissipated. This incident is illustrative of the services this Organization can perform for its Members. And when we are fully cognizant of the fact that the Secretary-General is not only truly devoted and dedicated to the cause of world peace but also capable and willing to take upon himself the high responsibility of his office, more delicate tasks concerning the preservation of world peace may be entrusted to him with confidence.

(Same, p. 158)

TUNISIA (Mokaddem) October 2, 1959

I should like to pay a vibrant tribute to the great devotion of our eminent Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld who, through happy initiatives, has been able to strengthen the moral authority of our Organization and to strengthen the voice with which it speaks among the peoples. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 818, pp. 43-45)

UNITED KINGDOM (Lloyd) September 17, 1959

7. There is a second way in which the United Nations has shown its capability for helping to keep the peace. That is by the introduction



of what we have come to call a United Nations "presence" in a troubled area. Again I look to the Middle East for an example. The special arrangements made by the Secretary-General following the Third Emergency Special Session in August 1958, his visits and Mr. Spinelli's work in the area have undoubtedly played a useful part in removing misunderstandings and contributing to the lessening of tension which happily has taken place since this time last year.

11. The very fact that the United Nations has not, as a rule, been able to take speedy action to deal with particular crises, has led to these new methods and new techniques being developed. The Secretary-General has spoken of the United Nations serving a diplomacy of reconciliation, of mediation and conciliation. I think the United Nations representatives in the Middle East have quietly, unobtrusively and successfully sought to operate such a diplomacy.

12. We are filled with admiration for the work which the Secretary-General himself does, his journeys and his untiring efforts to find ways to iron out differences and to harmonize the relations between States. We have complete confidence in him and his work and he has our full support.

13. I have read with great interest the section of the introduction to the Secretary-General's annual report [A/4132/Add.1] with regard to the role of the United Nations. He refers to the work of the permanent delegations and their growing diplomatic contribution outside the public meetings, often in close contact also with the Secretariat. He refers to the possibility of the organization of regular meetings of the Security Council in executive session. He also made an interesting suggestion at the Economic and Social Council this year [1074th meeting] about the possibility of short special meetings of that Council at Ministerial level. These are interesting and imaginative ideas.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., pp. 21-22)

UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) June 26, 1958  
[Mr. Hammarskjöld's] keen understanding of the spirit and objectives of the United Nations combined with an astute sense of diplomacy have contributed substantially to the growing stature of the office which he holds.

—Letter transmitting to the Congress the 12th Annual Report on U.S. Participation in the United Nations, *DSB XXXIX* (August 4, 1958), 220

UNITED STATES (Cargö) October 24, 1958  
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld,

by his quiet and effective efforts has come to play a major role in the peaceful settlement activities of the United Nations.

—Address before the Rochester Citizens Committee for United Nations Day, DSB, XXXIX (November 10, 1958), 731

## Security Council

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

Well known factors have in recent years tended to reduce the public role of the Security Council. However, . . . constant talks and negotiations among, and with, members of the Security Council have given the Council a continuing life and importance and enabled it to exert its influence during the intervals when it does not meet in public. It may be asked if the time is not now ripe to give formal expression to this fact by the organization of regular meetings of the Council in executive session. Such meetings would not as a rule be devoted to particular issues brought to its attention, but to any aspect of the international situation which may prove of concern to the Council because of its responsibilities under the Charter. Sufficient experience seems now to have been gained in the Council of the value of the kind of deliberation for which such meetings might give an opportunity to warrant that the suggestion be given serious consideration by Member nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs. Suppl. 1A, p. 3)

BELGIUM (Wigny) October 1, 1958

140. The United Nations has not even partially accomplished its mission, which, as set out in Article I of the Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security. We can certainly be proud of the record of the specialized agencies which, as provided in the same Article, are achieving international co-operation of an economic, social, intellectual and humanitarian character, but our satisfaction on this score should not be allowed to delude us. If we had ensured peace, the resources made available through disarmament would have been so great that even such secondary activities could have been developed in a manner that today is inconceivable.

141. What is the basic reason for this failure? The founders of our Organization believed they were improving upon the Covenant of the League of Nations by giving the great Powers a decisive role in the Security Council. These hopes have been dashed because the great Powers have not been able to agree on even a small number of political principles. If some of the illusions had been cleared away, perhaps it could have been foreseen that States maintaining large armies with continually improved equipment would be more inclined to intransigence born of the conviction of being in the right and strengthened by the

of what we have come to call a United Nations "presence" in a troubled area. Again I look to the Middle East for an example. The special arrangements made by the Secretary-General following the Third Emergency Special Session in August 1958, his visits and Mr. Spinelli's work in the area have undoubtedly played a useful part in removing misunderstandings and contributing to the lessening of tension which happily has taken place since this time last year.

11. The very fact that the United Nations has not, as a rule, been able to take speedy action to deal with particular crises, has led to these new methods and new techniques being developed. The Secretary-General has spoken of the United Nations serving a diplomacy of reconciliation, of mediation and conciliation. I think the United Nations representatives in the Middle East have quietly, unobtrusively and successfully sought to operate such a diplomacy.

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### *Security Council*

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(UN. GA. 14th. ORs. *Suppl. 1A*, p. 3)

sureness of force, than to forms of compromise based on mutual concession. (UN. GA. 13th. OR. 766 mtg.)

#### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (Herrera Baez) September 29, 1959

In his Introduction to the annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General refers to the provisions made in the Charter of the United Nations which, although they may not be carried out within the organs of the United Nations, are nevertheless linked by the Charter itself to the tasks of our Organization. He also refers to the interpretation given Article 36 on the Security Council, in stating that as far as the recommendation contained in this Article is concerned, that the Security Council take into account any procedure which the parties may have adopted in order to settle a dispute. The Secretary-General then states:

"This rule has been understood to have reference especially to efforts on a regional basis or through regional organizations like the Organization of American States." [A/4132/Add.1]

The delegation of the Dominican Republic considers that, far from undermining the importance and prestige of the United Nations in the guidance of international relations, regional bodies carry out a complementary role of great importance as different regional communities are set up with the constant appearance of new sovereign entities of an independent nature in international life. As a consequence of this, the volume of work of the World Organization becomes more and more onerous.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 813, pp. 17-20)

#### ECUADOR (Correa) October 1, 1959

The situation in other principal bodies of the Organization is somewhat more complex. The Security Council is still the main body entrusted with the task of maintaining international peace and security, yet it sometimes shows the somewhat contradictory spectacle of being unable to act at times when the world seems plagued with explosive situations which can seriously endanger peace. Therefore we are forced to ask ourselves: Perhaps the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members has to a certain extent sterilized the Security Council? Or, is it that the representation on the Council is not sufficient to cover all the regions of the world? Or, is it that many of the international situations cannot be settled in a body so dramatically dominated by the great Powers? Or, fourthly, perhaps States might prefer to turn to other means of solving their problems rather than run the risk of being involved in political debate of wider scope?

It is true that the actions and activities of the Council are seen suddenly emerging in a critical situation, as was the case in Lebanon in 1958 and in Laos in 1959, both extremely complex cases upon which

the Council was able to pass adequate measures. In view of the importance of the functions of the Council, the Secretary-General suggests the holding of closed meetings, not called upon to study concrete items, but to examine the aspects of the international situation which may fall to the competence of the Security Council in view of the functions which are vested in it by the Charter. This might be one of the ways which will lead to a strengthening of the Council, and perhaps it might be worth while exploring it, as well as exploring at such meetings the possibility of setting up confidence in the minds of the parties to a conflict that their cases will be dealt with only on their merits. (UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 817, pp. 53-55)

#### ETHIOPIA (Deressa) September 24, 1958

82. What is encouraging, however, is that a new trend is now clearly discernible, of great reassurance to those who find the language of the Charter too vague and ineffectual for the purpose of assisting States which feel themselves threatened by aggression in bringing situations to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Ethiopian delegation at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations fought long and unsuccessfully for a more specific and reassuring language than that which has been adopted in Article 35 of the Charter. It will be recalled that this Article is merely permissive in allowing Members of the Organization to bring a dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly, without requiring that such matters, in fact, receive the attention requested. The course of events during the past decade, and particularly those which concerned the two special sessions to which I have made reference, are, therefore, most reassuring to the small States of the world which have frequent occasion to fear that they might become the object of eventual aggression.

83. It is significant that those who, two years ago, felt themselves endangered could turn with confidence to this Organization in requesting its assistance. Similarly, the Assembly has given the fullest consideration to the requests formulated by yet other States which have considered themselves the object of threats. By these remarks I do not in any way wish to reflect upon the substance of the matters which were submitted to the consideration of the special session, or to pass judgement upon the merits of the requests as formulated. What appears to my delegation to be of supreme significance, however, is the fact that a tradition is now in the delicate stage of formation, a tradition of the utmost importance to all Members of this Organization which might fear for their future security.

84. It is true that this evolution has taken place essentially in the General Assembly rather than in the Security Council, for the small

States of the world have, perhaps, a keener sense of the urgency and anxiety which prompts other nations like themselves to seek recourse through the United Nations. Consequently, the supremacy of the General Assembly is alone, today, the guarantee and the assurance of the triumph of the principle of collective security.

(UN. GA. 13th. *OR.* 756 mtg.)

#### TURKEY (Zorlu) September 24, 1958

69. Indeed, the very pillar of our Organization, as envisaged in the Charter, is collective security. The spirit of the Charter must constantly be adapted to new situations and new necessities in the light of our experiences, of our successes and our failures. In this manner, a series of decisions adopted by the Assembly in 1950 under the title "Uniting for Peace" have already proved their effectiveness in a number of cases in which the Security Council was prevented from exercising its primary responsibilities. I am convinced that even those Member Governments which were opposed to these measures at their inception have by now recognized their usefulness.

(Same, 756 mtg.)

#### UNITED KINGDOM (Dixon) September 7, 1959

. . . It is quite true that in the past the practice of the Council has not been entirely consistent. But I should like to make it clear that the attitude and the view of the United Kingdom—that is all I can speak for—have been fully consistent throughout.

(Doc. S/PV. 848, p. 66)

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1959

Meanwhile, even without a charter review conference, we believe steps should be taken to revitalize the Security Council. As the General Assembly becomes ever larger and more unwieldy, we must find appropriate ways of restoring to the Security Council some of the power and influence it formerly enjoyed. Perhaps the prompt action taken by the Council in the Laos situation is a good augury for the future.

In addition, I would like to urge again the enlargement of the Security Council. At the San Francisco conference the Council was designed to serve a membership of 51 nations. Today the number has grown to 82. In 1960 it will probably reach 86. If we were to add at least two more members to the Council, it would increase the stature of that body and give more adequate representation to the new members of the U.N., particularly the countries of Asia and Africa.

—Address before the American Association for the U.N., *DSB*, XLI (September 28, 1959), 447

## Voting

### General Assembly

#### UN (Secretary-General) June 3, 1958

In inter-state politics, we are still only at the beginning of an evolution toward a system where a minority is presumed to bow to a majority. The normal thing in international deliberations remains, of course, agreement. The influence of this older attitude has prevented the voting technique within the United Nations from reaching full efficiency. On the one hand, agreement between the five permanent members of the Security Council remains a condition for achieving a decision of the Council in question of substance. On the other, as is well known, all the decisions in the General Assembly, and most decisions of the Council, are only recommendations, the effect of which may depend mainly on how well they are believed to reflect world opinion.

—Speech in Oslo. *Today's World and the U. N. Four Addresses*. . . U.N. Office of Public Information, p. 24.

#### UN (Secretary-General) April 2, 1959

It is sometimes said that the system of one vote for one nation in the United Nations, and the consequent preponderance of votes by the middle and smaller powers, damages the usefulness of the United Nations for the purposes to which I have just referred. It is certainly not a perfect system, but is there any proposal for weighted voting that would not have even greater defects?

—Speech to Parliament, London. Same p. 4.

#### CANADA (Smith) September 25, 1958

134. The increasing importance of the peace-making activities which I have mentioned emphasizes the role of the smaller Powers in the United Nations. The assumption of greater responsibility is perhaps good for the souls of the middle size Powers. It has been all too easy for us, who are middle size Powers as against great Powers, to belabour the great Powers and find in their sins the causes of all our trouble. It is not infrequently the irresponsibility of those of us who belong to a lesser Power which has involved the United Nations in a crisis, and we should bear in mind that such irresponsibility inevitably encourages the great Powers to assume, or try to assume, a greater authority. The smaller Powers are not wiser or more virtuous just because they are smaller. Nevertheless, the lack on the part of the smaller Powers of the capacity to undertake global aggression and our limited involvement in world affairs does give us the chance to play a peace-making role which is denied by the circumstances to the great Powers. This represents to some extent a shift in the nature of the United Nations as envisaged by its founders. The Charter, as we all know, was based



upon the principle of collaboration among the great Powers to keep the peace. If this basis is not as yet possible, then it is up to the lesser Powers in this Organization to do what they can in the meantime to maintain peace. We should then be in a sounder position to warn the great Powers that the United Nations was not established as a forum in which they could play the game of power politics and in which the lesser Powers would be assigned the roles of pawns in a "cold war."

(UN. GA. 13th. ORr. 759 mtg.)

#### INDIA (Krishna Menon) October 6, 1959

The same applies with regard to voting procedures. When we touch on this matter, we touch a very tender spot. While it is quite true that equality of status, as a great British Prime Minister once said, does not mean equality of function, it is also true that, the less the capacity to function, the more a person is conscious of his status. Therefore, when we touch on this problem, we shall be touching on something which requires a great deal of consideration.

Each State here has one vote. All are equal. The very large country of Iceland, with a population of 200,000 is as important as the country of India, with a population 380,000,000. But it is equally true that a mere massing of votes—whether it is 45 to 11 with 25 abstentions or, as in the old days, 55 to 5—does not have the same impact upon world opinion as, shall we say, a vote that reflects the real views and conditions in the world. To a very large extent, a vote in this Assembly has value in direct ratio to its impact upon world opinion and the response it arouses on the part of the world.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 823, pp. 63-65)

#### SUDAN (Mahgoub) October 6, 1958

53. My delegation cannot therefore let pass without comment the caustic remarks made by one representative, attacking the United Nations and assailing the small nations to the extent of attempting to amend the Charter with a view to not giving the small States equal rights in the process of voting in the United Nations. It is the respectful submission of my delegation that international relations are fundamentally based on equality of status between States. The concept of equality of States is derived from that of State sovereignty. Every State, irrespective of origin, size, or form of government, is equally entitled to the rights accorded by international law. States are equally entitled to the enjoyment of the rights, prerogatives and privileges which their membership in this community of nations and the different international organizations confers upon them.

54. The Charter of the United Nations not only stresses the principle of equality of States but is in fact based on it. Article 2 of the Charter, which lays down the fundamental principles upon which the

new international order is founded and in accordance with which the new world Organization and its Members shall act in pursuit of the purposes of the United Nations, devotes its first paragraph to the principle of sovereign equality. As rightly stated by Goodrich and Hambro's standard work on the Charter of the United Nations:

"This Article is of fundamental importance in the total economy of the Charter. It lays down certain fundamental principles which the Organization operating through its various organs must respect. These same principles are also binding upon Members." . . .

55. In contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations, where no prominence is given to the concept of State equality, the Charter of the United Nations makes it one of the chief pillars. Article 1 of the Charter sets out as one of the purposes of the United Nations: "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people." . . . The preamble of the Charter begins with a pledge expressing the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in the equal rights of nations, large and small.

56. It is noteworthy that all the preparatory work and the international conferences which preceded the San Francisco Conference underscored the concept of "equality of States." Thus, the expression "sovereign equality" appears in the four-Power Declaration of the Moscow Conference of 1943 and in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of October 1944. The drafters of the United Nations Charter therefore decided irrevocably to base the new Charter on international equality and to set up the new world Organization as a democratic association of sovereign and equal members. They decided to do away with pre-Charter institutions and the "concept of Europe system" under which a number of States shoulder the task of shaping the destiny of the world or decide the fate of small nations or peoples. Any attempt to change the fundamental principles of the Charter would only result in undermining the structure of this world Organization. Such an attempt would represent a retrogressive step in the struggle of mankind towards a universal and democratic community of nations.

57. It is a defiance of the United Nations Charter and a flagrant disrespect of this Organization by a Member State when its representative declares in unequivocal terms from this rostrum that his Government will disregard any resolution or decision that may be taken by this Assembly in one matter or another.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 771 mtg.)

U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) September 18, 1959

99. The distinguishing feature of a properly functioning international body is that such a body decides issues not by formally counting up

votes, but by searching intelligently and patiently for a just solution which is acceptable to all. One cannot, indeed, conceive of States agreeing to carry out an unjust decision which has been adopted against their will. This sort of thing leaves a bitter taste in their mouths. How many such cases have there been in the history of the United Nations! The United Nations must therefore adopt only such decisions as are voted for by all, seeing that such decisions reflect the will of all and the interests of all. Our generation, and the historians of the future, will recognize decisions of that kind as being the only correct and only possible ones.

100. A group of States which at any time commands a majority can, of course, secure the adoption of a decision which is advantageous to it. But that is only a Pyrrhic victory. Such "victories" do damage to the United Nations, and are instrumental in ruining it.

101. It must also be remembered that a majority in the voting on a given question before the United Nations is a variable quantity and may change to the disadvantage of those who today rely so frequently on the voting mechanism. As the Russian saying goes, "You must reap what you have sown." The wisest and most far-sighted policy is, therefore, that of jointly seeking mutually acceptable solutions, dictated solely by a concern to ensure peace throughout the world and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

102. When the United Nations Security Council was created, there was taken as a basis for its work the idea of agreed decisions. At the same time, special responsibility for maintaining peace was entrusted to the great Powers, whose representatives are the permanent members of the Security Council. In order to avoid complications in international relations, it was recognized as necessary to establish the principle of great Power unanimity in the Security Council; this went by the name of the right of veto.

103. Some people oppose the veto. If there is no veto, however, there will be no international organization; it will collapse. The veto principle makes it incumbent upon the great Powers, in all questions requiring consideration by the Security Council, to reach a unanimous decision which will ensure the effective maintenance of peace. It is better to strive for unanimous decision by the great Powers than to decide international issues by force of arms.

(UN. GA. 14th. OR., p. 38)

#### *Security Council*

**BOLIVIA (Andrade) September 23, 1959**

179. The theory behind the planning for peace was based on the ideal of complete understanding between the great Powers which have permanent seats in the Security Council and under the current system

of voting enjoy the right of veto in matters concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. But at the same time one cannot overlook the immense contribution made by the small countries which, in their eagerness to proceed with their development in an atmosphere of peace, have shown even greater zeal and enthusiasm in seeking ways to eliminate factors likely to undermine the peace and security they value so highly, and create instead a basis of justice and respect for the dignity of man. (UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 141)

ITALY (Pella) September 23, 1959

137. It would be unrealistic not to recognize the limitations which today hamper United Nations action. It is only too obvious that the historical necessities of the right of veto cannot be disregarded. Nor can we have any illusions regarding the possibility of modifying the legal situation which exists today. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from hoping that the constitutional privilege of the veto will be resorted to only in cases of exceptional gravity. The will of a great majority would thus be allowed to prevail. (Same, p. 121)

PERU (Porras) September 28, 1959

93. Ever since the San Francisco Conference there have been suggestions, justified by the fact that all human institutions inevitably grow and develop, that the United Nations Charter might be amended in a number of ways with a view to restating the principle of the Organization's universality and the sovereign equality of all States, and reviewing the respective powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council, above all the right of veto, which the smaller States wish to see changed, but which is jealously defended by the great Powers. Ever since the San Francisco Conference Peru has been opposed to the institution of the veto in the Security Council, as being prejudicial to the principle of equality and to the moral and legal principles on which our international Organization is founded, and moreover because the political interests of the great Powers can never have greater importance than the safeguarding of international peace and security. The veto should not be allowed to paralyse or hamper the proper functioning of the United Nations in settling disputes among States. Until such time as it is possible to amend the letter or the spirit of the Charter, it is to be hoped that these restrictive powers can be circumvented, as they have been on recent occasions, by the intervention of the General Assembly or by emergency measures dictated by an immediate danger to peace. (Same, p. 223)

U.S.S.R. (Bulganin) February 1, 1958

In this connection I should like to refer also to your proposal regarding measures for strengthening the U.N. We, Mr. President, do not disagree with you that it is necessary to strengthen the U.N. and

make it an effective organ of international co-operation. In our opinion, much could be done in this respect through the joint efforts of all states, primarily the great powers which are permanent members of the Security Council.

But what does your message propose? It proposes, in essence, one thing: to depart from the principle of unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council, a unanimity which is the basic pivot on which hinges the very existence of the U.N. Twelve years' experience of the activity of the U.N. has shown with all certainty that this very right of unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council ("veto") makes possible the very existence of the U.N. as an international organization for the maintenance of universal peace and prevents the adoption of important political decisions in the Security Council which would not take into account the interests of states which find themselves in the minority. The U.N. is not some kind of world government which could enact laws and adopt decisions that would be binding on all states. In the creation of the U.N. it was kept in mind, and this has been stated with full clarity in the Charter, that states become members of it voluntarily and voluntarily assume obligations to execute the demands of the Charter, while fully maintaining their independence and integrity. The U.N. Charter provides that this organization must be a center for coordinating the actions of nations and for working out mutually acceptable decisions. These ends are also served by the rule of unanimity of the great powers. The abolition of this rule would lead to abuses, to the violation of the interests of the minority, and to attempts to use this organization to the advantage of some one power or group of powers. Is it possible to forget that states which are members of the U.N. are sovereign and independent states and cannot permit themselves to be saddled with decisions which are incompatible with their sovereignty?

It is absolutely obvious, Mr. President, that departure from the rule of unanimity of the great powers would not only fail to strengthen the U.N. but, on the contrary, such a step would weaken this organization and would in the last analysis lead to its disintegration. This cannot be permitted if we are really striving to transform the U.N. into an effective organ of international co-operation and not into an instrument in the hands of supporters of a policy "from out of a position of strength." To identify the U.N. with the interests of a group of states, and actually with those of a single power, means canceling the U.N. Charter for purposes which have nothing in common with those high principles and tasks for the sake of which this international organization was created.

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXVIII (March 10, 1958), 378.

U.S.S.R. (Bulganin) March 3, 1958

... we are not opposed to having an exchange of views regarding ways of strengthening the U.N.; we have merely expressed certain considerations of principle which we have in this respect.

I have already had occasion to explain why we consider unacceptable the proposal that our two governments renounce the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in deciding certain questions in that body. We cannot agree at all with the claim that the only thing in question is the procedural aspect of the matter, although, as is well known, this aspect also has important significance in settling great political problems. We are firmly convinced that the implementation of measures proposed by you would in practice lead to the use of the Security Council in the interests of one or several powers to the detriment of the interests of other states, to undermining the various principles of unanimity of the great powers which have the basic responsibility for maintaining international peace, that principle on which the U.N. is founded and which represents the basic guarantee for the normal activity and the very existence of the U.N. It is a well-known fact that in the development of this principle the Government of the U.S.A. itself played an active role. One cannot fail to see that at the present time the preservation of this principle is still more necessary than it was thirteen years ago. . . .

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXVIII (April 21, 1958), 650.

U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) June 11, 1958

We are also prepared to consider the question of methods of strengthening the United Nations, which has been touched upon in the correspondence between our two governments, because we also have something to say in this connection.

—Letter to President Eisenhower, *DSB*, XXXIX (July 21, 1958), 101

UNITED STATES (Lodge) January 17, 1958

These facts of power are recognized in the way the United Nations is organized, where the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, has a privileged position—the right to the veto.

The Soviets abuse the veto. But to deprive them of the veto, or of their United Nations membership (even if these steps were legally possible) would raise the question of the right of the United States to use the veto and, concerning this vital right of ours, Americans should be in no doubt at all.

To understand the special position of the great powers in the United Nations, remember that in the 1920's there were two principal objections to the League of Nations Covenant:

1. The first was that it put the very small states on a basis of equality with the great powers.
2. The other objection was to the proposition that an international organization could order our troops into combat without our consent. It seemed absurd to many Americans at that time that the United States should have one vote and that some country with a small area and small population would have the same. When the United Nations Charter was created, therefore, the lessons of the League of Nations debate had been learned and this defect was corrected. The five leading powers (China, France, the U.S.S.R., Britain, and the United States) were accordingly given a privileged position—permanent seats in the Security Council.

They were also given the veto power over Security Council resolutions. Although the United States has never yet used the veto, the charter would probably not have been ratified by the Senate had the provision for the veto not been included. This was a wise insistence by the Senate because, in my view, the United Nations should not have the power to order United States troops into action without our consent. Final decisions on such a vital matter should always be taken in Washington.

In his recent letter to Chairman Bulganin, President Eisenhower proposed that the veto on procedural questions and on pacific settlement of disputes be abandoned. Much of the work of the Security Council deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, and the elimination of the veto on such matters would greatly increase the effectiveness of the Council. But this means that we do not give up the veto on such vital questions as putting United States manpower into combat. If we want this special status for ourselves (which I think we do) we cannot contend that the Soviet Union should not have it too.

—Address prepared for delivery at the University of Louisville, *DSB*, XXXVIII (March 3, 1958), 347

UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) February 15, 1958

I tried in my letter to you of January 12 to put forward some new ideas. For example, I proposed strengthening the United Nations by rededication of our nations to its purposes and principles, with the accompaniment of some reduction in the use of the veto power in the Security Council.

That proposal you reject, alleging that it would give to the Security Council a power to "adopt decisions that would be binding on all States" and make it in effect a "world government." That argument is directed to a misrepresentation of my proposal. I suggested that our two nations should, as a matter of policy, avoid vetoing Security Council recommendations as to how nations might proceed toward

the peaceful solution of their disputes. Surely authority to *recommend*, and that only as to *procedures*, is not to impose binding decisions. Already, the General Assembly can, free of veto, recommend procedures for peaceful settlement. Would it really be catastrophic for the Security Council to exercise that same facility?

—Letter to Bulganin, *DSB*, XXXVIII (March 10, 1958), 373

**UNITED STATES** (Memorandum handed to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Moscow by the British Ambassador on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and France), May 28, 1958.

The peoples of the world look upon the UN organization and the pledges of its members embodied in its Charter as man's best hope for peace and justice. Thus, the Western governments cannot but welcome the recent assertion of the Soviet Union that it believes in the importance of the United Nations and its role in the maintenance of peace and security as well as in the peaceful settlement of international issues. Like the USSR, they deem that efforts should be made to strengthen the United Nations by every means, so that it should be able to fulfill its tasks more effectively. One practical way in which this can be done now is through an undertaking by the Governments of the US, UK, France and USSR that they will, as a matter of policy, avoid vetoing Security Council recommendations as to how nations might proceed toward the peaceful solution of their disputes.

—*DSB*, XXXIX (July 7, 1958), 15

**VENEZUELA** (Arcaya) September 24, 1959

106. It is true that the experience of the last fourteen years has revealed structural defects in this world Organization, and if it is to endure and to thrive as an effective means of preserving peace its essential machinery must be honestly examined and overhauled. I cannot conceal the fact that my Government is particularly concerned at the paralysing effect which the abuse of the veto so frequently produces on the United Nations organ bearing the greatest weight of political responsibility, namely, the Security Council. This state of affairs must be remedied.

107. A facetious journalist quoted, and the international Press services picked up, a shrewd remark attributed to our President that the United Nations does not function with the veto, and without the veto it would cease to exist.

108. I do not know whether our President actually said those words or not, but if he did he was no doubt attempting thus pithily to convey the seriousness of this problem of the veto in the United Nations. We must face this grave problem and try to solve it by democratic means in keeping with the standards of the United Nations.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 169)



## Chapter 5

# ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

### *Introduction*

A variety of administrative and budgetary matters seem to have captured the interest of particular delegations. But only in the debate on the possibilities of disseminating information about the United Nations in the Trust Territories was there considerable comment from many delegates. The Administering Authorities not unnaturally believed that they had arranged for an adequate public information program in the areas for which they were held responsible. But other members criticized them frequently for allegedly failing to disseminate enough information about the United Nations. The Indian analysis, territory by territory, is a very useful appraisal of existing conditions. With regard to public opinion and public relations generally, the Secretary-General has some pointed remarks to make about the value of privacy in negotiations going hand in hand with a well conceived program to educate the public about complex issues.

As expected, the Members continued to urge upon the United Nations new and expanded programs, which required additional funds. At the same time, they are painfully aware of the gradual increase in the United Nations' budget and wonder whether the Secretariat could not use states' contributions more efficiently. On the other hand, the Secretary-General once again carefully admonished Members to remember that unless they arrange priorities for the Secretariat to follow, the budget cannot help but get out of hand. A few Members do support Mr. Hammarskjöld in his pleas, but others do not seem to recognize their ambivalent positions. Several Members, for instance, expressed concern about the financial position of UNICEF, but few suggested contributing more money. Similarly, although the Netherlands deplored the inadequate conference facilities in Geneva, it did not suggest that states tax themselves to expand the European headquarters, nor did it urge the United Nations to give priority to their implied request.

The Secretary-General's remarks on the evolution of his office and of the Secretariat reveal once more the political difficulties inherent in his role. And he quite properly calls attention to the importance to the Secretariat of a new, unified Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

## Conferences

### UN (Secretary-General) July 1, 1958

The four-year pattern of conferences commencing 1 January 1954, established by General Assembly resolution 694 (VII) in 1952, has proved to be essentially sound in the rational and economic distribution of meetings between Headquarters and Geneva, and has resulted in the proper utilization of staff and conference facilities at both places.  
(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs. Suppl. No. 1*, p. 91)

### NETHERLANDS (Schurmann) July 10, 1958

14. The twenty-second report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination contained many passages that deserved careful consideration. He wished to deal first with what might seem a domestic matter, . . . namely, the complaint by the executive heads of several specialized agencies about the shortage of office space in the Palais des Nations. The Council considered it essential that representatives of the specialized agencies should take part in its deliberations, and it was therefore unreasonable not to provide adequate office space for those of them whose agencies had their headquarters elsewhere than at Geneva. Delegations also suffered from the lack of facilities. It should be remembered that the Council was one of the principal organs of the United Nations, and its requirements should therefore have priority over those of *ad hoc* conferences. It was time to abandon the erroneous belief that the Palais des Nations and the city of Geneva could take any kind of conference. Moreover, there was a critical size beyond which conferences became unmanageable. The Netherlands Government had had great difficulty in finding accommodation for its delegation to the Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which some 6,000 persons were expected to attend.  
(UN. ECOSOC. 26th. *ORs.*, p. 63)

## Cost

### UN (De Seynes) July 31, 1958

58. It appeared that with regard to the item concerning industrialization (E/3172), annex, p. 2), the Secretary-General had been over-optimistic when he had submitted those estimates to the Council at its twenty-fifth session. He had expected at that time to be able to meet the additional staff costs without seeking additional budgetary provision. The budgetary procedure of the United Nations had recently been completely overhauled, and the full extent of the changes could not yet be gauged accurately. The Council had expressed its desire that the Secretariat should extend its activities in that field clearly enough to make it necessary to put the financial implications before the Council during the current session. . . .

60. With regard to the periodic economic appraisals, he warned the Council against any drastic reduction in expenditure. By instructing the Secretariat to make frequent surveys the Council had imposed on it a heavy responsibility. All governments with similar experience knew that it was impossible to produce such surveys satisfactorily without a fairly large and highly qualified staff. The Secretariat was in fact working with inadequate resources at the moment, and the Secretary-General had drawn attention to the anomaly of expanding programmes and diminishing budgets.

(UN. ECOSOC. 26th. ORs., p. 150)

UN (Secretary-General) September 29, 1959

... it is not possible indefinitely to maintain a policy of budgetary stabilization unless the task of concentrating efforts and resources and applying priority standards is actively pursued by each and every organ upon which it has been laid ... I regret that once again I must bring to the attention of Members the unsatisfactory situation confronting the Organization in respect to its cash resources.

28. It may be recalled that a year ago in my report on the Working Capital Fund, I expressed concern at the then dangerously low cash position of the Organization and put forward a number of proposals designed to safeguard its solvency. I said in that report there was a demonstrated need for a Working Capital Fund at a level of some \$30 million and that, additionally, it would be prudent to authorize the Secretary-General, in the event of urgent need during the first half of 1959, to have recourse to the use of cash in special funds and accounts in his custody. It was fortunate that the General Assembly, while limiting the increase in the Working Capital Fund to \$23.5 million for 1959, granted authority to utilise cash from special funds and accounts in my custody since it became necessary in June and early July of this year to borrow \$2 million in order to pay the bills of the Organization.

29. Serious as the situation appeared one year ago it is today even more disturbing. I have already reported that within the one-year period from 1 January 1958 to 1 January 1959 available cash resources fell by \$7.4 million from a level of approximately \$22 million to \$14.6 million. As a result of the continued arrears in payments of assessments both for the regular budget and for UNEF we can now anticipate that the cash balance available for both purposes at the end of 1959 will have been reduced by another \$2 to \$3 million.

—Statement before the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Press Release, SG/858, pp. 2, 5-6.

**CANADA (Cottillard) April 23, 1958**

51. The fact that the rate of increase of contributions for 1957 had slowed down was of special concern to the Canadian delegation, particularly as UNICEF was undertaking a series of programmes to combat malnutrition and had to maintain at their present level, at least until 1960, the funds committed to anti-malaria campaigns.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. ORs., p. 51)

**CANADA (Nesbitt) July 31, 1958**

54. The financial implications of the decisions of the Council at its twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions amounted to more than \$1,000,000 for 1959 alone. He felt the magnitude of the increased estimates should be very carefully scrutinized. . . .

56. He suggested that in future, documents giving the financial implications of the Council's decisions should be circulated earlier in the session and that such estimates should accompany each proposal involving expenditure from United Nations funds, as required by rule 34 of the rules of procedure. If that were done, any possibility of misunderstanding arising when items were considered by the General Assembly would be avoided.

(UN. ECOSOC. 26th. ORs., p. 150)

**CHINA (Tsao) April 23, 1958**

21. He was concerned at the decline in the rate of growth of UNICEF funds, the more so since rising prices and increasing requests for assistance called for greatly increased resources.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. ORs., p. 49)

**CUBA (Nunez Portuondo) October 2, 1958**

21. The Cuban delegation has noted that the tendency for international expenditure to increase continues. The initial United Nations budget estimates for 1959 amount to \$59,006,170. . . .

A general comparison with the budget approved for 1958 shows that for 1959 there will be an increase of approximately \$3 million.

22. In addition to the regular budget estimates, Member States will have to meet the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force and the costs for the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, amounting together to not less than \$25 million or \$30 million. In addition, it is estimated that expenditure for nine specialized agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, will amount to some \$60 million, bringing the sum total of international expenditure to \$150 million.

23. If we add to this the figure for voluntary extra-budgetary contributions (for the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Refugee Fund, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the

United Nations Children's Fund) and the contributions required for the establishment next year of the Special Fund, together with other costs of a regional nature—in the case of the Latin American countries, the costs of operation of the Organization of American States—we must inevitably be forced to the conclusion that international expenditure is becoming too heavy to be borne, especially for small States which because of their unstable and under-developed economies lack any ample source of income. To ask countries in such a situation to make any financial effort additional to that they are already making would be to place them in an extremely difficult position, despite their ardent spirit of international co-operation.

24. We fully understand that the main causes of these increased costs are world inflationary trends and statutory obligations which the Secretary-General is bound to carry out although he is not responsible for them. We also recognize that the financial effort made has not been wholly without effect, since thus far the United Nations has succeeded—although with some difficulty, owing to the group of Member States which refuse to respect the decisions of the majority—in carrying out its fundamental aims of maintaining international peace and advancing the progress and social and economic development of all peoples.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. 767 mtg.)

FRANCE (Boris) July 31, 1958

44. . . . \$250,000 was too large a sum for the initial stages of an international administrative service.

(UN. ECOSOC. 26th. ORs., p. 149)

ICELAND (Thors) October 5, 1959

The Icelandic delegation has during the past weeks listened with interest to the many speeches of all those who have had anything to offer toward the solution of any of our diversified world problems. Some speakers have also referred to the status of our Organization of the United Nations, and to its future prospects. Let me only mention the difficulties and embarrassment caused by the tardiness of many delegations to pay their annual and approved contributions to the Organization to enable it to run efficiently its detailed work on a financially sound basis. However, it is gratifying to note that we all seem agreed in our unflinching trust in our wise, well-advised and energetic Secretary-General and in our highest officials, including all the Under Secretaries, as well as the members of the Secretariat in general and the staff. We have in fact to be thankful for all the information, statistical data, scholarly and even scientific reports with which the Secretariat treats us all the year round, although some of us are obliged to feel occasionally that we have more documents than there is time to read them. All these reports have great statistical and

educational value, and our government offices could hardly function satisfactorily without these reports of the United Nations Secretariat.

(UN. GA. 14th. Doc. A/PV. 820, pp. 33-35)

**INDONESIA (Ompi) April 23, 1958**

4. The financial position of UNICEF was not, unfortunately, as promising as might be desired. Its 1957 income showed an improvement of only \$900,000 over that of 1956. The fact was all the more disturbing since there was hardly any likelihood of an increase in the number of contributing countries, and prices were rising.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. ORs., p. 53)

**NORWAY (Lange) September 24, 1959**

183. . . . In his foreword to the budget estimates for the financial year 1960 [A/4110] the Secretary-General states that the cash position of the United Nations is a matter of deep concern.

184. It is no pleasant reflection on the attitude of Member States to the Organization that the Secretary-General cannot meet current payrolls out of available resources because some Members have failed to pay their contributions. Each nation has been assessed according to its ability to pay and each nation has also, by voting for the assessment scale, committed itself to paying its share which, by no standard, should mean a heavy burden on its financial resources.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs., p. 175)

**PAKISTAN (Faruqi) May 1, 1958**

17. [He] observed that paragraph 12 of draft resolution A provided for the establishment of a committee of experts composed of up to ten persons, while the statement of financial implications submitted by the Secretary-General (E/3115) contained a proposal for a budgetary allocation of only \$9,000. With such an amount it would not be possible to obtain enough experts with sufficiently high qualifications and variety of experience for fulfilment of the task imposed on the Committee.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. ORs., p. 101)

**SUDAN (Ahmed) May 1, 1958**

9. [He] regretted that draft resolution A did not contain the paragraph, which had appeared in the original, asking the General Assembly to authorize the necessary credits for the expansion of staff suggested by the Secretary-General (E/3079, para. 11). It was not consistent for the Council, on the one hand, to endorse the staff expansion, as it did in paragraph 11 of draft resolution A, and, on the other, to withhold authorization to incur the necessary expenditure. . . .

Any attempt to secure funds for the expanded activities of the Industry Section of the Resources and Industry Branch by effecting economies in other programmes would merely hold up execution of those pro-

grammes and lead to the abandonment of an increasing number of urgent projects.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. ORs., p. 100)

#### UNITED STATES (Kotschnig) January 31, 1958

. . . In 1957, some 80 countries contributed to the Expanded Program, as contrasted with 54 in 1950-51, which was the first year of actual operation of this program. Total pledges have risen from about \$20 million in 1950-51 to almost \$31 million in 1957.

. . . The United States has been the major contributor, our pledges for the years 1950-57 totaling almost \$95 million out of the total from all countries of \$173 million. However, the truly multilateral nature of this program is evidenced by the fact that several states, such as Denmark, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, are contributing more per capita than does the United States.

—Address before the Middle East Institute, DSB, XXXVIII (February 24, 1958), 308.

#### UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) February 19, 1958

The mutual security program which I recommend for fiscal year 1959 contains essentially the same component parts as authorized by the Congress last session. To carry out this program I request \$3,942,100,000.

(Of this amount) \$106.6 million . . . will provide for our contribution to the United Nations Children's Fund, certain refugee programs, the atoms-for-peace program, and for the cost of administering the economic programs.

—Message of the President to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, DSB, XXXVIII (March 10, 1958), 370, 371.

#### UNITED STATES (Kotschnig) April 23, 1958

39. The United States had undertaken to increase its contribution to UNICEF funds by \$1 million in 1958. At the same time its percentage contribution would be reduced from 55 per cent to 52.5 per cent. The reduction in its share of total contributions was deliberate, and was designed to stimulate other countries to do more for UNICEF.

(UN. ECOSOC. 25th. ORs., p. 50)

#### UNITED STATES (President Eisenhower) June 26, 1958

Of particular interest to the Congress is the General Assembly's action in accepting 30 percent as the maximum share to be paid by the largest contributor (the United States) to the budget of the United Nations. The Assembly took a first step toward achieving

this objective by reducing the percentage assessment of the United States from 33-1/3 percent to 32 1/2 percent in 1958. Member states have contributed to this financing of the United Nations budget through a cost-sharing system based on their capacity to pay. With the admission of 22 new members in the past three years, the General Assembly decided that old members, including the United States, should pay proportionately less and thus benefit from payments by the new contributors.

—Letter transmitting to the Congress the 12th Annual Report on U.S. Participation in the United Nations. *DSB*, XXXIX (August 4, 1958), 221.

#### UNITED STATES (Wilcox) September 14, 1958

Now, some people complain that our contribution to the United Nations is too high. To be sure the cost of peace is high, but it is far less costly than the terrible cost of a nuclear war. The dollars we put into the United Nations are certainly a small price to pay in terms of benefits which mankind derives from that organization.

—Address before the American Association for the United Nations, *DSB*, XXXIX (September 29, 1958), 513.

### *Documents*

#### UN (Secretary-General) July 1, 1958

Results were obtained in rationalizing patterns of documentation and drafting, at Headquarters as well as at the regional offices, and in eliminating non-essential material and rendering texts more readable and more concise. Instrumental in these respects were, apart from the usual activities described previously, the holding of drafting seminars, the issuing of drafting instructions and the rewriting of certain manuscripts. It is still too early to calculate to what extent the 25 per cent reduction suggested as a target has been achieved, but in several fields there are already clear signs that the maximum compression acceptable to delegations has been reached.

... For the first time, the percentage of the printing programme contracted for in the Headquarters area accounted for less than half of the total budget. Even so, it is felt that the amount of soft currency area printing has still not reached its maximum point.

(UN. GA. 13th. *ORs. Suppl. No. 1*, p. 91)

#### CANADA (Jay) July 11, 1958

13. The secretariats of the international organizations could not make their full effort to help governments unless governments in turn assisted them by not asking for more documentary material on marginal topics than could easily be produced and not asking for the



holding of meetings and seminars without regard to the physical possibilities of effective preparation. If governments voted in different ways in different bodies on identical issues, they would have only themselves to blame for the resultant confusion, inefficiency and waste. (UN. ECOSOC. 26th. ORs., p. 28)

#### UNITED KINGDOM (Fox) July 18, 1958

. . . the Secretary-General's report on taxation in capital-exporting and capital-importing countries of foreign private investments was a highly technical document which those whose task it was to draft legislation would find most useful. It contained nothing from which the United Kingdom delegation wished to dissent.

40. The Secretary-General's reports on the international flow of private capital, 1957, and on international economic assistance to the under-developed countries 1956/57 were a mine of useful information and would provide a good background for discussion. They should be considered together, for they were complementary. . . . It was a pity, as the United States representative had observed, that the second of those two reports was not more complete, but that was not the fault of the United Nations Secretariat.

(UN. ECOSOC. 26th. ORs., p. 122)

### Library

#### UN (Secretary-General) July 1, 1958

The most conspicuous feature during the period was the very sharp increase in the use of the Library and in its documentation services. The number of reference questions answered rose by about 30 per cent from the level of the three preceding years to a record total of more than 87,000; loans increased by 15 per cent and the number of United Nations documents received and indexed by 25 per cent.

With no commensurate increase in staff, the Library was able only to meet the daily demands of the service. All long-range projects for the evaluation, organization and description of the collections had to be suspended or deferred.

The year's accessions totalled about 9,000 books, 73,000 newspapers and periodicals, 90,000 government documents, 82,000 United Nations and specialized agency documents, 1,400 maps and 5,000 sound recordings—in all, more than 250,000 pieces of material of all kinds. . . . and discarded upwards of 125,000 newspapers, periodicals and documents of no further usefulness.

The most notable bibliographical accomplishment of the year was the first *Cumulative Index to the United Nations Treaty Series*, covering volumes 1-100 of the series, and an *Interim Index* to volumes 101-175.

(UN. GA. 13th. ORs. Suppl. No. 1, pp. 91-92)

## *Opinion and Public Relations*

UN (Secretary-General) February 3, 1958

In my discussion so far of "the element of privacy in peace-making," I have not dealt with one problem of major importance. This is the problem of the relationship of the increased need for private diplomacy with the need for a better informed public opinion on international affairs. It is a problem of some difficulty and one where the responsibility for a solution is shared by the governments, by those who direct the mass media of communications, by international civil servants serving the world community like myself and by the general public of which you in this audience tonight are a part.

The media of mass communications, when supplemented by education in world affairs in schools and universities, provide powerful tools for developing a better informed public opinion. However, they can also be misused. We learned between the first and second World Wars that public diplomacy could not in itself provide insurance of peace, for in the hands of a ruthless group of rulers the mass media had been misused to build strong public support for the wildest aspirations of these rulers and thus to place an additional weapon in the hands of those who wanted to lead the world in the direction of war, not peace.

Thus the mass media can be misused under certain circumstances for harmful propaganda. Where competitive conditions prevail there is also a tendency to play up conflict because conflict usually seems more dramatic than agreement. For the same competitive reasons there is the natural desire to be "first with the story." In international affairs, this may result in premature and often poorly informed publicity about an issue at a time when the privacy of quiet diplomacy is essential to achieving a constructive result. At the same time I recognize that public opinion cannot be truly well informed about the progress of peace-making unless it understands the part that is played at all stages by private diplomacy and its relationship to the public proceedings of parliamentary diplomacy which are so fully reported. This creates difficulties both for the private negotiator and the representatives of the mass media.

—Speech in Athens, Ohio, "The Elements of Privacy in Peace Making," Press Release SG/656, pp. 6-7.

UN (Secretary-General) July 1, 1958

United Nations public information activities have continued along the main lines laid down in previous years, with the principal accent on services to assist and supplement the services of Member Governments and non-official information agencies in presenting information about the United Nations.

There has, however, been an increasing tendency, on account of budgetary stringency, to readjust activities to enable new essential tasks to be undertaken. . . .

The publications programme tries to meet, as far as possible, the increasing demand for material in many languages. . . .

Increased emphasis has been given to securing attention to United Nations subjects in teacher-training programmes and to provide teachers with adequate reference material.

(UN. GA. 13th. OR. *Suppl. No. 1*, pp. 87-88)

UN (Secretary-General) September 29, 1959

In times of rising prices, and in view of the increasingly important role of the Organization, I believe most of us would now agree that a budgetary approach based on a fixed and predetermined monetary limit is neither practical nor manageable. In paragraph 18 of my report there is set out a policy of stabilization which presents a viable framework for the development of the information program. It provides a practical but restrictive approach. The budget estimates for 1960 have been presented in line with such a policy.

26. I hope that the Secretariat can now be given a clear mandate on the budgetary policy for these expenses so that its concentration can be turned to developing the information program itself within the restrictions proposed. It is possible to plan ahead with increasing effectiveness only if there is a reasonable understanding as to the resources which will be available. I am convinced that if such a stabilization policy can be endorsed by the Assembly, the Secretariat will be in a better position than before to carry out the wish of the General Assembly to serve the objectives of the resolution it adopted last year.

—Statement to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Press Release SG/858, pp. 8-9.

UN (Secretary-General) October 22, 1959

I would wish to remind the Committee of the time-table. After the long studies by the Expert Committee and after the long debate in this Committee, the decision was reached late last fall—only ten months ago . . . [to leave the matter of the Office of Public Information] largely in the hands of the Secretary-General, with the guidance provided by the General Assembly and in the report of the Expert Committee . . . I should also mention that the treatment of this problem over more than a year had had an impact on the work of the Department which also had to be overcome before the work of building and re-building could begin with full efficiency . . . regarding the suggestion that an advisory committee be established . . . the value of such an advisory arrangement would to a very large extent depend

on the representatives which governments would be willing to send. Even in the suggested consultant capacity the work they undertake will be very time consuming as this is not a field in which it is possible to arrive at helpful views without careful prior studies and a thorough acquaintance with current problems. It is impossible to apply here without such thorough knowledge experiences gathered in other fields of public relations activities.

Regarding the idea of a ceiling on expenditure, I have on various occasions expressed my scepticism about the value of artificially imposed limitations. The line that seems most promising to me is the one I have presented in this year's report to the General Assembly. The ceiling formula is deceptive, unless based on an agreement also regarding what activities of OPI should be cut. I fear that the wide unanimity on the desirability of keeping down the costs for OPI has a counterpart in a divergency of views which would become apparent if the Committee were to try and establish by what sacrifices the cuts should be achieved.

—Statement to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Press Release SG/862, pp. 1-4.

BURMA (Tin Maung) August 4, 1959

25. . . . his delegation, which attached great importance to the matter, was far from satisfied with the information activities undertaken by the United Nations; there were still no information centres in certain Member States. He hoped that some specific proposals would be made in the Council concerning the establishment of information centres in the Trust Territories.

(UN. TC. 24th. OR., p. 475)

INDIA (Rasgotra) June 17, 1959

67. [He] felt that the Secretary-General's very brief report on the establishment of United Nations information centres in or near the Trust Territories was only of a provisional nature. He regretted that certain aspects of the question, inter alia, the financial aspect, had been neglected. He . . . drew the Secretariat's attention to two points: the question of the funds available to the United Nations Office of Public Information and the question whether the Secretary-General had consulted the Administering Authorities on the possible establishment of information centres, since an information centre could be established only at the request or with the consent of the Administering Authority. In the light of General Assembly resolution 1276 (XIII), the General Assembly—or the Secretary-General acting on its behalf—should take the initiative and if necessary request the consent of the Administering Authorities to the establishment of United Nations Information Centres. Only if it were able to provide the General Assembly with information

General Assembly would find means of providing the funds necessary for the establishment of such centres. Although none of the Administering Authorities had invited the Secretary-General to establish information centres in any of the Trust Territories, his delegation felt that it would be appropriate for the Secretary-General to initiate correspondence with the Administering Authorities with a view to the application of the General Assembly resolution and it was confident that the Administering Authorities would agree. It hoped, therefore, that a fuller report on the subject would be submitted to the General Assembly at its next session. (Same, pp. 473-74)

ITALY (Vitelli) August 4, 1959

26. . . . The Soviet Union representative had said that no Administering Authority had asked for the establishment of new information centres. So far as Somaliland was concerned, the Secretary-General's report (T/1463) stated that, according to the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration, information material about the United Nations was widely distributed in the Territory and that the knowledge of United Nations affairs so acquired had created in the population of the Territory a close and genuine feeling of faith and confidence in the United Nations. Somaliland was at present engaged in solving more urgent problems; once the Territory had become independent, the matter would be one for its Government to take up. (Same, p. 475)

NETHERLANDS (Miss Pelt) April 23, 1958

41. Her delegation had sometimes wondered whether voluntary organizations were receiving sufficient support and guidance from UNICEF in the field of public information. She was happy to note the steps which had been taken to strengthen the relations of UNICEF with voluntary organizations (E/3083/Rev. 1, para. 85) and would await the outcome with interest. (UN. ECOSOC. 25th. OR., p. 50)

U.S.S.R. (Lobanov) June 20, 1958

68. . . . it was immediately apparent from the report (T/1378) that very few United Nations official documents were available in the Trust Territories. From the table in paragraph 4 it could be seen that records of United Nations meetings and particularly of the Trusteeship Council had been circulated to only twelve addresses in Tanganyika, and there as in other Territories the number of recipients was not increasing. The activities of the Trusteeship Council and its discussions, having a direct bearing on the welfare and future of the people of the Trust Territories, were of considerable interest to the latter, and the existing situation as regards dissemination of information was therefore far from satisfactory. Information

on available educational facilities was of special importance to the inhabitants of Trust Territories. Without the necessary contacts between the Trusteeship Council and the indigenous inhabitants of the Territories, the Council could not carry on any fruitful activity. Moreover, an improved system of dissemination would increase the feeling of responsibility of members of the Council, especially those which had duties and commitments under the Charter and Trusteeship Agreements. The Council should therefore recommend that the Administering Authorities should take appropriate measures to make the necessary documents available to educational and other cultural centres in the Trust Territories. (UN. TC. 22nd ORs. 898 mtg.)

U.S.S.R. (Oberemko) August 4, 1959

17. . . . it was clear that the position with regard to dissemination of information in the Trust Territories was unsatisfactory. The General Assembly had adopted a precisely worded resolution on the subject and had requested the Trusteeship Council to submit a report at the fourteenth session. All that the Council would be able to report, however, was that not a single step had been taken to carry out those recommendations and that no requests for the establishment of information centres in Trust Territories had been received from the Administering Authorities. His delegation felt that the most effective method of ensuring the dissemination of such information in the Trust Territories would be to establish information centres within the Territories themselves, and that point of view had been shared by the great majority of the Members of the General Assembly. It was regrettable that the Administering Authorities had failed to comply with the terms of the resolution. The Trusteeship Council should take steps to ensure the implementation of the resolution.

(UN. TC. 24th. ORs., p. 474)

UNITED KINGDOM (Caston) August 4, 1959

19. In his delegation's opinion, the Secretary-General's report (T/1463) on what had been achieved in the individual Trust Territories revealed a not unsatisfactory situation: indeed, the catalogue of achievements which it contained was quite an impressive one and suggested that the peoples of the Trust Territories were fortunate in the efforts made by their Governments to keep them informed about the United Nations. . . .

20. The question of establishing information centres in or near the Trust Territories could only be considered in the context of the general policy of the United Nations concerning public information. In reaching an opinion, his Government naturally had to take into account the views which it held as a member of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

21. The Belgian representative had drawn attention to the Secretary-General's statement concerning the need for a rational basis for planning a public information programme designed to give the maximum effectiveness at the minimum possible cost. In the same report (A/4122) the Secretary-General had emphasized that the pattern of development must provide for a balanced geographical distribution and must take into account those places where existing offices were still trying to service areas too large for their resources. It was against that background that his Government, like other Governments, had to decide whether to seek the establishment of an information centre in any Trust Territory under its administration or whether the needs of those Territories could be met satisfactorily from existing centres in neighbouring countries or in the metropolitan country itself.

22. Information material for the Cameroons under British administration was sent direct from United Nations Headquarters and from the Information Centre in London, which had good communications with the Cameroons. When for any particular purpose it seemed appropriate information was supplied also from the Information Centre in Ghana. In the case of Tanganyika, too, information was sent from both New York and London; his delegation would be glad if the information office to be established in Addis Ababa could help in meeting the needs of that Trust Territory, although, for practical purposes London would still be nearer to Dar es Salaam than Addis Ababa was.

23. The representative of the United Arab Republic had rightly pointed out that the first question to be considered was how the supply of information to Trust Territories from existing information centres could be improved. The most obvious method was by means of personal contact between the staff of those information centres and the authorities in the Trust Territories. In view of the many practical and budgetary difficulties in the way of opening new information centres, and of the existing advantageous arrangements for the supply of material direct from New York to the Trust Territories, his delegation did not feel that the most efficient way to promote the objectives of the public information programme would be to open centres in the Trust Territories. Moreover, the fact that information centres already existed or were soon to be opened near the Trust Territories in Africa with which his delegation was concerned meant that the intentions of General Assembly resolution 1276 (XIII) were to a large extent already satisfied.

24. In Tanganyika, information about the United Nations was made available through the Government Information Service, at the expense of the Tanganyika Government. That was part of the special responsibility of the Government of a Trust Territory; indeed, his Govern-

ment would be prepared to consider making arrangements for the designation of an officer who, within the Tanganyika Government Information Service, would have the special task of distributing information about the United Nations and would correspond direct with the Office of Public Information in New York regarding material for distribution. Such an arrangement would not entail any additional cost to the United Nations, the limited budgetary resources of which would thus be available for the effective promotion of public information programmes elsewhere. The Government of Tanganyika was mindful of the provisions of the sixth paragraph of the preamble of General Assembly resolution 1335 (XIII) and was fully prepared to co-operate with the Secretary-General. The decision of his Government whether or not to ask for the establishment of information centres in either of the Trust Territories under its administration would be determined in the light of all those considerations; for the present, it seemed unnecessary. (Same, p. 475)

#### UNITED STATES (Sisco) April 21, 1958

Another fundamental worth mentioning is that the primary tools of the United Nations today are persuasion, exhortation, negotiation, and conciliation—backed by world opinion. While the influence of world opinion is far from negligible, member states can give it due weight or flout it. Negotiations can be promoted by world opinion or can be made more difficult by it. World opinion can unite states on crucial issues. It also can divide them. . . .

It is too seldom realized that the source of political authority, whether national or international, is the public opinion behind it. The power of the sword, the power of the purse, the power of the laws—these are basic political powers. But in the last analysis they are probably dependent on the power of the word.

The United Nations provides the United States with maximum opportunity to put forward the American point of view and to influence the views of other states. . . .

It is true, of course, that Communist spokesmen also use the United Nations platform. We need not be defensive about the fact that the Soviet-bloc spokesmen use the organization as a sounding board for the Communist line. The important point about the United Nations forum is that it is one in which we can immediately and forcefully answer Communist claims. The ability to meet and defeat Communist propaganda on an intellectual level in the United Nations is a source of real strength and support for us wherever men are able to listen.

—Address before the McBride Lecture Foundation at Western Reserve University, DSB, XXXVIII (June 9, 1958), 973-74, 976-77.



## Secretariat

UN (Secretary-General) August 20, 1959

In considering the evolution of procedures of the principal United Nations organs, attention may also be given to the developing functions of the Secretariat. There have been, in the first place, various decisions taken in recent years by the General Assembly or the Security Council under which the Secretary-General has been entrusted with special diplomatic and operational functions, which he is responsible for carrying out within the wide framework of general terms of reference laid down in the resolutions and, naturally, in the Charter itself. This, also, represents an evolution of the procedures of the United Nations for which no explicit basis is to be found in the Charter—although it may be said to fall within the scope of the intentions reflected in Article 99—and to which neither the League of Nations, nor the United Nations during its earlier years, presented a significant counterpart. These decisions should not, of course, be considered as setting precedents changing the constitutional balance among the various organs of the United Nations. However, they have pointed to the possibility of developing new methods of approach of great practical significance, which, after the thorough testing needed, may become part of a common law of organized international cooperation.

It should also be noted that in some recent cases of international conflict or other difficulties involving Member States the Secretary-General has dispatched personal representatives with the task of assisting the Governments in their efforts. This may be regarded as a further development of actions of a "good offices" nature, with which the Secretary-General is now frequently charged. The steps to which I refer here have been taken with the consent or at the invitation of Governments concerned, but without formal decisions of other organs of the United Nations. Such actions by the Secretary-General fall within the competence of his Office and are, in my view, in other respects also in strict accordance with the Charter, when they serve its purpose. As a matter of course, the members of the appropriate organ of the United Nations have been informed about the action planned by the Secretary-General and were given an opportunity to express views on it. These cases also should not be considered as setting precedents, especially as it always remains open to the appropriate organs to request that such an action, before being taken by the Secretary-General, be submitted to them for formal decision. However, in these cases too, what has been tried may provide experiences on which, later, stable and agreed practices may usefully be developed. The main significance of the evolution of the Office of the Secretary-General in the manner referred to above lies in the fact that it has

provided means for smooth and fast action, which might otherwise not have been open to the Organization. This is of special value in situations in which prior public debate on a proposed course of action might increase the difficulties that such an action would encounter, or in which a vacuum might be feared because Members may prove hesitant, without fuller knowledge of the facts or for other reasons, to give explicit prior support in detail to an action which, however, they approve in general terms or are willing should be tried without formal commitment.

It goes without saying that none of the developments to which I have referred has changed the basic character of the Office of the Secretary-General, or its place in the Organization in relation to the General Assembly, the Security Council or other main organs. They represent, from a constitutional viewpoint, an intensification and a broadening of the interplay between these main organs and the Secretariat for purposes for which these organs maintain their primary responsibility. Thus, the wider functions which in specific cases have been exercised by the Secretary-General fully maintain the character of the United Nations as an organization whose activities are wholly dependent on decisions of the Governments. On the other hand, the development reflects an incipient growth of possibilities for the Organization to operate in specific cases within a latitude of independence in practice given to it by its Member Governments for such cases.

(UN. GA. 14th. ORs. Suppl. No. 1A, p. 3)

UN (Secretary-General) September 29, 1959

18. The creation of the unified Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in which the technical assistance activities of the Organization are being integrated with the Secretariat's substantive work in the economic and social field, has proceeded in accordance with the steps outlined in my report to the General Assembly last year. On 1 February 1959 the unified Department came into being, composed of organizational units of the Department as it had previously existed together with a Commissioner for Technical Assistance (who assumed his duties on 1 March 1959) and a Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations. At the same time an Office for Public Administration was established, to which the functions of the Public Administration Division of the Technical Assistance Administration were transferred.

19. The first objective of the merger has been achieved. There is now a single center for the determination of basic policy in the economic and social field, whether the questions arise from normal research and the servicing of the Council and its Commissions or whether they arise from Technical Assistance operations, including our dealings with individual governments and with TAB and TAC. The timing of this

policy centralization is fortunate, since it can extend now to the participation of the United Nations in the operations of the Special Fund.

20. . . . There is [also] . . . improvement [in involving] . . . the substantive staff in technical assistance programming . . . especially [in] . . . industrialization and resource development. —Statement to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. Press Release SG/858, pp. 6-7.

#### U.S.S.R. (Levyckin) December 5, 1958

The Soviet delegation, like many other delegations in the Fifth Committee during the discussion on geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat of the United Nations, made a number of critical remarks addressed to the Secretary-General.

It was pointed out that in the practical activity of the Secretary-General, Article 101 of the Charter was being violated. . . . and as a result the existing United Nations staff does not properly reflect its international character, which hampers the objectivity of its activity. Almost all key posts in the Organization's machinery are occupied by United States citizens and by citizens of NATO and SEATO countries. On the United Nations staff, Asian, African and some Latin American countries are only very sparsely represented, even though the role and significance of these countries have grown considerably in international life. Particularly noteworthy are the deliberate and artificial limitations imposed on the recruitment of USSR citizens and citizens of other socialist countries to posts in the Secretariat despite the well-known active role of the Soviet Union in international life, and its large percentage contribution to the budget of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the number of Soviet citizens on the United Nations staff is only 2.5 per cent of the total number of staff members recruited on an international basis. These Soviet employees are not to be found in key posts in such departments as the Office of Personnel.

(UN. GA. 13th. Doc. A/PV. 782, pp. 61-62)

#### UNITED STATES (Lodge) September 2, 1958

Looking for a moment at the internal setup of the United Nations, it is good to be able to report to the American Legion, which takes such an active part in the struggle against communism, that every single American employed by the United Nations has been screened in accordance with procedures prescribed by the FBI and the United States Civil Service Commission—for the good and sufficient reason that, when there are so many patriotic American from which to choose, there is no excuse whatever for employing one single American Communist. —Address before the 40th Convention of the American Legion, DSB, XXXIX (September 22, 1958), 449.

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